Five years ago, I wrote an article arguing that the Indonesian government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic was undermined by its anti-expertise and anti-science attitude. Today, such an attitude is widespread in all sectors of the current government of President Prabowo Subianto.
The current “Red and White Cabinet” clearly demonstrates this anti-expertise sentiment. The cabinet is filled with ministers without expertise in their respective portfolios, with a lack of relevant training and experience. Their lack of expertise has already had far-reaching consequences.
Take for example the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sugiono. Before him, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) had been led by career diplomats for most of its history, including over the past 20 years. The foreign ministers of this period – Hassan Wirajuda, Marty Natalegawa and Retno Marsudi – all held university degrees in international relations or international law, had served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for decades, and had led diplomatic missions to other countries as Indonesian ambassadors. Their education and experience developed their ability to become the country’s top diplomat.
Compare this to Sugiono. Before being appointed minister, his previous career included a two-year military service during which he rose to the rank of first lieutenant, Prabowo’s personal secretary and a member of Prabowo’s Gerindra political party. He holds a bachelor’s degree in computer science and a master’s degree in business and management, neither of which is directly related to his work at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His only encounter with foreign affairs was during his term as a deputy between 2019 and 2024, during which he was assigned to the first committee of the House of Representatives (DPR) responsible for overseeing foreign affairs.
Sugiono’s tenure as foreign minister was therefore disastrous. Just one month after his appointment, in November 2024, Indonesia issued a joint statement with China in which the two countries agreed on “joint development in areas of overlapping claims” in the South China Sea. This statement was widely seen as a mistake, as Indonesia had long had the status of a “non-claimant” state and had never recognized the existence of overlapping maritime boundaries with China.
Sugiono’s other mistake was leaving ambassadorial positions in several friendly countries and international organizations, such as the United Nations, vacant for months in mid-2025. This damaged Indonesia’s strategic bargaining power, amid geopolitical tension at the time. Only after careful consideration by the DPR’s first commission did Sugiono promise to immediately fill the vacant ambassadorial positions.
His most recent mistake was to delay the process of receiving the credentials of newly appointed foreign ambassadors by several months, until mid-2026. This prevented these ambassadors from carrying out their official diplomatic work in Indonesia. It was only after criticism from former Deputy Foreign Minister Dino Patti Djalal that the government organized an official ceremony to receive the credentials of these envoys.
Sugiono made many other mistakes, but the lack of expertise goes well beyond him. Another glaring example is that of the current Minister of Forestry, Raja Juli Antoni, who has no relevant training or experience in forestry. His previous career was in a religious non-governmental organization called Muhammadiyah, the Indonesian Solidarity Party, and served as Deputy Minister of Agrarian Affairs and Land Planning in 2022-2024. He holds a doctorate in political science and international studies, but in no discipline related to forestry.
Much like Sugiono, Raja Juli’s lack of expertise led to mistakes. The 2025 floods and landslides in North Sumatra, which left more than 1,000 dead, 140 people missing and more than a million displaced, were attributed to massive deforestation on the company’s concession lands. Deforestation was rampant before Raja Juli became minister, but during his tenure the Forestry Ministry continued to liberally issue forest management permits to many companies. An MP criticized Raja Juli for not understanding forestry.
The list of ministerial officials in the current government who lack expertise is long, but perhaps the worst example is the officials tasked with running the National Nutrition Agency (BGN), the agency created to provide students with Prabowo’s flagship free nutritious meals program.
When it was established in 2024, the officials appointed to run the agency were Dadan Hindayana as head of the agency and Nanik Sudaryati Deyang, Lodewyk Pusung and Sony Sanjaya as deputy directors. None of them have any training in nutrition or food safety: Dadan is an entomologist; Nanik is a journalist; Lodewyk is a retired Army general; Sony is a retired police general. This lack of expertise among BGN leaders has also led to disasters, as cases of food poisoning and mass hospitalizations linked to the free meal program have been reported almost every week. Dadan, Lodewyk and Sony were recently arrested over allegations of corruption within BGN in mid-2026, leading to Nanik becoming head of the agency.
Why did Prabowo appoint so many non-experts to strategic positions? Chances are it’s because he values loyalty and favoritism. For example, let’s take again Sugiono, who was nicknamed Prabowo’s “ideological child”. After graduating from high school, Sugiono received a scholarship from Prabowo to study at military universities in the United States. After his brief military service, Sugiono became Prabowo’s personal secretary in the early 2000s, well before the Gerindra party was established in 2008.
Similarly, Dadan Hindayana was introduced to Prabowo when the latter was looking for a plant disease expert to treat the plants at his residence. This led to close relations between Dadan and Prabowo. Dadan admitted that he expected to get a commissioner position in a state-owned company, but was instead appointed head of the BGN.
Meanwhile, Nanik Sudaryati Deyang, who recently replaced Dadan as head of BGN, has been a Prabowo loyalist since 2014. She became infamous for spreading false information about the persecution of Prabowo supporters during the 2019 presidential election.
The list of Prabowo appointees who got their positions out of loyalty, not expertise, is long. Some of these named stalwarts are alumni of Taruna Nusantara High School – a prestigious high school run by a foundation under the Defense Ministry that works closely with the military – including Sugiono, State Secretariat Minister Prasetyo Hadi and Cabinet Secretary Teddy Indra Wijaya, among others. In Teddy’s case, in order to enable his appointment as cabinet secretary, Prabowo revised the position so that it was no longer at ministerial level – something prohibited for active-duty military officers.
Besides Taruna Nusantara alumni, some other loyalty members are retired military personnel. When Prabowo’s cabinet was formed in October 2024, it included four ministers, five deputy ministers, one agency head, and five special advisers and agency heads who were retired military officers.
The phenomenon of the Indonesian government appointing ministers and other ministerial officials who do not have relevant experience for their ministry or agency is not something new, but the scale has surely grown significantly under Prabowo.
Of course, it is true that a ministerial portfolio is a political position, and there is a debate to be had about whether a minister should have technical expertise related to their portfolio. Some argue that a minister must only be able to lead and develop strategic policies, while also being able to be supported by a team of professional technocrats. However, recent controversies have highlighted that some ministries and technical agencies need ministers and agency heads who understand their sector.
To support ministers without relevant expertise, the government created many new deputy minister positions. Some ministries now have up to three deputy ministers. The current government has 54 deputy ministers, compared to 19 under the previous government.
Ministries with three deputy ministers include the ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Finance, as well as the now-dissolved Ministry of Public Enterprises. Does having many deputy ministers help establish expertise in these ministries? This is debatable, as Sugiono continues to make mistakes on foreign affairs. He even joked that having three deputy ministers was not enough.
The above examples show how the current Indonesian government has ignored evidence-based policy formulation by replacing technocrats and academics who have relevant training and experience with political appointees who lack the necessary skills regarding their portfolio and often ignore advice from experts. This is clearly a phenomenon of the “death of expertise” and the consequences have been disastrous. This diminished bureaucratic efficiency and weakened public trust in government.
To restore bureaucratic efficiency and public trust, the Indonesian government must return to respecting meritocracy in the appointment of civil servants. Government officials should be appointed based on their scientific background, expertise and integrity. The government also needs to involve more academic institutions, research institutes and technical bodies in policy making.