The negotiations of American president Donald Trump with Russia occur not only at the expense of Ukraine, but also have wider implications for China. Historically, the reverse was true – the strategic opening of Henry Kissinger in China contributed to the possible collapse of the Soviet Union. From now on, the Trump administration plays a game calculated with Russia, aimed at guaranteeing economic advantages such as cheaper raw materials while trying to reshape Sino-Russian relations. The objective seems to be to keep Moscow from Beijing away and weaken their growing alignment.
However, a repetition of the Sino-Russian split seems unlikely in today’s geopolitical landscape, because Russia and China remain skeptical about Trump’s erratic foreign policy and question the reliability of American commitments.
Trump’s confrontation position towards Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was a political shock for Ukraine and Europe. In particular, the Trump administration, whether intentionally or not, has adopted China’s rhetoric in the past three years, referring to the Russian-Ukraine war simply as a “conflict” and to promote peace by Negotiations with Russia. This approach was proposed for the first time by China in February 2023 and has since been aggressively pushed through the media and diplomatic channels controlled by the State, in particular the Special Envoy LI Hui. Now, the Trump administration has reconditioned this strategy in a more unilateral way, with a key difference – in the midst of the talks in Russia -US, Ukraine and Europe are widely excluded from the decision -making process. The fate of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine is discussed behind closed doors, without its participation.
A historical parallel can be attracted by the Yalta conference of February 11, 1945, when Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin determined the post-war order without consulting China, then weakened by the civil war. The requests of the Soviet Union were satisfied in the Yalta agreement, granting it control of external Mongolia, access to the ports of the Manchurians and the influence on the Chinese railway Changchun. At the time, Chiang Kai-Shek deplored that “China had really been exhausted in Yalta.” Today, Ukraine faces a similar situation, because its future is debated without its direct involvement. Although Chinese officials have not openly criticized this exclusion, they hosted an increase in the dialogue of Russia-US, signaling Beijing preference for strategic patience.
By labeling Zelenskyy a dictator, by attacking him on social networks, depicting Russia as a victim and demanding a reimbursement of $ 500 billion for American aid, Trump and his circle reported a spectacular change in the position from Washington. Rather than strengthening the resilience of Ukraine, the administration seems to favor the stronger links with autocratic regimes such as Russia while undergoing the democratic aspirations of Ukraine. This change does not take into account the sacrifices of the defenders of Ukraine and the values that the United States has long defended. In this new alignment, the United States and China effectively repel Ukraine in the sphere of influence of Russia, devaluing its European ambitions and sending a dangerous message: the sovereignty of Ukraine is negotiable.
A similar dynamic takes place in the Gaza strip. China’s “two -state solution” and the efforts to mediate between the Rival Palestinian factions were sidelined by the Trump administration, which is rather committed to “taking over” from Gaza. This position is likely to provoke Beijing, as the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman indicates, Lin Jian, who publicly expressed his opposition to the American approach. In Ukraine and Gaza, Chinese peacebuilding efforts have been largely compromised, and the Trump administration is unlikely to invite Chinese mediators to the negotiating table.
Strategic realignment: China, Russia and the United States
If Trump manages to forge positive relationships with Russia, what would that mean for China?
Teacher Feng yujunOne of the main scholarship holders in Russia at the University of Beijing, described Trump’s foreign policy as a chaotic mixture of mercantilism, populism, anarchism, conservatism, gangster style diplomacy and Opportunism – largely provoked by the ego and transactional competition. Regarding the relations of Russia-United States, Feng argued that the fears of real reconciliation are overestimated, citing structural contradictions and a deep historical distrust. However, he warned that Russia had historically been the greatest threat to China precisely when it claimed to be the partner closest to China. This historical model suggests that Beijing should remain cautious of any rapprochement of Russia-US.
Teacher Sisheng Zhao From the University of Denver echoed these concerns, noting that a relaxation of Russia-US under a second Trump administration could disrupt the “United” anti-hegemony “strategy. If Washington succeeds in keeping Moscow from Beijing, China could be more and more isolated in its geopolitical rivalry with the United States.
Wang HuiyaoAn eminent Chinese academic, suggested that Trump’s transactional approach promoting the economic conclusion of military intervention, creates both risks and opportunities for China. He maintains that this change could lead to a “new big triangle” involving the United States, China and Europe. On the peace plan of Russia-Ukraine proposed by Trump, Wang thinks that Putin is unlikely to accept it fully, in particular with regard to security guarantees. However, the remarks of the American Secretary for Defense on the involvement of European and non -European forces in the security framework of Ukraine present a potential opening for China to be committed by the peacekeeping mechanism of nations United.
China, as the largest supplier of United Nations Peace Soldiers among the permanent members of the Security Council, could play a role in post-war stabilization alongside India and Brazil. This possibility was explored by Zhou BoA principal researcher at the International Security and Strategy Center of Tsinghua University. However, Ukraine is unlikely that Ukraine accepts the presence of Chinese troops on its territory due to the widespread political distrust among the Ukrainian elites and the public, as well as the narrow links of Beijing with Moscow.
China’s European opportunity?
While Trump kisses Russia, China also strives to strengthen its position in Europe. During the Munich Security Conference of this year, the Chinese delegation, formerly seen with skepticism, occurred more effectively than their American counterparts. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi The advocacy for a multipolar world and its call for negotiated peace in Ukraine, which explicitly included Europe in the discussions, helped to fill the gaps between the decision -makers of Beijing and European policies.
This moment could present the opportunity for China to reconstruct relations with the EU, in particular because the transatlantic unity faces new strains. At the very least, China should launch a renewed charm offensive. Unlike Trump’s unilateralism, China’s conflict resolution format, the “Friends of peaceThe group, which includes the participation of the world South, can now earn more traction.
Observers of the Munich Security Conference also noted that the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen The speech has taken a softer tone on China this year. It recognized the need for Europe to adapt to the change in the global dynamics of power and stressed the importance of strengthening the strategic autonomy of the continent – alignment, to a certain extent, with the call of long -standing from China to a more independent European foreign policy.
The Ukrainian postman
Meanwhile, Ukrainian Minister for Foreign Affairs Andriy Sibiga met Wang in Munich, where the two parties reaffirmed their “strategic level” relationship dating from 2011. Sibiga extended an invitation to Wang to visit kyiv to discuss a just and lasting peace. However, this invitation was absent from the Official Ministry of Chinese Foreign Affairs statement. Instead, Reunion’s reading of Reunion has highlighted the reaffirmation by Ukraine to support the policy of China alone. Silence at the invitation was a notable omission which raises questions about the real will of China to engage under the conditions of Ukraine.
“We need your support”, Sibiga told Wang.
Will China intervene to provide real political support for Ukraine? A 2023 opinion poll showed that 64% of Ukrainians disapproved of Xi Jinping. However, if a survey was carried out today, it could reveal greater Ukrainian sympathy for XI than for the current American president.
Feng argued that China should focus on a long -term strategy rather than react impulsively to external events. He argued that Trump’s yield makes it even more difficult for Beijing to define his main national interests in an increasingly unstable world. Wang Huiyao, on the other hand, suggested that Trump’s policies could paradoxically defuse geopolitical tensions. If Trump continues to give priority to the economic interest of economic interest in the ideological confrontation, China could be able to take advantage of this trend to stabilize relations with Washington and explore new diplomatic agreements.
But will these agreements contribute to lasting peace in Ukraine?
Conclusion
The evolution of the dynamics of power between the United States, China and Russia reshapes the geopolitical reality of Ukraine. While Trump’s transactional diplomacy seeks to weaken the Sino-Russian ties, a real split remains unlikely given the deeply rooted mutual distrust. For Ukraine, its resilience remains its strongest asset despite its sidelining in key decisions concerning its future. Ukrainian national unity continues to strengthen, as well as the national status of Zelenskyy. Meanwhile, Europe has accepted reality that this war is, above all, a European problem – not global, because a large part of the world remains isolated by “a large and magnificent ocean”.