There is a sense in foreign policy circles that despite the unpredictability and radical changes in US foreign policy towards its allies and partners under President Donald Trump, the Philippines remains one of the few countries firmly aligned with Washington, as ASEAN member states calibrate their positions between the global superpower and the region’s dominant power – China.
Recent research reinforces this perception. In the latest Southeast Asian state public opinion survey conducted by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, respondents in the Philippines chose the United States over China by the widest margin among ASEAN member states – 77% versus 23% – when forced to choose between the two powers. The 2026 report also shows that across Southeast Asia, China emerges as the preferred choice over the United States, a reversal of the Institute’s 2025 findings.
Similarly, the Sydney-based Lowy Institute’s Southeast Asia Influence Index 2025 found that while China holds greater influence over the United States in the majority of ASEAN member states, the Philippines, alongside Singapore and Timor-Leste, were among the few countries where the United States ranked higher in all five measures of influence: economic relations, defense networks, cultural influence, diplomatic relations and regional engagement.
These results support the dominant narrative that while Southeast Asian countries look to Beijing or carefully manage great power competition, the Philippines remains firmly in the US column. This description only tells part of the story, however. Recent developments suggest that the Philippines has not forgotten how to protect itself. While maintaining its alliance commitments with Washington, Manila has deliberately sent signals of a more nuanced foreign policy posture – shaped by its awareness of the evolving strategic environment and the demands of its own national interests.
Firm on sovereignty, open to commitment
Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the Philippines has pursued a strong policy of defending its national interests, resulting in a more assertive posture toward China than virtually any other ASEAN member state. The reality of Chinese coercion on Filipino fishermen and uniformed personnel in the West Philippine Sea has hardened public opinion and strengthened Manila’s commitment to its maritime claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2016 arbitral award.
The Philippines’ transparency strategy has dominated the discourse whenever Philippines-China relations are discussed. But a strong stance in the West Philippine Sea does not preclude strategic cover elsewhere. In fact, it may be necessary, particularly when the changing strategic environment demands a recalibration of Manila’s approach. This has resulted in a posture that actively maintains its alliance with the United States while keeping channels of engagement with Beijing open.
A tangible sign of this came in January, when the Philippines announced a 14-day visa-free entry deal for Chinese nationals, in line with the president’s directive to facilitate trade, investment, tourism and people-to-people exchanges with Beijing. The one-year pilot project could be interpreted as a positive economic signal to Beijing in the context of the ongoing maritime conflict, consistent with the Philippines’ role as ASEAN chairman for 2026. It is also a way for Manila to subtly communicate its desire to separate the security dimension from the diplomatic and economic sides of the relationship.
A set of more significant developments followed in late March. In an interview with Bloomberg Television, Marcos acknowledged that there would be a “very serious restructuring” of the Philippines’ relations with China and the need to “redraw” Manila’s international relations amid changing geopolitical realities. He also reiterated that the Philippines has always sought to differentiate its territorial disputes from its trade agreements – a formulation that has long been the operational logic of Manila’s hedging strategy, even if it has not been openly stated before.
Days after the Bloomberg interview, the Philippines and China convened the 24th Foreign Ministries’ Consultations and the 11th Meeting of the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea on March 27-28 in Quanzhou, Fujian province. Both sides made progress on practical confidence-building measures, including coast guard communications, ocean weather and initial discussions on possible oil and gas collaboration. Previous foreign ministry consultations took place in 2023, making the Quanzhou meetings a notable resumption of high-level diplomatic engagement.
Practical pressures and the ASEAN Chairmanship
These recent developments occurred against the backdrop of a disruption in global oil supplies triggered by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The Philippine economy is reeling from this crisis, becoming the first country in the world to officially declare a state of national energy emergency in late March. In his interview with Bloomberg, Marcos noted that this disruption could prompt Manila and Beijing to explore joint oil and gas development in the South China Sea, describing an external crisis as an opening for greater bilateral engagement.
These economic openings carry added weight given the Philippine presidency of ASEAN in 2026. The country assumed the presidency in January under the theme “Navigating Our Future Together.” ASEAN leadership is placing Manila at the center of one of the region’s most important unresolved agenda items: a legally binding code of conduct for the South China Sea. Following the 48th ASEAN Leaders’ Summit in Cebu earlier this month, Marcos reaffirmed that the Code of Conduct remains one of the Philippines’ key aspirations before the end of the year.
Both the energy security component and the Code of Conduct rely on a functional diplomatic relationship with Beijing, thereby providing a solid foundation for the Philippines to pursue confidence-building measures in different areas of cooperation. As ASEAN chair, Manila also has responsibility for managing the regional bloc’s collective relationship with China – a role that requires engagement regardless of bilateral tensions.
An intact alliance, an evolving posture
Does this mean the Philippines is abandoning its alliance with the United States? Far from it. The Philippines-US alliance remains at a high point since 2016. The two countries just concluded Balikatan 2026, the largest iteration of annual exercises to date, involving 17,000 troops and representatives from five other partner countries. Prior to this, the United States announced the launch of a 4,000-acre economic security zone, which will be established in Luzon under the Pax Silica initiative. These are the most recent additions to a series of defense cooperation initiatives that constitute the deepening of security relations between the two allies.
What recent months suggest is that while meeting alliance commitments, Manila is simultaneously adapting to the demands of a changing global landscape and its evolving role in the regional security architecture, particularly when domestic pressures necessitate such recalibration.
U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration has introduced a degree of unpredictability that even treaty allies must now actively seek to manage. For the Philippines, this means navigating a more complex security environment that requires recalibrating its economic posture and managing its relationships across bilateral and multilateral networks. The energy crisis has only heightened Manila’s willingness to explore all viable options to meet the country’s energy needs, providing a practical basis for engagement with Beijing that goes beyond the contentious maritime security situation.
In other words, the Philippines is doing what small states have always done in navigating great powers: drawing clear lines, holding firmly to them, and preserving space to engage where interests permit. Manila has made it clear that any progress would be anchored in the country’s laws and would preserve its sovereignty and sovereign rights. What the Philippines is doing is calculated hedging – a rational response when elements of uncertainty and volatility are introduced into its strategic calculus.
Disclaimer: All opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect, unless otherwise stated, the official policy or position of any institution, organization, affiliated company, or any other person or entity with which he is associated.