Afghan-Uzbek relations are expected to reach a new summit in 2025. Last year, the two countries objectives indicated to increase Bilateral turnover at $ 3 billion. The planned construction of an Uzbek shopping center, covering an area of 220 square meters, in Mazar-i-Sharif In addition to an effort to intensify the implementation of the Trans-Afghan transport corridor, could further consolidate bilateral pragmatic cooperation between the two neighbors.
Over the past three years, Uzbekistan has pursued a proactive foreign policy towards Afghanistan led by the Taliban on the basis of its own strategic interests. Tashkent’s lasting obsession for a security -oriented approach has been exchanged for a pragmatic foreign policy focused on the economy compared to Kabul. The adoption of a flexible and multivicious approach to its Afghan policy could lead to potential reputation risks for the international image of Uzbekistan. However, the current geopolitical reality and the historical links between Afghanistan and Central Asia underline the importance of the country for the priorities of the Uzbekistan foreign policy.
Historical context
The orientation of the foreign policy of Tashkent towards Afghanistan is largely concentrated in the northern provinces. Historically, both sides of the Oxus (Modern Amu Darya) were deeply linked by ethnic, historical and cultural ties. The Afghan provinces of Balkh, Jowzjan, Faryab, Sar-E Pol, Takhar and Kunduz, where a significant Uzbek community resides, have long been closely linked to the Mavarannahr civilization space (also called Transoxiana), whose heritage is presented to the outlet.
Certain Northern Afghan territories have maintained administrative and political links with the Emirate of Bukhara Until the end of the 19th century, stressing the longevity and depth of shared historical heritage.
This factor plays a crucial role in the training of contemporary Afghan-Uzbek relations, offering a basis for a sustainable partnership. Even during the mandate of the first president of Uzbekistan, when Tashkent officially showed prudence concerning Afghanistan, commitment with northern Afghanistan – in particular with the head of the Uzbek community, Abdul Rashid Dostum – remained stable.
Over time, cultural historical links have led to practical stages. A key contribution from Uzbekistan to the development of infrastructure in the region was the construction of the 75 km Hairatan-Mazar-Ii-Sharif Railwaycompleted in 2011 using its own funds. However, during this period, Tashkent’s priorities were mainly focused on security issues, and northern Afghanistan was considered a buffer area ensuring strategic stability along the southern borders of Uzbekistan from the early 1990s to 2021.
Economic context
Economic factors play an important role in contemporary Afghan-Uzbek relationships, moving attention from security problems. In recent years, Uzbekistan has actively expanded commercial and economic cooperation with Afghanistan, establishing a International Trade Center Ultimatelyz,, At the border, which considerably stimulated bilateral turnover. As part of the promotion of economic engagement, the plans are being studied to open a similar center in Mazar-I-Sharif, creating additional conditions to expand commercial and investment cooperation between the two countries.
Afghanistan, with its population of 41 million inhabitants, represents a promising market for Uzbek products. Currently, several countries – including China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates – are of interest in the Afghan market. Given increasing competition, Tashkent faces the challenge of maintaining and strengthening its economic position in Afghanistan at a time when others are almost the same thing.
While the provinces of southern Afghanistan are traditionally oriented towards Pakistan and its Western regions to Iran, Uzbekistan has the possibility of maintaining and extending its economic influence in the North. In this context, cultural and historical ties play a crucial role, promoting local preference for Uzbeks goods and services in northern Afghanistan. This factor offers Tashkent a strategic advantage in competition for the Afghan market.
QOSH-TEPA factor
The transformation of the Uzbek foreign policy to Afghanistan has manifested itself in its approach to the Qosh-Tepa Canal project. In particular, the Uzbek government has refrained from highlighting the potential water -related tensions that can result from the initiative. This meticulous approach can be attributed to the recognition that, with the aim of its own security, Tashkent has come to understand the importance of promoting economic development in Northern Afghanistan as a means of ensuring regional stability. Consequently, the dominant consensus in Tashkent underlines the prioritization of security by economic cooperation and socio-economic development strategies. Uzbekistan’s approach to the channel project undoubtedly demonstrates the evolutionary trajectory of Uzbek foreign policy towards Afghanistan.
In the meantime, the development of Agricultural and irrigation infrastructure in Afghanistan The northern provinces helps to improve the standard of living of local communities and thus strengthen bilateral relations between Tashkent and Kabul. In this context, Uzbekistan supports the implementation of the Qosh-TEPA project, provided that it meets international standards and standards, guaranteeing the minimization of potential environmental risks and long-term advantages for all stakeholders.
Gentle power
Uzbekistan has put significant emphasis on educational initiatives in Northern Afghanistan, considering them key factors in mutual understanding and eventually promoting regional stability. In this regard, Tashkent spared the construction of the “Khair al-Mudaris Imam Bukhari” Madrassa in Mazar-i-Sharif. The establishment should be built with financial support supported by the Uzbeks for an amount of $ 6 million and to accommodate 1,000 students.
Tashkent believes that the establishment of such a joint teaching establishment could facilitate the development of a unified approach to religious education, which will possibly minimize the risk of propagation of radical ideologies and to strengthen the spiritual security of the region. In addition, such a madrasse seems to promote a positive perception of Uzbekistan among the religious community of Afghanistan, which plays a crucial role in socio-political processes and governance. Thus, the involvement of Uzbekistan in the preparation of the intellectual elite of Afghanistan could become a vital instrument of its soft power strategy, contributing to the long -term influence of the country in the region.
Challenge
Although the Taliban seem to consider the growing interest of Uzbekistan for Northern Afghanistan as a positive development and recognize Tashkent as a key economic partner, several existing challenges could have an impact on the development of bilateral relations.
First, the conscious and subtle thrust of the Taliban to Change the ethnic landscape Northern regions of Afghanistan could move the balance of these provinces. Pachtounes, with their distinct cultural and historical history, can be less receptive to Tashkent’s initiatives in the region. In the long term, these developments could influence Uzbekistan’s strategic approach to northern Afghanistan and may require adjustments.
Second, Chinese influence in the northern regions of Afghanistan increases. Chinese investments in oil extraction Amu Darya Delta and the development of Wakhan corridor The project could potentially move local economic preferences in favor of China, which could affect the conditions of Uzbek investment in the region. However, this process could present possibilities for Chinese-Azbek cooperation aimed at transforming northern Afghanistan into a key transit center for international projects, thus improving the regional influence of Tashkent and making its economic interests progress.
Third, The implementation of international energy projects such as TAPI and CASA-1000 could lead to the reorientation of the Afghan Energy Market towards Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This, in turn, can reduce Uzbekistan humanitarian assistance in northern Afghanistan while simultaneously decreasing Afghanistan’s dependence on energy cooperation with Uzbekistan. A weakening of energy diplomacy could have an impact on the overall nature of bilateral relations.
Conclusion
Uzbekistan has recognized Afghanistan is a part of the larger region of Central Asia, at least in the speech. The main projects implemented and planned by Uzbekistan are concentrated in the northern parts of Afghanistan, stressing its strategic importance within the framework of the Uzbekistan foreign policy.
In particular, Uzbekistan’s approach on the Qosh-TEPA canal project as a development problem and a potential point for bilateral collaboration Sureweigh, at least for the moment, concerns about water safety. In this context, Tashkent’s policy extends beyond its traditional national security concerns to encompass wider objectives-improving regional stability and socio-economic development-which, in turn, contribute to the long-term strengthening of Afghan-Uzbek relations. In the end, channel water feeds the Uzbeks living on both sides of the border.