Since the second Trump administration was inaugurated, the world has looked with a mixture of hope and anxiety while US national and foreign policies have moved away from the standards that have been established for a long time. The assertion of President Donald Trump according to which the United States has brought an excessive burden, as well as requests for larger contributions from Europe, Japan and other allies, and even comments that undermine the alliances themselves, shaken the unit which had been meticulously sought by the Biden administration. With his deep distrust of international institutions, Trump has already signed a decree that withdraws the United States from the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Meanwhile, the dismantling of the USAID has sent shock waves via aid sectors around the world.
For Asia, the most important revelation was the rejection by Trump of economic globalism and its clear inclination to protectionism. Prices are often considered as a form of “transactional” diplomacy: high prices could sometimes be threatened, but on condition that requests are satisfied, they are ultimately not implemented. Trump sent shock waves worldwide by announcing – then suspending – what he called “reciprocal prices”, which were in fact calculated on the basis of American trade deficits with its individual business partners. In a few minutes, Trump had shred down the free and open economic order supported by the Gatt / WTO system. These sudden changes in American economic policy have raised serious concerns in East Asia and in the regional industry, which is based on supply chains built on open affairs.
While China has achieved rapid gains, the United States remains the pre-eminent superpower of the world. To move forward, however, it is clear that the United States will continue its own interests rather than being the main pillar of the World Order, as it was throughout the post-cold period. It should be noted that this transition to the type of behavior historically more generally associated with large powers did not start with the Trump administration, but is in fact a long -term trend. However, Trump’s policies in particular overthrew alliance networks, international institutions, economics and universal values in several areas. They also explained how dependent Asia and the rest of the world were in the United States
With a rapid increase in uncertainty in the regional order in Asia, Japan and the Anase countries must work together more closely than ever. However, their cooperation does not change the reality that they remain strongly dependent on the United States. For its part, Japan is part of an alliance and strongly depends on the United States for its own security. Since the emergence of China as a major power, Japan has intensified security cooperation with the United States in a number of areas. The Philippines are also based strongly on the United States for Security, in particular compared to the other Anase countries. Thailand is an ally treated in the United States, while Singapore and Malaysia have worked informally with the United States in defense, seeking to maintain a continuous American presence in Southeast Asia as a China. However, no country is as closely aligned with the United States in defense as Japan.
There are significant differences between Japan and Southeast Asia in the field of values. Bilahari Kausikan of Singapore, former diplomat and well -known commentator, argued (in Foreign affairsFor example) that Trump’s efforts to dismantle democratic institutions in the United States are not a major concern in Southeast Asia, where skepticism towards Western values has always been present. Japan is different. While skepticism and resistance to a world centered on Western exist, post-war Japan has adopted the values of advanced democratic countries as a model. He reached these values to some extent and built a peaceful and democratic society. This achievement has now become part of the national identity of Japan. For many Japanese, it is difficult to turn away from what is happening in the United States, which they have long considered a model.
Tokyo now has to face a booming trade war between the United States and China, as well as net changes in American politics. Japan is not part of a regional organization like Anase, which acts as a buffer against external pressures and challenges. It is true that independent active diplomacy of the countries of the Anase, such as the adhesion of Indonesia to the BRICS, is notable, which raises the question of how much more centrality of the anase can be maintained. However, it was interesting to note that in February, Malaysia, acting as president of the Anase, alluded to the plans of an American summit aimed at expressing regional opinions on American tariff policies. Regardless of whether this initiative comes to anything, the countries of the Anase have at least one framework to coordinate individual opinions on external challenges and negotiate collectively with external powers. This is something that Japan is lacking.
While recognizing these differences, Japan and Anase must cooperate to create a highly predictable strategic environment in the region and work to keep the economic order as free and as open as possible. This will require a multifaceted and sophisticated diplomatic approach which consists in strengthening partnerships with major powers, intermediate powers and small countries. More than ever, it is essential that the countries of Japan and Anase strengthen partnerships.
Oba Mie is a professor at the University of Kanagawa.