On May 19, 2026, the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) and the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) resumed Tonzang, a strategically vital town located on the Tedim-Kale trade route, of the Chin Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO). This is part of the Myanmar government’s ongoing broader offensive in the mountainous Chin state in western Myanmar.
Last month, Myanmar government forces recaptured Falam, the second-largest town in Chin State. Now the Tatmadaw can potentially develop its offensive towards Rihkawdar, located on the Indo-Burma border. Due to the timing of the offensive, the geographical location of Chin State and the political situation in neighboring Indian states and the Chattogram Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh, the offensive has significant political and strategic ramifications for Myanmar, India and Bangladesh.
A map highlighting the location of Chin State in Myanmar. Via Wikimedia Commons.
Conflict in Chin State
Chin State, with an area of 36,018 square kilometers and a population of almost half a million, is located in northern Myanmar and is populated mainly by predominantly Christian Chin peoples. The Chin people are a collection of ethnic groups who speak Kuki-Chin languages and share ethnic ties with the Kuki-Chin people of the CHT of Bangladesh, the Mizos of Indian Mizoram, and the Kukis of Manipur and Nagaland.
The state is bordered by the Sagaing and Magway regions of Myanmar to the east, the Rakhine State to the south, the Rangamati and Bandarban Hill districts of Bangladesh and the Indian state of Mizoram to the west, and the Indian state of Manipur to the north. Sagaing and Magway are part of the ethnic heartland of the Bamar; Rakhine State is dominated by a predominantly Buddhist people. In Bangladesh, Rangamati is populated by mainly Buddhist Chakmas and mainly Muslim Bengalis; Bandarban is inhabited by the Bengalis, the Marmas (mainly the Rakhine people) and a multitude of Kuki-Chin peoples. In India, Mizoram is dominated by Mizos while Manipur is divided between the majority Meiteis and the minority Nagas and Kukis. Thus, the Kuki-Chin peoples are essentially surrounded by non-Christian and non-Kuki-Chin peoples on almost all sides.
A number of factors, including underdevelopment, isolation from the rest of Myanmar due to hilly terrain and underdeveloped infrastructure, discrimination and neglect by the central government, chronic poverty and food insecurity, are to blame. responsible for the outbreak of conflict in Chin State against the Myanmar government. The Chin National Front (CNF), formed in 1988, sought autonomy for Chin State and waged a low-level insurgency against the Myanmar government, but the scale of fighting was limited and a ceasefire took effect in 2012.
A map showing effective political control of northern Myanmar, including Chin State and Rakhine State, as of November 2025. Map via Wikimedia Commons.
However, after the outbreak of civil war in Myanmar in 2021, two competing Chin EAOs – the CNF and the Chin Brotherhood (CB), as well as the largely decentralized Chinland Defense Force (CDF) – waged war against the Tatmadaw. Together they captured most of Chin State. Meanwhile, the Arakan Army capture Paletwa Township in southern Chin State from the Tatmadaw. Until early 2026, the Tatmadaw only controlled certain urban centers in the state, including its capital Hakha.
However, after years of heavy attrition, the Tatmadaw made a to come back in early 2026 in Chin State and elsewhere. The Myanmar military has benefited from its arsenal of manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the conscription of new troops, and the gradual reduction of Chinese support for several EAOs.
The Tatmadaw’s recent successes in Chin State are significant not only for Myanmar but also for neighboring India and Bangladesh.
Implications for Myanmar
The current Tatmadaw offensive in Chin State apparently has three goals: Reclaim the state’s strategically vital territories, establish control of Chin State’s border with India, and strengthen the Arakan Army’s blockade of Rakhine State.
The Chin EAO currently controls most of Chin State, but internal dissension caused by political, geographic and tribal rivalries, coupled with their relative lack of air and air defense capabilities, means they will struggle to hold their own against a reinvigorated Tatmadaw. Current trends show that the Myanmar military is prioritizing the recapture of urban centers and strategic territories and concentrating its air power and artillery to seize these targets. Once their control over these territories is assured, they could contest the rural areas currently under the control of the EAO. In doing so, the escalation of the war risks causing more population displacement in the state.
Furthermore, by seeking to regain control of the Indian border, the Tatmadaw is attempting to disrupt the logistics of the Chin EAO. The bordering Indian state governments, especially the Mizoram government, sympathize with their ethnic kin in Chin State and hence the Chin EAO uses Mizoram as a strategic logistics and rear point. The Tatmadaw seeks to deprive the Chin EAO of this strategic backyard, by weakening them.
Furthermore, the Tatmadaw has been blockading Rakhine State since November 2023, implementing the “four cuts” strategy to deprive the EAO of funding, food, intelligence and recruits. However, the Arakan Army illegally provides goods from India and Bangladesh, and through Chin State, supporting their economy. By extending its control over Chin State, the Tatmadaw seeks to strengthen its blockade around Rakhine State. The blockade has already caused considerable suffering for civilians in Rakhine State, and strengthening it would make their lives more difficult.
Implications for India
India’s policy towards the insurgency in Chin State has been complex. Mizo and Naga insurgents have been fighting against the Indian government for decades, and New Delhi therefore views with concern the close ties between the Mizoram state government and Chin insurgents. Additionally, New Delhi views the reported presence of Chin insurgents in Indian territory as one of the contributing factors to the ongoing inter-ethnic violence between the Meiteis and the Kukis in Manipur.
Furthermore, India has traditionally sought to maintain a working partnership with the Myanmar government to protect its security, counter Chinese influence in the country and project its own influence. Recently, as the Tatmadaw intensified its offensive operations against Chin insurgents, Naypyidaw sought to develop ties with New Delhi, illustrated by the meetings between defense officials of the two countries and by the decision of the President of Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing, to visit India on his first foreign trip after taking up the post.
As a result, the consequences of the Tatmadaw offensive in Chin State are likely to be complex for India. On the one hand, the Indian government might view the weakening of the Chin insurgents as conducive to the security of its borders. On the other hand, Mizoram already hosts thousands of refugees from Chin State, and the intensification of the conflict could generate a new influx of refugees into India.
Implications for Bangladesh
The Kuki-Chin people constitute a significant minority in the Bandarban Hill district of Bangladesh. Historically, the Kuki-Chin people have refrained from taking part in insurgent activities against the Bangladeshi government. However, since 2022, the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) and its military wing, the Kuki-Chin National Army (KNA), have been waging a small-scale insurgency in the region seeking autonomy.
The KNF is linked to various EAOs in Myanmar and is believed to have received arms and ammunition through Chin State. Therefore, the conflicts in Bandarban Hill District and Chin State are linked and, from Dhaka’s perspective, the emergence of conflict de facto an independent mini-state in Chin State is a concern.
Hence the current Tatmadaw offensive in Chin State is of importance to Bangladesh. On the one hand, weakening the Chin insurgents and reasserting government control over border territories may indirectly serve Bangladesh’s interests by limiting the KNF’s access to arms trafficking through Myanmar.
On the other hand, intensifying conflict along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border may threaten the country with a potential influx of refugees and security incidents. The recent death of three Bangladeshi citizens near the border in landmine explosions illustrates the threat to civilian security caused by the intensifying conflict on the other side.
Conclusion
The current Tatmadaw offensive in Chin State is reshaping the strategic landscape of western Myanmar and its borders. By retaking key towns and border corridors, the Myanmar government seeks to weaken the Chin EAO, isolate the Arakan Army, and restore government authority over the border regions. However, the offensive is also likely to intensify humanitarian suffering, displacement and cross-border instability.
For India, the campaign presents both security opportunities and refugee challenges, while for Bangladesh it brings implications for internal and border security, refugee management and civilian security. Therefore, future developments in Chin State would be of strategic importance to the entire region.