Europe is trying to distance itself from China, continuing its quest for economic and industrial autonomy which has been underway for several years, but with mixed results. Like the United States, the European Union aims to reduce its dependence in Beijing in the key strategic sectors and to limit the influence of China on the political and economic dynamics of the continent.
The most recent confirmation of this descending trajectory in bilateral relations is the corruption scandal that has engulfed Huawei in Brussels. The Chinese technology giant is at the center of a sprawling investigation which extends from the Belgian capital in Portugal, which has already led to the detention of four individuals Accused of illicit corruption and lobbying to promote the interests of Huawei in European institutions.
According to the first conclusions of the office of the Belgian federal prosecutor, and in addition reported by the survey point of sale follow the moneyLobbyists with links with Huawei would have offered gifts – smartphones, tickets for football matches and other events, and travel benefits – in exchange for political support, in particular with regard to the deployment of 5G infrastructure in Europe. The case would have involved more than 40 current and former members of the European Parliament. He brought an already disturbing two years after the infamous 2022 Qatargate Corruption scandal which seriously damaged the credibility of the Parliament.
The EU’s response to the new scandal was rapid. Huawei lobbyists have been prohibited of all the premises of the European Parliament and the Commission. A week later Digitaneurope – One of the main associations of the continent technological industry – has also suspended members of the company. However, beyond the judicial aspect, this scandal represents another symbolic step in the worsening of the relationship between Brussels and Beijing.
Huawei has long been the visible face of the growing – and controversial – presence of China in Europe. According to lobbyfactsBetween 2018 and 2020, the company spent around $ 3 million a year for lobbying, which later brings together this figure at $ 2 million, while keeping a regular team of a dozen full -time lobbyists and organizing numerous meetings with EU officials. However, this soft power strategy began to show its limits in the face of growing political distrust, especially since European attitudes towards the growing influence of China become more cautious.
Although never definitively proven, suspicion remain that Huawei technologies could serve as wanderings for Chinese state surveillance. This fear alone has been sufficient to push several EU member states to limit the role of the company in strategic infrastructure. The last scandal only strengthens this trend, because dozens of deputies of deputies have now called for the ban on Huawei apparatus in institutional environments, reflecting earlier moves against Tiktokwhose deputies were prohibited from downloading from work devices.
In this broader context of EU’s concern about China, the role of the United States is anything but marginal. Washington has long exerted pressure on its European allies to align itself with its strategy of containing China, especially in the high -tech sectors. The chip war, export restrictions on sensitive technologies and control of critical supply chains are only some of the tools used by the United States, which urges Europe to adopt a firmer position towards Beijing.
Donald Trump’s election has still complicated the photo. On the one hand, the new administration of the White House should maintain strategic competition with China at the center of American foreign and commercial policy, by maintaining – and even tighten – Existing export restrictions and rates. This could in turn put pressure on European companies to reduce their links with China, fearing secondary sanctions or the exclusion of chains of transatlantic value. An example of such is the Italian Pirelli, which, under government pressure and in anticipation of a more difficult international climate, seeks to limit the influence and access to sensitive data from Sinochem, the Chinese company which has important participation in the company. This decision reflects a broader European trend towards deactivating relations with China.
On the other hand, Trump introduces a Strong element of uncertainty in transatlantic relations. His unpredictable approach, combined with openly antagonistic rhetoric towards Brussels – including the prices and criticism of NATO allies – could lead certain European actors To reconsider their position on China as geopolitical counterweight. Indeed, despite the current tensions, the economic relationship between Europe and China remains important. In 2023, China was among the largest EU business partners, with a total exchange for around 739 billion euros. However, balance is strongly biased in favor of China, which enjoys a profession surplus exceeding 290 billion euros.
In addition, the Chinese presence of companies in Europe remains vast, especially in the infrastructure, energy and automotive sectors. Chinese direct investments in Europe amounted to 6.8 billion euros in 2023, according to data from the Rhodium group. Many of these investments have raised concerns about strategic dependence and technological property within the EU. However, in the context of a volatile American ally, Beijing can start again to be perceived once again as a more pragmatic and manageable economic partner – at least in certain European circles. However, this dynamic could further deepen internal divisions within the EU between pro-Atlantic countries firmly and those more inclined to an autonomous foreign policy course.
In this regard, one of the most controversial areas of China-EU relations remains electric vehicles. At the end of 2023, the European Commission launched an anti-subvente survey In Chinese car manufacturers, suspecting them of benefiting from unfair interior subsidies which allow them to undermine European competitors. The concern is that Beijing floods the European market with low -cost vehicles to quickly gain market share, thus weakening the local automotive industry.
In response, several Chinese companies – including Byd and SAIC – have accelerated plans to establish production facilities directly in Europe. This strategy is both political, aimed at presenting themselves as cooperative employers generating local and economic jobs, seeking to bypass potential future prices and strengthen their foot on the continent. Byd, in particular, announced the construction of a Major plants in Hungary – which could soon be under probe by EU institutions – in a clear signal that China does not intend to give up access to the European market.
In short, the times are complicated and the future of China’s ties seems difficult to predict. And while Huawei is today a symbol of an increasingly isolated China in the heart of Europe, it remains to be seen whether Europe’s economic pragmatism will resist the geopolitical order changing by Trump’s Washington.