ASEAN often says “don’t make us choose“, and yet some of the region’s sharpest observers say its states are move to China and far from the United States, particularly in the economic and diplomatic fields. Washington, meanwhile, finds itself with a shrinking traditional security portfolio. Many now believe that the contested and fast-growing market Southeast Asia region could drift towards a Chinese-led order.
This argument captures a real trend. China is now influential enough that US presumption in Asia, in general, is casually assumed. it’s over. Considering China significantly increased economic weight since the 1990s, this is hardly surprising. However, the end of American primacy does not necessarily mean a defeatist acceptance of its replacement by Chinese hegemony.
To begin with, Chinese influence has grown unevenly across ASEAN and has been most effective in countries where US grand strategy has the least influence: Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. This is not to say that these countries are unimportant; their future matters. However, in the context of strategic competition and regional balance of influence, ASEAN states do not have the same weight. American regional interests are more linked to the orientations of Malaysia, Thailand, and especially the “VIPS”: Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore.
Most importantly, Washington can plausibly deny Beijing’s dominance and ensure that Southeast Asia remains free and open, not forced to choose. To do this, it must reinvigorate burgeoning regional minilateral networks and reach out to allies in Northeast Asia and beyond.
Strong allies: Washington’s latent advantage
A bipolar conception of the Southeast Asian order ignores the fact that ASEAN has other external partners. Fortunately for Washington, the other most influential Pacific allies are Japan, South Korea and Australia. The Lowy Institute Southeast Asian Influence Index shows that the balance of influence shifts dramatically if one measures China against a latent US-led minilateral bloc rather than against the United States alone.
Economically, China leads the United States trade partner for ASEAN as a whole and for each major regional state. China also has overinvested in the United States in almost all Southeast Asian states since 2015. The United States and its allies together, however, surpass China as a trading partner and source of investment for ASEAN as a whole and for all major states in the region, with the exception of trade, but not investment, for Indonesia.
Allies mitigate Washington’s other weaknesses. On the diplomatic level, China’s total bilateral dialogues with ASEAN states more than doubles the United States’ total, but the allies’ combined total is more than double that of China. Socially, Southeast Asia sends more students at Chinese universities than in the United States, but Australia alone surpasses China. China attracts Southeast Asia online searches than the United States, but Japan surpasses all superpowers. In terms of security, which remains the main advantage of the United States, developments in Korean arms sales has Japanese access agreements has Australian defense pacts make Southeast Asia less automatically dependent on China if the United States grows unreliable.
Beyond additional weight, Washington should approach ASEAN in a minilateral manner, because it appeals more than the United States alone. Survey data And regional commentary consistently show that Southeast Asians trust Japan more than the United States and China. South Korea, although still a mature power, is perceived as attractive and benign. Australia presents a plus measured, integrated and consultative Western presence.
A Handbook for a Free and Open Southeast Asia
Of course, a US-Japan-South Korea-Australia bloc is not a unitary actor. Governments have different perceptions of threat, Chinese positions, and domestic political and economic considerations. South Korea was particularly hesitant adopt minilateralism or antagonize China, and holds grievances against Japan. However, these discrepancies are manageable. All four states seek resilience supply chainsto prioritize freedom of navigationand are opposite to Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific. Seoul’s capabilities and Ties to Southeast Asia, especially with Vietnam, meanwhile, are too robust to be neglected, and its relationship with Tokyo is improves quickly.
However, developing a minilateral strategy for Southeast Asia is not simply about measuring the influence of each ally. Without coordinationthe whole is less than the sum of its parts. This strategy to negate creeping Chinese hegemony is feasible but not self-executing.
First, while the United States and its allies should build closer ties with all ASEAN members, they should prioritize VIPS. Within this group, the apparent drifting towards China is particularly concerning – even with the recent American security agreement. Here the merits of minilateralism are obvious, as Tokyo, SeoulAnd Canberra have all strengthened their ties with Jakarta in specific and significant areas.
Second, whether the United States actively leads or delegates day-to-day management, probably in Japanthis commitment must extend beyond the portfolio with a strong security component, especially in economics. THE Luzon Economic Corridor (LEC) in the Philippines, with integrated Japanese participation, offers a model. Efforts in the LEC and Subic Bay would benefit complementary commercial strengths of South Korea. Making such coordinated engagement a minilateral enterprise and expanding it beyond the Philippines would go a long way toward addressing the United States’ greatest regional disadvantages. Providing Indonesia with alternative partnership options develop national downstream nickel processing and other minerals is a win-win candidate for this cooperation model.
Third, the United States should empower its allies to “carry the torch” on its behalf. The distance This prevents even senior committed U.S. leaders from appearing frequently in the region. This logic extends to links between people in general. Inevitably, Southeast Asian leaders and audiences will see their Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Australian peers more often than Americans. ASEAN leaders must be able to voice concerns and advance U.S.-related agendas in their meetings with their allied counterparts. Japan appears particularly well suited to such a role.
Making minilateralism work
In practice, jointly strengthening influence in Southeast Asia requires more regular consultations among allies, beyond the ad hoc hub-and-spoke model. Whether through a formal mechanism or improved iterations of recent developmentsthe group must identify opportunities, divide work according to its comparative strengths and amplify everyone’s initiatives.
Take the example of Indonesia. South Korea sells KF-21 fighter jets in Jakarta and developing electric vehicles investmentsAustralia brings geographical links including and beyond the Jakarta Treaty, and Japan is a Long-standing ODA and infrastructure chief. Korean-led supply chains, Australian-led maritime capacity building and Japan-led infrastructure should be collectively supported and integrated, not isolated. Such coordination will help the world’s fourth most populous country stay “free and active“rather than”somnambulism» to align with China.
More importantly, the United States’ neglect of Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific in general, where rhetoric goes beyond substancemust be addressed; the declared “pivot to Asia” failure is well supported. Engaging ministerially with ASEAN would reduce the US burden of denying Chinese hegemony. This does not mean, however, that Washington can simply hand over the task to its allies and engage as it sees fit.
To avoid ceding the regional balance of influence to China, a substantial American contribution remains essential. When Washington once again moves limited capacitieseven temporarily, towards other regions, promised initiatives turn offand individual leaders doesn’t seem interested in the Indo-Pacific and especially Southeast AsiaChinese hegemony may seem inevitable. Praise of Japan efforts to enter the breach appear insufficient, South Korea returns to outdated approach habits of small statesand “post-alliance” Australian voices seem more convincing. Greater allied minilateralism helps avoid losing Southeast Asia; This does not remove this task from the United States foreign policy council.
THE need a Southeast Asia’s minilateral, multi-domain, bloc-based approach is part of and reflects the Indo-Pacific dilemma and Washington’s grand strategic dilemma in general. Whether or not Americans should have sought 1990s-style perpetual global liberal primacy first, but that is simply no longer viable. But this brave new world does not mean that Washington must cede a key emerging region to its strategic rival.
Calls to allied scale to one Pacific Defense Pacta latent prioritya disciplined U.S. strategy can leverage domestic and allied capabilities and would serve core national interests far better than clinging to an outdated post-Cold War status quo or returning to hemispheric isolationism. Southeast Asia fits very well into such a strategy. The key is to frame the regional alternative to China not as the United States alone, but as the United States and its allies together.