India’s current relationship with the United States is extremely difficult to classify in conventional geopolitical terms. It is neither an alliance in its traditional form nor a pure and simple rivalry. And it’s not a friendship marked by strategic intimacy. The India-US relationship occupies a delicate and ambiguous space.
The recent conflict in the Middle East has only exacerbated underlying tensions caused by very different regional priorities. Still, anyone looking for a practical story of a burgeoning or collapsing alliance would also be disappointed.
Let’s start with the last incident that shook up the relationship. Between June 8 and 11, US military forces operating near the Strait of Hormuz attacked a number of ships passing through this sensitive region. One of these ships was the oil tanker MT Settebello, which had two dozen Indian nationals on board. Unfortunately, three Indians died as a result of US military action. In another incident, another Indian sailor died independently of medical complicationsand his body rotted on the stranded ship due to the American blockade, which made his evacuation impossible.
When the Indian Foreign Ministry summoned the US charge d’affaires over the issue, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio replied that the United States would not allow the “illicit transportation of Iranian oil.” He added that “all commercial vessels should immediately comply with orders from U.S. forces.”
THE The American reaction angered many people in New Delhi and for good reason. The death of Indian citizens, intentionally or not, by a country presented as a strategic partner is not easy to dismiss with simple legal arguments and diplomatic platitudes.
For many Indians, the first comparison that comes to mind is an uncomfortable parallel: China’s reaction to the 1999 NATO attack against its embassy in Belgrade, which killed three Chinese nationals. At the time, there was little the Chinese could do to stand up to the United States, but they still managed to secure a public apology from President Bill Clinton and secure $32.5 million in compensation. So far, India has achieved neither. The difference is not lost on commentators or opposition politicians.
The Innocent raises a legitimate question: Does India’s much-vaunted “strategic autonomy” give New Delhi any leverage?
To be frank, the honest answer would be: not much. Just when India needs to demonstrate a more flexible approach than ever, it finds itself trapped in its dependence on Russian military equipment, advanced American technology, Chinese-made parts and Gulf energy imports.
However, it is equally wrong to interpret these developments as a sign of a fading Indo-US partnership. The Quad was seen by many as an obsolete platform, but the foreign ministers’ meeting held in New Delhi in May found much more than meets the eye. The foreign ministers of Australia, India, Japan and the United States emphasized practical cooperation and strategic continuity in an era of sustained great power competition. Cooperation on critical mineral supply chains, maritime surveillance, undersea cables, cybercrime and port development in Fiji may not seem like glamorous topics. However, they represent what a well-functioning partnership should do. Perhaps the point here is that the Quad should focus more on implementation and less on rhetoric.
It is also worth remembering why India and the United States initially came together. The structural dynamics of the relationship have remained virtually unchanged. China continues to be the critical element that brings India and the United States together. And there has been no incentive on either side to let differences and disagreements get in the way of an agreement that has been decades in the making. Like Pete Hegseth, the US Secretary of Defense, emphasized during his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singaporean India strong enough to work for its own interests maintains the balance of power that the United States would like to maintain in the Indo-Pacific region. In fact, a retired U.S. Marine and diplomat Grant Newsham supported that although the relationship is currently in a “difficult period”, it still appears remarkably positive compared to the Cold War era.
However, there are real tensions that we cannot wish to disappear. It’s hard to see Washington’s recent conduct in India’s neighborhood as being partner friendly. For example, the United States supported the 2024 regime change in Bangladesh, which India had warned against and which led to an Islamist resurgence, as New Delhi feared. The US stance on Myanmar has also caused problems from a security perspective on India’s vulnerable eastern border. The United States is increasingly inclined to view Nepal as an independent strategic partner rather than under India’s domain. And finally, the The Trump administration prepares for Pakistanwhich has long supported terrorism against India and is in reality a client state of China, adds insult to injury.
Then there is the delicate question of what exactly Washington expects from India economically. THE admission of US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau That Washington would not repeat with India the “mistakes” it made with China – allowing it to expand its market and potentially compete with the United States – is a stark revelation. New Delhi cannot be expected to ignore this notable change in the US strategic framework towards India.
Certainly, the message from Washington seems contradictory: India is indispensable to the security of the Indo-Pacific, but it is also a trade problem to be solved and also a country whose citizens can apparently be killed by American military operations without a formal apology being deemed necessary. So, what is India supposed to do in the face of these paradoxes and contradictions?
Policy advice from different quarters tends to cluster around certain key points. First, be helpful to Americans. Trump administration appreciates concrete help without worrying about diplomatic subtleties. Increasing operational-level cooperation within the Quad, increasing Indian Ocean access agreements, and helping break China’s hold on rare earth minerals are the types of contributions that would earn India strategic credit.
But more importantly, India also needs its voice to be heard. Although a moderate response to the sailors’ deaths may seem diplomatically prudent in the short term, such political prudence has limits. Nations build their prestige by defending their interests; tolerating the killing of its citizens without demanding accountability is hardly an image likely to enhance India’s global reputation.
A realistic portrayal of India-US relations is not optimistic, but it is also not pessimistic and speaks to inevitable deterioration. Rather, it is a much more difficult reality, that of a relationship whose importance and shared interests have grown despite tensions caused by divergent regional considerations and asymmetric leverage, as well as a transactional administration in Washington that values power more than anything else.
India is today more powerful economically and militarily than it has ever been, but it is not powerful enough to dictate terms to the Americans. The task over the next few years will be to bridge this gap while keeping the partnership alive long enough to benefit.