Eight months after the eviction of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the chief advisor of Bangladesh, Muhammad Yunus, met for the first time on April 4 on the touch of the sixth summit of Bimstec in Bangkok.
The meeting was important. It was the first face -to -face meeting between the two leaders since Yunus took care of the interim administration in Bangladesh on August 8, and came in the midst of bilateral relations.
During the meeting, the two leaders raised their main concerns. Modi drew attention to targeting minorities in Bangladesh, while Yunus reiterated Dhaka’s request for Hasina’s extradition. After the meeting, Dhaka described talks as “very constructive and fruitful”, while India stressed that the two leaders had agreed that all bilateral questions should be resolved “by constructive discussions”.
The biggest achievement of the meeting has been that it happened, especially since India had been multiple cold of Dhaka requests for a meeting between the two leaders. Consequently, the Bangkok meeting was considered a icebreaker, “the first provisional step towards the repair of tense relations”.
The “long-awaited meeting” between the two leaders is “a positive sign for the Bangladesh-Indre relationship”, observed Daily Star in an editorial, adding that it “raises improved links” between the two neighbors.
However, such hopes were short -lived.
Three days after the Bangkok meeting, the Indian government announced the withdrawal of a transhipment establishment granted to Bangladesh in 2020, which enabled it to buy its export cargo to third -party countries via Indian Terrestrial Customs stations, airports and sea ports in India.
According to Randhir Jaiswal, spokesperson for the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, “significant congestion in airports and Indian ports”, which caused “logistical delays and higher costs” for Indian exports, was the reason for the decision. Apparently, Indian exporters have raised concerns concerning obstructed ports due to the transhipment installation given in Bangladesh and asked the government to act by interrupting these installations in the neighboring country.
This action occurred on April 8.
Although logistical problems and economic concerns can be the underlying reasons for the Indian decision, geopolitics has determined its calendar.
During his visit to China from March 26 to 29, Yunus made a statement that rushed the Delhi feathers. Stressing the landlocked nature in northeast of India, Yunus had stressed that the region had “no way to reach out to the ocean. We are the only ocean guards for this region ”. This “opens a huge possibility” for “an extension of the Chinese economy. Building things, producing things, marketing things, bringing things to China, getting it out in all the rest of the world, “he said.
The Indian northeast has been exhausted for decades, and Bangladesh and China have in the past have fueled these insurrections and provided groups of anti-Indian insurgents with weapons and a sanctuary. While most insurrections have calmed down, the situation in the northeast remains carried out. The region is the sensitive gentle component of India, vulnerable to interference by hostile foreign powers.
The Siliguri corridor is particularly vulnerable in this regard, a territory of territory which is only 22 kilometers to its widest and which is the only land bond in the northeast with the Indian continent. Bangladesh and Nepal share borders with this corridor, also known as “chicken neck”, with Bhutan and China a few kilometers away.
At the end of last year, social media was in fullness with information showing bangladesh recovery to revive an old air base with Chinese assistance in Lalmonirhat in northern Bangladesh, just 12-15 km from the Indian border and approximately 135 km from the Siliguri corridor. Although these reports were rejected as “false news” at the time, the problem again returned during the recent visit to Yunus in China.
Yunus may only have talked about economic possibilities. However, by referring to the northeast “without coastal”, he underlined the vulnerability of India in the region and the lever effect that Bangladesh holds there. Worse, he pushed India into his eyes by inviting Chinese collaboration at this stage of Indian vulnerability.
Yunus’ remarks were undoubtedly aimed at highlighting the Modi government that Dhaka had options other than India. There were cards – Read the porcelain card – to play and would not hesitate to do it if necessary. Indeed, Bangkok’s meeting is widely considered in Bangladesh as a victory for Yunus, his visit to China having forced the Indian Prime Minister to meet him.
However, the last round may have disappeared in favor of India.
Despite the handshakes in Bangkok, India then removed the transhipment facilities in Bangladesh in the days following the Bangkok meeting. Delhi struck the Bangladesh where it would really hurt – his international trade.
In addition, the decision to refuse access to Bangladesh transbridization goods to the Indian ports coincided with Trump’s announcement of a “reciprocal” rate of 37% on imports from Bangladesh. Although this has been arrested for 90 days, he plunged the Bangladesian economy in deep uncertainty; The United States is the largest single market in Bangladesh. India’s decision to close transhipment facilities in Bangladesh will have an impact on the latter’s trade, in particular with the markets of Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Europe. Bangladesh exporters “will now have to face more expensive, long and uncertain transport routes.”
This could lead to the closure of clothing factories, forcing hundreds of thousands of people.
By needle in India, Yunus may have won a little applause in Beijing, even impressed by the anti-Indian sections. However, he seems to have triggered a chain of events that could deepen the problems of Bangladesh and delay the normalization of relations with India