Once upon a time, there was a US president with a unilateral streak who intervened in the Middle East to prevent and eliminate an allegedly terrorism-sponsored threat, thus provoking a diplomatic crisis with his European allies. This description fits perfectly with the way President Donald Trump waged war against Iran, but it also bears an uncanny resemblance to that of an American president from another era: George W. Bush.
While Bush campaigned for a “humble“In foreign policy, the terrorist attacks of September 11 transformed his presidency into a hawkish presidency that would tolerate no risk. He eventually invaded Iraq to eliminate suspected weapons of mass destruction and disrupt a network supposedly aiding terrorism. The Iraq War caused a rift between NATO alliesand the insurrection it sparked – leaving the United States mired in protracted conflict – was seen as an inflection point at which the unipolar moment began to ebb.
Beyond the continuities that can be observed in US foreign policy – what could be described as a never-ending obsession with the Middle East – Hattori Ryuji, professor of political science at Chuo University in Japan, offers other perspectives on the current situation in his recent book on Japan-US relations during the War on Terror period: “After terrorism.” Hattori’s work shows how an ally can turn a crisis into an opportunity to strengthen alliance unity, a particularly relevant lesson given the uncertainties surrounding the Iranian conflict.
Although the Bush era marked a low point for relations between Europe and the United States, for the Japan-US alliance it was a period in which the bilateral relationship transformed into a global alliance addressing international issues, including terrorism. As Hattori pointed out, even though Japan’s willingness to support the alliance was driven by reputational concerns – a reaction to backlash from the 1991 Gulf War, when Japan’s aid was criticized as “too little, too late” – during the War on Terror, Tokyo proactively supported the US war effort. Although it did not play a direct role in the fighting, Japan took the lead in humanitarian missions in Afghanistan and provided logistical support to US ships in the Indian Ocean.
Japan’s support for the alliance was not without strategic calculation. When the U.S. stance toward the Iraqi regime began to tilt toward regime change, Japan cautiously sought to pair its support for possible action in Iraq in exchange for continued attention to the North Korean problem—a threat that was not only military in nature, given Pyongyang’s ballistic and nuclear capabilities, but also deeply political for Japan because of the kidnapping issue. In his work, Hattori traces this connection to December 2002, when two geographically distant issues – Iraq and North Korea – were linked at a meeting of the Security Advisory Committee (SCC) between Japan and the United States and then included in a joint statement.
However, Japan’s attempt to use its influence as a loyal ally came at a cost – a predicament that Hattori sought to explain through the concept of the “global alliance security dilemma.” According to its definition, this type of dilemma arises when an alliance expands “beyond its initial geographic or functional parameters, thereby generating an expanded set of responsibilities and risks for the participating entities.” Hattori argued that the founding meeting of the SCC had set up conditions under which “Japan could not refuse to support the use of force by the United States in Iraq”, placing Tokyo in a dilemma in which it was forced to accept the geographic expansion of the alliance’s reach in the Middle East – contrary to the pre-agreed idea that the Japan-US alliance was primarily about East Asia.
Overall, it is questionable whether Japan’s strategy – encouraging the United States to focus on North Korea by supporting the war in Iraq – was actually successful. No weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq, which had been the main justification for launching the military campaign. Today, North Korea’s nuclear capability has developed more than ever, and the issue of kidnappings, which has significantly hardened Japan’s position towards this country, still remains unresolved. While then-Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro attempted to ease the alliance’s dilemma during this period by moving closer to North Korea and calling for United Nations reform, these initiatives actually only “exacerbated the situation,” according to Hattori.
At the same time, it is hard to deny that Japan’s struggle to resolve the alliance dilemma ultimately resulted in stronger Japan-US relations as Tokyo gained the trust of its American counterparts. The strategic document entitled “The Japan-United States alliance of the new century“, released following Koizumi’s final visit to the United States during his term in office, speaks to this point. The document describes the alliance as “one of the most accomplished bilateral relationships in history” and celebrates how the Bush-Koizumi partnership “expanded and strengthened the cooperation achieved within the alliance.” The document ends on a forward-looking note, affirming the global role that the Japan-United States alliance has come to occupy in the era post-September 11: “TBoth leaders share the view that the U.S.-Japan global alliance remains a constant and positive force. They shared the hope that the friendship and global cooperation between the United States and Japan will continue to strengthen.
The global character that the Japan-US alliance has become has been both a blessing and a curse for Japan’s foreign policy heading into the 2000s. Takaichi era. With the alliance’s mission scope expanding, there is growing pressure from the United States and serious debate within Tokyo over whether or not to send in the military troops. Maritime Self-Defense Force guaranteeing safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz – a prospect that has divided opinions within the Japanese public.
However, the expanded role and vision that Japan has adopted has encouraged the country to play a more active role not only in the Indo-Pacific region – through the promotion of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” And arms transfers – but also by cultivating a global network of partners to strengthen Japan’s deterrence and diversify supply chains.
The story Hattori tells shows that Japan has some influence over the United States, as debates over the connection between the Iraq and North Korea problems have demonstrated. During one of the most diplomatically isolated periods in U.S. history, Japan stood firmly by Washington, and while the fruits of that loyalty remain questionable, it ultimately strengthened the Japan-U.S. alliance and expanded Japan’s role on the international stage.
In its toolbox, Japan can find measures that allow it to exert influence without harming the alliance, including non-military options that Japan might be more willing to take on. Although speaking at the height of hisonly ally» – a favorite expression in Japanese diplomatic circles – perhaps difficult Sometimes the perception of Japan as an obedient partner can harm the alliance in the long term, especially in light of polls showing divergent views on the alliance between the public and policy makers. The Koizumi administration demonstrated that Japan could do just that on the North Korean issue when the stakes were high enough.
This information would help Japan respond to current U.S. demands regarding the security of the Strait of Hormuz. By leveraging its position as a key geopolitical player in the Indo-Pacific region and a close ally of the United States, and shouldering a growing burden in an area that the United States considers a cornerstone of global prosperity, Japan can turn the current crisis into a real opportunity to advance its interests – as the history of Japan-US relations during the War on Terror demonstrates.