Last year, as part of China’s 15th Arctic expedition, two of China’s manned submersibles, the Fendouzhe and the Jiaolong, carried out what the Chinese news agency Xinhua described as “joint underwater operations” or manned dives under the Arctic ice. This was the first time China had done something like this. For these dives, China brought two of its deep-sea research vessels to the region, which acted as motherships for submersibles. These submersibles then made more than 40 dives over a 56-day period in the central Arctic Ocean, some together and some separately.
As we discussed in a longer dissertation on the subjectThe tests were just the latest sign of the growing scale of Chinese scientific activities in the Arctic. There are many signs that China is increasingly seeking, among other goals, to develop reliable means to operate, communicate and navigate in the Arctic region, both below the surface and above. The manned submersible experiments can only be seen as an important step in this direction, reflecting China’s growing ambition and capacity to expand its presence within its self-defined “new strategic frontiers”.
Towards the “new strategic frontiers”
The polar regions (i.e. both the Arctic and Antarctic) and the deep seas are both part of what Chinese political vocabulary sometimes calls “thenew strategic frontiers» (战略新疆域). These are regions or areas of strategic importance that are opening up to exploitation thanks to technological advancements and towards which China is already planning the next phase of its development. economic expansion. In addition to polar and deep-sea regions, they generally also include space, cyberspace and artificial intelligence.
Although valued primarily because of their economic prospects, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) views the new borders as potential future areas of “military struggle” between the great powers. The PLA views recent technological advances in unmanned submersibles and underwater communications as open deep waters to military operations – perhaps even in a transformative way. The Arctic, for its part, is often defined in PLA assessments as a crossroads of air and sea power projection – a “dominant strategic height” from which the entire northern hemisphere can be brought into strategic reach.
Overall, China views the new strategic borders as future theaters of great power competition, where it must preemptively establish a strong presence and secure its interests. In this, the borders also represent an important dimension of China’s military-civil fusion policy, being regions in which military and civilian interests intertwine, and the advancement of related capabilities and technologies serves both purposes.
The Arctic Link
The Arctic offers a particularly revealing case for observing Chinese ambitions in the new frontiers since it is a region where many, if not all, borders – especially the poles, deep waters and space – intersect. Their interdependence is established in official Chinese policy documents, such as the 14th and 15th Five-Year Plans. THE 14th five-year plan from 2021 included a national R&D project specifically for the development of “deep water and polar technologies and equipment”, with one of the objectives being the creation of a “three-dimensional space-land-sea surveillance capability” in the polar regions.
These R&D priorities reflect China’s interest in becoming a major player on the Arctic border. They are also beginning to produce significant results: China has growing scientific capabilities in the Arctic thanks to its expanding activities. polar icebreaker fleet and research vessels, conducting annual expeditions to the region. The country’s scientific ambitions are also reflected in a growing number of research priorities for expeditions. Chinese scientists have been trying for nearly a decade to expand China’s space surveillance, navigation and communications systems to the Arctic region. More recently, expeditions have moved into deep waters, as China has tested a number of polar and deep-sea autonomous and manned underwater vehicles (AUVs) in the Arctic.
Interestingly, many unmanned vehicles have been developed by institutions in Harbin Engineering University. The university has close ties with the APL and has begun researching and developing China’s first advanced polar AUV in 2019. The final product of this project, the Xinghai-1000, was tested in the region during the 2023 Arctic scientific expedition. The stated goal of the project was to develop a tool for scientific research, but it also aimed to achieve many advances in construction technologies necessary for operating unmanned submersibles under the ice.
In subsequent years, China tested and operated at least two other types of AUVs in the region. One of them, the Wukong 6000, completed multiple dives up to 3,800 meters during its first tests in the Arctic in 2024. Tests of the manned submersible a year later went even deeper, as the Fendouzhe reportedly dove down to 5,277 meters at the Gakkel Ridge, an extremely difficult-to-reach mid-ocean ridge in the central Arctic Ocean.
China’s growing scientific capabilities in the Arctic
China’s activities in the Arctic This indicates that Beijing is taking the race for new strategic frontiers very seriously and is rapidly developing ways to access areas previously beyond its reach. THE increasing sophistication China’s “three-dimensional” observation capabilities in the Arctic further demonstrate that China is becoming a considerable “near-peer” in the region – at least when it comes to scientific and technological capabilities.
The military dimension is perhaps not far away either. China’s increasing investments in various polar and offshore equipment and areas of research such as polar acoustic have considerable dual-use potential since PLA and some of The greatest Chinese scientists working on these subjects recognize. Under-ice and deep-sea exploration activities further produce much highly relevant data (e.g. on ice morphology, underwater acoustics, and seafloor topography) for military operations in the Arctic, particularly submarine operations, although there is no evidence that China has operated submarines in the Arctic Ocean to date.
However, whether recent activities can be seen as a sign that China’s civilian and military presence will grow with technological advances in the Arctic remains open to debate. Ideally, in the future, China would like to see all of its scientific and technological resources come to fruition in the longer term. “three-dimensional” observation capabilities or presence in the region so that its activities in the region are not limited to seasonal expeditions.
But we may still be a long way off, because despite recent successes, China’s polar capabilities still lag behind in many areas. It is also likely that Arctic states will react strongly to any indication that China would like to strengthen its permanent presence in the region. However, the country’s scientific activities in the region require active monitoring, as there are many signs that they will continue to advance rapidly, also in the near future.