Trans-Pacific View author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers from around the world for their diverse perspectives on U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Looi Teck Kheong – specialist ASEAN consultant, barrister and advocate of the Supreme Court of Singapore and author of “The Enforcement Age: The Maduro Capture and the End of Strategic Patience” (2026) – is the 513th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series”.
Explain why the conventional definition of kinetic conflict in the Strait of Malacca is incomplete.
The conventional framework assumes that the Strait of Malacca only becomes strategically relevant during a direct military confrontation involving a blockade, mining activities, escalation of piracy or missile attacks. This vision is increasingly incomplete because modern geopolitical competition now operates as much through regulatory coercion, sanctions, inspections, insurance restrictions, and compliance fragmentation as through kinetic force.
Malacca does not need to be physically closed to become dysfunctional. The most plausible disruption scenario is political and operational rather than military. A confrontation between the United States and China over Taiwan or the South China Sea could generate incompatible compliance demands from ASEAN littoral states without a single missile entering the strait itself.
This transforms Malacca from an issue of freedom of navigation into a contested governance corridor. The critical vulnerability is therefore not only geographical, but also ASEAN’s capacity to maintain credible neutrality under simultaneous pressure from the two great powers.
This distinction is important because around a fifth to a quarter of global maritime trade and almost 29% of maritime oil flows pass through the strait. The global economy is more vulnerable to prolonged uncertainty and fragmented compliance regimes than to short-term kinetic shocks.
Describe the most plausible scenario for disruption of the Strait of Malacca and the key variables underlying this scenario.
The most plausible scenario is not a total closure, but a conditional transit.
A limited blockade of Taiwan or a sustained confrontation in the South China Sea could lead Washington and Beijing to demand selective inspections, overflight restrictions, scrutiny of goods, or port access limitations targeting ships linked to the opposing party’s logistics ecosystem.
ASEAN states like Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia would then face mutually incompatible demands. Conforming to one side risks being interpreted as aligning against the other.
The key variables underlying this scenario are:
- Intensity and duration of the US-China confrontation – if tensions remain episodic or evolve towards lasting strategic coercion.
- Degree of escalation of sanctions – notably involving dual-use technologies, semiconductors, energy cargoes and military-related supply chains.
- ASEAN political cohesion – whether ASEAN members can maintain a posture of coordinated neutrality or fragment into divergent national responses.
- Reactions from the insurance and shipping market – war risk premiums and liability uncertainty can disrupt transport rhythms even before physical threats emerge.
- Availability of rerouting alternatives – The Lombok and Sunda Straits offer alternatives, but with considerable costs, delays and risks of congestion.
In this scenario, trading does not stop immediately. Instead, predictability collapses. This is often more economically damaging than an outright shutdown, because modern supply chains rely on precision timing rather than simple physical movement.
Examine the strategic relevance of the Strait of Malacca in the Sino-American geopolitical competition.
The Strait of Malacca lies at the intersection of energy security, maritime trade and the Indo-Pacific energy projection. It is a central part of China’s long-running “Malacca dilemma,” which reflects Beijing’s concern that outside powers could threaten critical maritime lines of communication.
China relies heavily on the strait for energy imports and trade flows linking the Middle East, Africa and Europe to East Asia. Meanwhile, the United States views open maritime access and freedom of navigation as the foundations of the regional order it has supported since the end of World War II.
This creates an asymmetrical strategic reality. China sees Malacca as a vulnerability; the United States sees it as the guarantor of maritime openness. ASEAN sees this as an economic lifeline that must remain politically neutral.
The strait therefore represents more than a navigation route. This involves testing whether middle powers can preserve their strategic autonomy in a context of growing rivalry between great powers.
However, unlike the Cold War, the current struggle is deeply economically integrated. Both the United States and China are integrated into the same global supply chains passing through Malacca. This means that future competition will likely target selective disruption, regulatory levers and technological bottlenecks rather than outright prohibition.
Analyze ASEAN’s structural dilemma in handling a Strait of Malacca crisis similar to that of the Strait of Hormuz.
ASEAN’s structural dilemma lies in the contradiction between economic interdependence and geopolitical non-alignment.
The Strait of Hormuz model shows how strategic waterways can become conditional transit corridors shaped by geopolitical signals and selective authorizations rather than outright closure. A similar dynamic in Malacca would place ASEAN in an extremely difficult position.
If ASEAN states comply with US demands, China could interpret ASEAN as participating in containment. If they comply with Chinese demands, Washington could interpret ASEAN as a means to facilitate Chinese strategic logistics. Attempting neutrality on a case-by-case basis risks being accused of inconsistency or bad faith on both sides.
The problem is compounded by the absence of operational regional maritime deconfliction mechanisms. ASEAN has diplomatic forums, but no robust crisis management architecture capable of simultaneously managing pressure from major powers over maritime transport access, inspections and sanctions compliance.
This creates the risk that ASEAN neutrality becomes operationally impossible, even if politically declared.
The challenge is therefore not only diplomatic. It is institutional and structural.
Evaluate the three theoretical options available to ASEAN stakeholders in a Sino-US confrontation over the Strait of Malacca. What would be the commercial consequences of a prolonged standoff if deconfliction was ineffective?
ASEAN stakeholders are effectively faced with three theoretical options.
First, align primarily with US demands. This preserves relations with the dominant naval power, but risks serious Chinese economic retaliation and creating the impression that ASEAN is now part of a containment architecture.
Second, respond to Chinese demands. This could reduce immediate regional tensions with Beijing, but risks secondary sanctions, strategic distrust from Washington and investor concerns about political neutrality.
Third, attempt calibrated neutrality through selective or case-by-case enforcement. This is the most likely path, but also the most unstable, because both powers can perceive inconsistency as strategic manipulation.
If deconfliction fails, trade consequences could become severe even without formal closure of the strait.
These include prolonged port delays, insurance surcharges, blank crossings, diversions to the Lombok and Sunda routes and the disruption of just-in-time manufacturing systems in ASEAN and Northeast Asia. Semiconductor, automotive, energy and raw materials supply chains would experience a disruption in pace before a real disruption in flows.
The long-term danger is that companies begin to structurally diversify and move away from Malacca-dependent supply chains altogether. Once trust in the supply chain erodes, rebuilding it becomes extremely difficult.
In this sense, the greatest threat to Malacca is not military destruction. This is a gradual loss of confidence in the reliability of neutral transit.