Pakistan’s ambitions to become a major defense exporter and influential player in Africa suffered a major setback in April as Saudi Arabia reportedly withdrew financing of the proposed project $1.5 billion arms deal with Sudan and urged Islamabad to end the deal entirely. The episode revealed the limits of Pakistan’s increasingly ambitious attempt to project power across Africa.
For Pakistan, the Sudan deal was seen as one of the largest arms export deals in its history and a gateway to African security markets. The package included a K-8 Karakorum light attack aircraft, hundreds of drones, armored vehicles and advanced air defense systems of Chinese origin flown across Pakistan.
The deal had the potential to transform Pakistan from a regional arms supplier to an important security actor in Africa’s conflict landscape. Saudi Arabia’s decision to withdraw reminded us that Pakistan’s geopolitical reach remains heavily dependent on external support.
For decades, Pakistan has sought to leverage its identity as the world’s only country. Nuclear-armed Islamic State cultivate its influence throughout the Muslim world. This strategy combines diplomatic engagement, military cooperation, training missions and support for causes presented as the defense of Muslim interests.
From supporting Arab states in conflicts with Israel to providing assistance to the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet occupation and supporting Bosnian Muslim fighters during the Yugoslav Wars, Islamabad has always presented itself as a defender of Islamic causes. The Sudan deal fits perfectly into this historical narrative.
Sudan represents a particularly attractive proposition for Pakistan. The two countries share notable political and historical parallels. Each pursued state-led Islamization projects. Both experienced the secession of major territories: East Pakistan became Bangladesh in 1971 and South Sudan gained independence in 2011. Both have grappled with insurgencies rooted in ethnic and regional grievances, and both have witnessed prolonged military domination of politics. These similarities created a natural basis for cooperation. More importantly, for Pakistan, Sudan represented a strategic foothold in Africa, an invaluable asset.
The agreement with Sudan was fundamentally about access to the African market for Pakistan’s military-industrial complex. Pakistan’s defense industry is increasingly looking beyond traditional markets in the Middle East and Asia. Faced with recurring economic crises, repeated IMF programs, foreign exchange shortages and limited industrial exports, Islamabad has sought to increase its defense sales as a source of hard currency revenue.
Sudan presented an opportunity to establish credibility in African defense markets at a time when sanctions, political restrictions or reputational concerns are holding back many Western suppliers. Indeed, success in Sudan could have opened doors to other markets in the Horn of Africa, East Africa and the Sahel, notably Nigeria and Ethiopia.
Last but not least, the agreement would have strengthened Pakistan’s diplomatic position among Muslim-majority African states and strengthened its influence in multilateral forums such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the United Nations. In this sense, the agreement with Sudan was more of an entry point than a one-off defense agreement.
The Sudan package also illustrates the increasingly interconnected strategic relations between Pakistan, China and Turkey. The inclusion of HQ series air defense systems highlighted China’s indirect role. Although Beijing avoids overt involvement in many African conflicts, routing Chinese-origin systems through Pakistan would have allowed China to expand its influence while maintaining plausible deniability.
Turkey’s interests were equally important. Ankara has become a major supporter of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and has expanded its political and security footprint across Africa. Pakistan’s support for the SAF closely aligned with Turkey’s regional agenda, particularly its support for political forces associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The convergence of Pakistan, China and Turkey has marked the emergence of an informal geopolitical axis seeking to increase its influence in the Red Sea corridor and the Horn of Africa.
Initially, Riyadh viewed Sudan through the prism of Red Sea security. Saudi policymakers were concerned about instability spreading across the region, threatening maritime trade routes and creating opportunities for rival powers. There was also concern about the growth Emirati influence through support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
However, as Western governments quietly discourage greater Saudi involvement in proxy conflicts in Africa, supporting a massive arms transfer in one of Africa’s most volatile wars is no longer viable for Pakistan. The Saudi decision to withdraw funding also reflects a broader recalibration of regional strategy. This suggests that Riyadh now prefers de-escalation and strategic caution rather than deeper involvement in external conflicts.
For Pakistan, the consequences of this cancellation extend well beyond Sudan. Reports say another proposed defense deal in Libya, worth 4 billion dollars, could also be at risk as Saudi Arabia reevaluates its commitments in Africa. Pakistan already book at least five cargo planes packed with weapons bound for forces aligned with eastern Libya’s authorities, led by military ruler Khalifa Haftar, in April 2026. If the Libya deal also fails, it would completely derail Islamabad’s ambition to establish itself as a security player on the African continent.
More importantly, this setback highlights Pakistan’s fundamental weakness in its geopolitical aspirations. Ambitious foreign initiatives that rely on financial support from the Gulf or other partners are doomed to failure, as they will also depend on the changing priorities of these partners. Without any external support, Islamabad does not have the economic resources to support large-scale strategic projects abroad. This dependence limits Pakistan’s ability to shape outcomes in regions where it seeks to exert independent influence.
The episode also raises questions about the future viability of Pakistan’s defense export strategy. Despite increasingly sophisticated military hardware and a growing defense industrial base, securing politically and financially sustainable markets in Africa will remain a challenge.
The wider implications for Africa are also worrying. The conflict in Sudan has already displaced millions of people and generated one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. The influx of drones, aircraft, air defense systems and advanced armored vehicles would likely have intensified the conflict and encouraged rival external actors to increase their support for opposing factions.
The result could have been a protracted proxy war involving the Gulf states, Turkey, China and other regional players, transforming Sudan into another arena of geopolitical competition similar to that of Yemen. Saudi Arabia’s withdrawal could therefore reduce the immediate risk of a major military escalation. But it also highlights how African conflicts are now intertwined with broader Middle East rivalries.
The failure of the Sudan arms deal represents a strategic setback for Islamabad’s attempt to translate Islamic solidarity, military exports and regional partnerships into lasting influence across Africa. This episode serves as a reminder that even as Pakistan’s aspirations in Africa grow, its ability to realize them remains limited by economic weakness, dependence on external financing, and the shifting priorities of its most important allies. Hopefully, this setback will also serve as a sobering lesson that strategic ambitions are difficult to achieve when they rely heavily on capabilities borrowed from external actors. The question is whether Pakistan will learn.