Sino-US strategic competition has become the defining feature of international relations in the 21st century. How each power conceptualizes and pursues this rivalry, however, varies considerably, and these differences carry important strategic consequences. U.S. policymakers have generally approached competition within a framework that values clear alignment, incentivizing partner states to demonstrate their commitment to the U.S.-led order. Beijing, by contrast, operates with a considerably lower threshold: it does not require explicit alignment, only that states refrain from actively harming Chinese interests. Of course, Beijing is ready to reward those who will actively support its positions.
This asymmetry of approach is important. In the Pacific Islands, where strategic imperatives If sovereignty, development and non-alignment shape foreign policy choices, Washington’s framework creates frictions that Beijing’s more flexible posture does not create. Bridging this gap between how the United States frames strategic competition and the realities in which Pacific island states operate is essential to advancing U.S. interests in the region. Understanding how Beijing exploits this space is the first step towards closing it.
China’s approach
Beijing’s engagement in the Pacific is not based on entering into formal alliances, but on making non-alignment with the United States the path of least resistance. Through the Belt and Road Initiativebilateral aid programs and security arrangements deliberately structured around sovereignty and non-interference, Beijing offers Pacific island states tangible benefits without demanding ideological commitment in return. Beijing has been explicit about this posture, formally committing to “no political conditions are attached” to its aid and pledging to fully respect the sovereignty of the Pacific Islands.
China 2022 security agreement with the Solomon Islands illustrates this logic in practice. Honiara has secured investments in infrastructure, police training, and diplomatic leverage over its traditional partners, all without formally aligning with the United States. Although the aftermath included significant domestic and international political friction, which contributed to Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare’s decision electoral eviction in 2024many Pacific governments will understand the appeal of the Beijing model.
Indeed, Pacific island states are increasingly using this competitive dynamic to their advantage. advantageextracting concessions from both Washington and Beijing while resisting pressure to commit to either. China’s low threshold makes them blanket efforts are much easier to sustain, gradually eroding the strategic access and influence the United States depends on in the region.
The American and allied approach
Meanwhile, efforts by the United States and its allies to gain ground in the Pacific islands have focused on developing multilateral frameworks, which first require securing commitments from foreign governments declaring that they are “all in.” Perhaps the most striking example is the Indo-Pacific economic framework for prosperity (IPEF), where countries were invited to register even before the substantive details were drafted. Than 13 countries did signing up, without knowing what they will receive in return, is a strong signal of the current demand for U.S. leadership and engagement.
As another example, Blue Pacific Partners (PBP) was prima facie an effort to align foreign aid from external partners with development priorities endogenously identified and codified by members of the Pacific Islands Forum in the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. In function, the PBP was a signaling mechanism for external donors to align themselves with U.S.-led attempts to counter what Washington considered to be “secretive, coercive and corrupting“Beijing’s influence. In fact, the IPEF and PBP, and some would say the “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific, were largely seen as signs of U.S. concern over China’s rise rather than genuine interest in the region.
The problem is not only American. Compare the 2022 China-Solomon Islands Security Agreement with the 2023 Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union and the 2024 Nauru-Australia Treaty. These arrangements give Tuvalu and Nauru firm commitments from Australia to their traditional, environmental and economic security, at the cost of giving Canberra an effective veto over certain areas of those countries’ national security policy. Such initiatives, like the Compacts of Free Association in the United States on which they were inspired, begin with a mutual and exclusive commitment.
The road ahead
Indo-Pacific countries value their sovereign right to choose. Part of this means staying out of the position in which Washington feels it can assume its presumed support for every policy initiative it presents. Regional voices refuse be forced into a global rivalry that harms their interests. There has never been a better time for American foreign policy to be grounded in “realities of power and interests.“No matter how much one believes that the values of the United States and the Pacific behavethe success of the American strategy will depend on meeting partners at the level of interests.
One of the interests that the Pacific Islands share with the United States is to maintain relations with Beijing.not unnecessarily confrontational.” Certainly, they want the United States to compete with China, but in the sense that Washington aims to make its initiatives more valid than Beijing’s, not by treating every issue like a geostrategic football.
Pacific Islands, Indo-Pacific and the world at large I want fixed rules of the road and for the great powers to enforce them (including by their own example). A free and open regional order that preserves the sovereignty of all states is a public good that these countries desire, and they are willing to bear significant burdens to support it. However, they are reluctant to embrace policies that appear to have the sole aim of limiting China’s power. Limiting Chinese power looks less like a defense of the international order than an attempt by Washington to maintain primacy within that order.
The United States and its allies should focus on specific solutions to specific challenges. A counterintuitive example of this approach is the second pillar of AUKUS. Although the initial announcement that the UK and US would help Australia acquire conventionally armed nuclear submarines caused concern among some in the region, once the details became clear, the Under the leadership of Beijing anxiety has given way upon acceptance and even support. A few years after the initial announcement, the main question regarding AUKUS became which countries may be able to join Pillar II to co-develop emerging defense technologies.
Such a careful approach would allow the United States to draw stricter boundaries on issues where alignment is either unmistakable or essential. Such examples include economic sanctions, export controls or 5G infrastructure. The United States and its allies should stop losing sleep over Chinese companies building roads, airports and hospitals. They should focus their efforts on ensuring that their development assistance, including that administered through multilateral institutions, responds to local needs, follows transparent processes and achieves the expected effects.
In short, the United States needs to focus more on party planning and less on marriage proposals.
Finally, we offer a final warning regarding a disturbing reality. The United States will have to accept that the countries which most strongly feel the weight of Chinese pressure will hedge. This means that these countries will occasionally engage in behavior that undermines their interests in specific areas in order to avoid the appearance of widespread alignment. On a given issue, no matter how tailored to the strategic needs of partners, there may be countries that will withdraw simply to demonstrate their non-alignment, as a signal to both Beijing and Washington. American strategists must agree with this.