Andrew Marshall, the visionary founder of the Net assessment office now now now (ONA) in the Pentagon, noted: “The aim of net evaluation is to look at the situation as a whole and to assess the long -term competition between states.” He thought that the essence of net evaluation is to compare the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and vulnerabilities of both parties to determine the most effective means of achieving national security objectives.
The annual evaluation of annual threats of 2025 recently published (ATA) gives a overview of global security, reflecting the collective knowledge of the 18 intelligence agencies under the American office of the National Intelligence Director (ODNI). The section on China – occupying a quarter of the report – declares: “The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) probably makes stable but unequal progress on the capacities it would use to try to grasp Taiwan and dissuade – and if necessary, to undo – American military intervention.” The expression “unequal progress” deserves a more in -depth examination, because it highlights the weaknesses of China and the crucial opportunities for Taiwan to exploit.
For Taiwan, carrying out a clear assessment should shed light on its broader strategic planning and guide its purchases of military technologies, thus improving the country’s ability to dissuade, disrupt and defeat a Chinese invasion.
Understand the “unequal progress” of the APL
From the point of view of the United States, “unequal progress” reflect the fact that if the APL has made significant progress in certain regions of military modernization, it is always confronted with significant challenges in others. In other words, China is progressing towards its objective of detering American intervention and achieving its objectives in Taiwan, but this progress is not consistent in all areas. This imbalance creates strategic openings that Taiwan and the United States can exploit, in particular in the fields where APL’s capacities remain underdeveloped or are faced with significant challenges.
Although the classified version of the ATA 2025 is not accessible to the public, open source information highlights the specific weaknesses of APL’s military capacities that Taiwan could use strategically. Key vulnerabilities include areas such as control and control systems (C2), electronic war (EW), anti-missile defense and cyber war, among others. These areas are complex and interdependent, but even target one of them could undermine the operational efficiency of the APL. If a critical element remains untreated or low, it could create usable shortcomings in the military capacities of China. By making targeted investments in these areas, Taiwan can considerably improve its deterrence and strengthen its posture of defense.
Key areas for Taiwan’s strategic orientation
Order and control (C2)
The Center for Joint Operations of the Central Military Commission of the APL (CMC), located in the Xishan command complex in Beijing, serves as a central nervous center for APL operations. At the regional level, the command of the Oriental theater in Nanjing supervises military activities in the region which includes Taiwan. Although specific details on the communication infrastructure used by these C2 centers remain classified, it is known that the APL has transformed into communications into fiber optics and satellite for these centers in recent years. These systems, however, are not impermeable to electronic war disturbances (EW) and cyber attacks.
Taiwan could use these vulnerabilities by targeting APL key C2 nodes with the help of American technology, such as advanced EW tools and cyber capacities. By focusing on critical communication infrastructure, such as fiber optic cables and satellite earth stations, Taiwan could disrupt the command flow and create confusion in the decision -making processes of the APL. In addition, the exploitation of the weaknesses of the security of the C2 network of the APL, likely to make a jamming and cyberattacks, could considerably degrade the capacity of China to pursue a military campaign. This disturbance would delay or prevent the PLA from performing synchronized precision strikes, creating a critical window for Taiwan to set up a more effective defense.
Electronic war (EW)
In April 2024, the APL (SSF) strategic support force underwent significant reorganization, penetrating independent units through the branches of the APL. Previously centralized, the capacities of the Chinese EW have now been distributed in its air force and the navy, reflecting a broader trend of modern soldiers. Although this decentralization offers tactical flexibility, it also introduces coordination challenges and incoherent expertise. In comparison, while the American army has also decentralized EW capabilities, it did so in a more structured and coordinated way than the recent reorganization of the APL.
Taiwan can capitalize on these vulnerabilities by improving its own EW capacities to target Radar PLA systems, communication networks, C2 centers and anti -missile defense systems. By investing in the interception and advanced signal analysis, jamming technologies and EW operations compatible with artificial intelligence, Taiwan could disrupt the APL’s ability to effectively coordinate military operations. Consequently, Taiwan could create a technological advantage, degrading the capacity of the APL to establish air superiority and naval domination, two essential elements for any successful military campaign against Taiwan.
Anti -missile defense
The HQ-9B, HQ-19 and HQ-22 HQ-22 of PLA missile systems are presented as competitive with American American or Thaad anti-missile defense systems. Despite these claims, the APL has also acquired Triumf S-400 anti-missile defense systems from Russia to complete its capacities. In the current war in Ukraine, the American Atacms (Army Tactical Missile System) has demonstrated a remarkable efficiency against the S-400, not only destroying missile batteries, but also critical infrastructures such as aerodromes, command posts and logistics centers, forcing Russia to reposition its assets further on the first line lines.
Taiwan has acquired less than 100 Atacms missiles. Given APL’s strike capacities, Taiwan should consider buying a large number of ATACM, as well as precision strike missiles (PRSM) and Tomahawk (Tlam) on earth attack missiles. These long -range precision ammunition could target critical plans – such as naval bases, air force bases and ammunition and fuel installations – disturbing the tempo and the operational capacities of the APL. These offensive capacities would also serve as a deterrence, indicating that Taiwan has the means to respond effectively if China initiate an invasion.
Cyber war
Chinese pirate groups such as unit 61398 (Apt1), unit 61486 (Apt3) and unit 78020 reflect the cyber sophisticated offensive capacities of China. However, China’s ability to defend its own networks against prolonged and complex cyber attacks is described as “low to very low” by analysts affiliated to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). The global cybersecurity index of 2024, published by the International Telecommunications Union (IUT), also classifies China behind the Western powers. In addition, the cyber-defense mechanisms of China are still in the early stages of integration with traditional military operations, leaving potential openings for exploitation.
Basically, China’s dependence on Western technologies for its cyber-infrastructure creates inconvenience inherent in times of conflict. With the technological support of the United States, Taiwan could use these vulnerabilities with large-scale cyber operations and focusing on the Chinese command and central command, among others. By targeting C2 key systems and other critical cyber -drugs, Taiwan could disrupt China’s ability to coordinate and perform military operations, further improving its own deterrent strategy.
Strategic opportunities for Taiwan
In recent decades, the world has seen the military balance evolve in favor of China. However, Taiwan is not without its opportunities. Using a net evaluation approach and good strategic planning, Taiwan can focus on the areas where the APL remains vulnerable – such as command and control, electronic war, anti -missile defense and cyber war – and strategically improve its own defense.
Although the United States has been a supplier of key weapons in Taiwan, focusing mainly on defensive systems, it is now crucial for Taiwan to develop offensive capacities. Washington’s reluctance to provide long -range precision typing systems, stealth fighter and other weapons has disadvantaged Taiwan. Given the rapidly evolving threat against Taiwan, it is urgent for the United States to revise its too cautious position for weapons sales in Taiwan, supporting the island’s ability to impose significant costs on China in the event of conflict.
By strengthening Taiwan’s offensive capacities, the United States can help guarantee that Taiwan is not only able to defend itself but also dissuade Chinese aggression effectively. In the end, Taiwan and the United States must collaborate in the development of a strategy which includes both defensive and offensive capacities, allowing Taiwan to become a force with which it is necessary to count against increasing Chinese military pressure.