After Vietnam and the United States improved their relationship with a complete strategic partnership in September 2023, China quickly responded to avoid losing a strategic influence in Hanoi. Three months later, President Xi Jinping made a visit to the state in Vietnam – and this week, he returned with what is undoubtedly the most ceremonious and politically significant diplomatic program in the recent history of bilateral links.
The visit was accompanied by unprecedented honors: President Luong Cuong personally welcomed Xi at the airport on April 14, while Prime Minister Pham Minh Chineh made him goodbye to him the next day. At the airport, the Chinese chief was also welcomed by a special dance interpreted by 54 young girls representing the 54 ethnic groups of Vietnam.
Even more notable was the scope and intensity of political engagement. XI had separate interviews with the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) of LAM and President Luong Cuong, as well as two name meetings, but carried out in the format of full -fledged talks, with the Prime Minister and the President of the National Assembly. These sessions involved high -ranking delegations on both sides, reflecting the broad institutional coordination between the two political systems. During these talks and meetings, Vietnamese leaders have used part of the strongest languages in recent years to describe the China-Vietnam relationship, declaring that “the development of links with China is a strategic choice and an absolute priority for Vietnam” and that “Vietnam constantly considers the strengthening of relations with China as an objective necessity and a strategic choice”.
On the sidelines, the senior officials of the Chinese Communist Party also met separately the permanent secretary of the CPV and president of the Vietnam Fatherland. These commitments show that China is pursuing a complete diplomatic strategy that extends far beyond high-level state visits.
In particular, China began again to underline the slogan of the 1950s “comrades and brothers” to characterize its relationship with Vietnam. Although this sentence was reintroduced by XI during her trip in 2023 to Hanoi, she was invoked with greater frequency and accentuated during last week’s visit, signaling Beijing’s intention to rekindle the ideological foundations of the bilateral relationship. For more than three decades since standardization in the 1990s, China favored more limited sentence “Dong Chi Khong Phai Dong Minh(The comrades but not the allies), reflecting his strategic prudence. The renewed accent on the “brothers” marks a deliberate effort of Beijing to attract more closely Vietnam into its political orbit in the middle of the intensification of the American-china rivalry.
The upgrade of September 2023 in American-Vietnam links was clearly a strategic shock which caused a rapid Chinese response. Three months later, Xi went to Hanoi to raise relations with Vietnam – China at a new level: a “shared future community” – a designation that ranks second in the diplomatic hierarchy at five levels of China.
This level is lower than the relationship of China with Russia, Pakistan and North Korea and can even be lower than its relationship with Cambodia, which is characterized as a “shared destiny relationship” and an “iron with iron”. Cambodia is also a cessation of the current XI tour, and China has completed the upgrading of the Ream naval database earlier this month, which raises regional concerns concerning its potential use for military operations at the southern China Sea. XI should donate two naval ships to Cambodia during the next visit.
Whenever China improves its links with Vietnam, it raises concerns that Hanoi can be drawn into a strategic confrontation with the United States. This time, US President Donald Trump has already expressed his concern, suggesting that Hanoi is trained in China’s efforts to “screw the United States of America”. History shows that leaning too far towards a great power, or becoming deeply anchored in a single sphere of influence, has often reached a long -term cost for the autonomy and strategic development of Vietnam.
This is particularly important because Vietnam is preparing for tariff negotiations with the United States and faces the threat of high import duties which could seriously affect its exports but also its entire economy.
In the increasingly polarized world today, Vietnam must remain vigilant. Unprecedented diplomatic ceremonies, friendly rhetoric and tens of signed agreements should not obscure reality: Vietnam must firmly pursue an independent, autonomous, multidirectional and balanced foreign policy which serves its national long -term interests. No relationship – whether with the United States or China – should be authorized to erode the space for strategic decision -making of Vietnam or to reduce its international agency.