The official story of China on the war in Ukraine has adopted three different themes over time which have sent contradictory signals, according to an analysis of state media reports and official declarations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
This reflects the competing priorities of Beijing in the conflict, according to experts.
Initially, after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022, Beijing officials sought to present China as a neutral power without any interest in getting involved. But a year later, they started to portray China as playing an active role as a peacemaker.
These two approaches were in contradiction with the coverage of war by the state media, which was sympathetic in Moscow. He portrayed the United States and Ukraine as an actors and Russia as a heroic victim protecting his security, according to a recent joint study by Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) and three research groups.
China’s attempts to play various teams are not surprising, according to experts. He does not want war to extend, but he does not want to criticize Russian President Vladimir Putin either because he needs to keep Russia on the United States and its world allies.
“Beijing ultimately benefits from an prolonged war which destabilizes the world economy and continues to present the potential risk of nuclear climbing and the propagation of conflicts beyond Ukraine,” said Patricia Kim, a Chinese expert in foreign policy in the Brookings Institution in Washington.
“At the same time, Beijing hesitated to reduce his support for Moscow and push Putin strongly to arrest his war, because China wants to keep Russia on its side while it turns to long-term competition against the United States and its partners,” she said.
First 100 days
A joint study conducted by AFCL, the Taiwan Doublehink laboratory, the Ukrainian civic organization detection project and the IRI Beacon research cabinet shows that the Chinese government has propagated coherent stories favorable to the justification of Russia for war.
Entitled “The invasion of Ukraine in a hundred days: a comparative analysis of Chinese and Russian war stories”, the study traces the common themes observed in Chinese and Russian accounts during the first 100 days of the conflict and notes that China has largely copied the Russian stories describing itself as a victim heroically opposing the opposition to the United States and the West.
In countries like China that have no free press, state -of -the -art policy and state media coverage provide a window on government priorities.
As spokesperson for the Communist Party, the media managed by the State such as the Xinhua news agency, the Global Times newspaper and video surveillance are used by the authorities to achieve political objectives and aim for a specific audience. They can target an international audience, a domestic country or specific countries.
During the first 100 days after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the Chinese media sought to position the country as a neutral player, highlighting Western support for Ukraine while minimizing its own links with Moscow, said Kim.
However, the media coverage managed by the state was clearly stored with Russia. He echoed the Russian stories on three controversial subjects: the theory that the United States had a bio-arme laboratory in Ukraine, the Russian massacre of civilians in the city of Bucha in March 2022 and the sanctions in progress against Russia, showed the joint study.
He also highlighted alleged divisions between Western institutions and the international community on sanctions against Russia.
Such opinions align with those of Moscow, but they also correspond to the domestic agenda of Beijing. The Chinese government has also sought to describe itself as a victim of Western hostility, alleging that the United States seeks to contain China and its ascent as a superpower – a line that Beijing has promoted among its people.
These stories contribute to an image of President Xi Jinping as a tough man who is ready to resist the West.
Chinese stories since May 2022
To examine the Chinese accounts on the invasion of Ukraine since May 2022, we have asked for data from Future Media and Disinformation Research Center on the way in which certain keywords refuse and circulate in Chinese public discourse.

From May 2022 to February 2023, references to Ukraine or Russia by the Chinese media and civil servants seem to have decreased. However, the number of references then jumped from February to April 2023 – with a new emphasis on China as a peacemaker working to prevent a chalet from the United States from extending the Ukrainian conflict.
The emergence of this account also coincided with a Xi State visit to Russia in March – its first since the start of its third year five years last October.
In many cases, this message has been disseminated by Chinese officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who tend to adopt a limited tone by speaking of more nuanced geopolitical problems surrounding the war.

China has also recommended peaceful war rules using other channels, including several position documents. Xi himself wrote an article published in the Journal of the Russian government Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in which he highlighted the role of China as a “peaceful”.
This change in account was followed by a telephone call between XI and the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky on April 26, the first direct communication between the two leaders since the war broke out. After the call, China reiterated that its “central position is to promote peace and promote talks”.
On the same day, China voted in favor of a request for the United Nations General Assembly which recognized the Russian aggression against Ukraine, fueling speculation according to which the position of Beijing towards the war has changed.

Despite the apparent change in Beijing position, some official media reports continued to disseminate the story of the United States as an agressor, as an article published by the Xinhua in February criticizing Washington to “always stir up flames in Ukraine”.
Articles of numerous chiefs reporting misleading or controversial declarations by Russian officials have been linked to specific incidents, such as the surprise visit of the American president Biden in Ukraine in February. An article indicates that the United States had become a direct participant in the war. Another article described Finland’s membership in NATO in April as a “deliberate violation of Russia’s security”.
Even if China continues to send mixed signals on the role of Russia in war, pragmatism seems to push the Chinese authorities to take a more active part to try to end the conflict.
Zelensky’s continuing will to engage in talks with Xi suggests that Ukrainian leaders hope that China will be able to play a role in negotiating a peace regulation.
As Kim says, “although Beijing can never be an honest broker, he always has an interest in seeing the end of the war and it is therefore logical for Ukraine and other states to encourage China to use its influence constructively vis-à-vis Moscow.”
Additional reports by Shen Ke. Edited by Malcolm Foster.
