Following the ban on poppy culture in Afghanistan imposed by de facto authorities, the Taliban, in April 2022, the production of opium was plunged by an estimate 95% By 2023, from 6,200 tonnes in 2022 to 333 tonnes in 2023. The poppy fields were reduced by 233,000 hectares to 10,800 hectares.
However, three years since the ban of the Taliban, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), announced last week that the Opium Prix of Afghanistan had been increased tenfold – $ 75 at $ 750 per kilogram. The increase in prices is not surprising. A classic economic model tells us that when demand is inelastic, the reduction on the supply side tends to make the product more expensive. Consequently, in the case of opium, many maintain that a repression on the side of demand would be more effective than one side of the supply.
A paradoxical problem: a victory in the war against drugs, a punishment for the poor
However, the greatest fear that presents itself with increasingly expensive goods is the collapse of the measure responsible for the shortage – in this case, the prohibition of the culture of the poppy. In the midst of the ban, small titles, including women, who participated in the production of opium for the good of their livelihoods, suffer great distress in Afghanistan, while high -level traders and exporters in organized crime groups make murder, according to the admission of the UNODC.
The drastic reduction in poppy culture for opium in Afghanistan has had significant consequences for vulnerable farmers and rural populations in Afghanistan, mainly in the southwest provinces where poppy growth has been widely concentrated. For a country that was already Macroeconomic tatteaux Due to massive political oil in 2021, even if it was struggling with the COVVI-19 pandemic, the ban on poppy culture added a devastating microeconomic shock for individual farmers. A World Bank report Released last year said that in a “historic reversal”, GDP per capita fell into at least 75 countries in the past four years with people in Afghanistan who remain with less than $ 4 per day.
Afghanistan’s opium economy
The poppy of opium is tolerant of drought and a high -value commercial culture. With a devastated economy and society, the culture and production of opium poppy in Afghanistan have become the only viable source of income for a large part of its population. In other words, in Afghanistan with its conditions of extreme poverty and insecurity, opium production has become a source of human security. The economy of opium has obtained the means of subsistence of 3.3 million people directly involved in poppy culturerepresenting almost 15% of the country’s total population.
According to the UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2019Opium harvest provided the equivalent of up to 119,000 full -time jobs to local workers and migrants hired by farmers. The wages reported for these weeded opium poppy fields are comparable to other types of agricultural work at around $ 4 per day. But Lancing could bring in $ 6 a day.
The culture and production of opium poppy is work with high intensity of labor. Even in deeply conservative Afghan society, women could be involved in work within family compounds without being exposed to outside men, which is considered non -Islamic in Afghan society. The labor division offered opportunities to Afghan women and offered a certain degree of financial independence, by access to cash and status through work. In the context of rural poverty and a chronic debt cycle for rural families, the opportunity to develop a lucrative rent harvest was considered a blessing by many rural households, in accordance with a drafting in The new humanitarian aid entitled “Afghan Women and Opium.“”
In 2021, the economy of opiates represents up to 14% of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Afghanistan, making the culture of opium and exchanges a major economic source. Since Afghanistan GDP continued in the following year, the The opiate economy probably constituted a greater proportion of its total economy in 2022.
The political use of opium: from the Taliban to the CIA
Opium has long been deeply anchored in political and powerful games in Afghanistan.
One of the first efforts towards Poppy’s ban came in 1957 under the Muhammad Daud Khan government, while Afghanistan was not a large producer. However, this posed a challenge to the political stability of the state Badakhshan pink in rebellion. Three decades later, mujahideen leaders like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Pir Sayad Ahmed Gaylani and Ismat Muslim used drug money for anti-Soviet resistance. This has been strategically introduced and widened by American secret operations via the CIA to counter the Soviets in Afghanistan.
Ironically, the success of the Taliban is also linked to their early occupation of valuable pop -off areas in the south and east of Afghanistan at the end of the 20th century, which allowed them to pay higher wages to their supporters and mercenaries. Most of the production took place in Helmand (around 49%) and Nangarhar (25%); However, in the northern parts under the control of the Mujahideen, Badakhshan has also become a smaller culture center in poppy (3%).
The Taliban took over in 1996 and repressed the production of opium in 2001 with a complete ban which dropped production at 185 metric tonnes at the end of their first regime, but it was not in power during the following two decades, the Taliban bastions showed an increase in opium production. Drug money once again fueled the Taliban struggle against American and NATO forces, which led to its return to power in August 2021.
The inconsistent and opportunistic position of the Taliban on opium is quite obvious, as this was before them. Poppy Fields was destroyed after the supreme chief Taliban Hibatullah Akhundzada has declared that it would be prohibited to develop them because dependence and the companies linked to it are not Islamic, but the Taliban have always exploited and used poppy money.
A thong in politics sends contradictory signals to those who implement policies in the field and to those who are supposed to respect the law. This remains an important problem in Afghanistan around the culture of poppy as well as other problems, such as the increase in the price of the goods can force the desperate farmers to take risks or changes of lucrative culture towards other regions, as was seen when Thailand decided for the first time to repress opium.
A Lesson to Learn from Thailand’s Success in Eliminatting Poppy Cultivation and Becoming “Opium-free” is that, Unlim Afghanistan and Iran, They Did So Over A Period of Time, Starting in 1984 and Being Declared Opium-Free by UNODC in 2008. of Programming of “alternative development”Where the loss of income due to substitute crops was formed by establishing a floor price and the government has become the guaranteed buyer by paying the difference in the farmer.
Where the Onudc can intervene
Most Afghan farmers have very small assets and a serious shortage of water in the region means that they relied on cash residents resistant to drought like the poppy which lead to beautiful financial yields. The policy of prohibiting the culture from poppy to opium was not associated with alternative subsistence measures for farmers, proving to be devastating for the population in difficulty.
In the meantime, even when efforts of alternative livelihoods have been made in the past, they have been poorly designed and ineffective and rarely generated by sustainable income for populations dependent on population of poppy, as Vanda Felbab-Brown points out in “No easy exit: drugs of drugs and counterbatotics in Afghanistan.“Consequently, the weight of eradication is most often carried by the poorest and most socially marginalized while generating extensive political capital for the Taliban.
This time too, it seems that the Taliban has been able to incumature political legitimacy through measures that create the appearance of the slaughter of illegal activities. The UNODC could use this desire to negotiate a plan of alternative livelihoods for farmers. Felbab-Brown has also suggested promulgating a microcredit system, which continues to be lacking in a large part of Afghanistan. This, associated with the creation of banks of local Afghan seeds, seed markets, rural companies and value -added chains, will address gaps in the structural market.
This moment could also be a foot in the door so that the world is negotiating a better deal for women and girls in Afghanistan. The current imperative is to go from the simple substitution of cultures to a more complete strategy for sustainable livelihoods. This implies a balanced mixture of farm support and employment possibilities, benefiting men and women.
The Taliban must be made to understand that the longevity of the prohibition of opium depends on a multifaceted approach. To achieve this, the Taliban must reconsider their position on education and work for girls and women. Historically, the cultivation of opium-poppy involved women, serving as a safety net for families when male family supporters faced adversity. Vocational training must now be accessible to both sexes, while targeted education can improve the employability of women. By promoting several winning members within families, Afghanistan GDP and GDP per capita could be lifted. In addition, women reintegrating the active population could open the way to renewed foreign aid, offering hope to a nation in difficulty.
Aside from the real patterns of the Taliban, seen only in terms of anti-drug war, it is also a moment for the UNUDC to be able to help clear knowledge of what the Taliban can really be afterwards, as explained above. The strong reduction in Opium of Afghanistan in 2023 must be maintained in the long term by supporting farmers, as well as women, to transform the cultivation of poppy. This will not only mean a victory for the fight against opium, but will also ensure a life of dignity for Afghans, far from paralyzing poverty.