Donald Trump’s US administration openly admitted that one of the reasons for his attempts to re-engage and rebuild good relations with Russia is to gain a lever effect on China (the so-called inverted Kissinger or the inverted Nixon). The calm or even indifferent reactions of Beijing to Trump’s reconciliation signals with Vladimir Putin can confirm that, whatever the American intentions, the outcome of the Russian-US dialogue would be beneficial for China.
First, it is quite obvious that the “Kissinger inverted” is not possibleAnd China knows it. This idea is based on the false assumption that the United States can (to a certain extent) repeat its movements of the 1960s and 1970s, when Washington worked with Beijing to isolate Moscow. But the main difference today is the strong Chinese-Russia relationship. Bilateral links are based on a very ideological cornerstone, namely deep anti-American (and anti-Western) feelings, the desire to preserve authoritarian regimes in China and Russia, and a lack of confidence in democratic systems.
Kissinger and Nixon have exploited the very acrimonial relations between the USSR and the RPC, known as the Sino-Soviet split. Relations had started to deteriorate with the secret discourse of Khrushchev in 1956 and reached their peak with the border crisis, in fact a short war, on the Ussari river in 1969. It is therefore incorrect to say that the United States attracted China far from the Soviet Union; The Nixon administration simply took advantage of the deterioration of the links between Beijing and Moscow.
China knows that a “reverse kissinger” will not work today. In a Reading published by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs After a telephone conversation between Putin and Xi Jinping in China on February 24, it was declared that “history and reality teach us that China and Russia are good neighbors who cannot be repulsed”. In case someone missed the message, the declaration added that “Chinese-Russian relationships have strong endogenous driving force and a single strategic value”.
If an “reverse kissinger” is not possible – as the American secretary of state Marco Rubio admitted it to a interview For Breitbart – The question is whether a partial “reverse kissinger” can work and what results it can bring to Russia, the United States and China. In other words, what can Putin from the United States get and what can it offer? In both cases, not much. But the United States seems to have something to offer, because it could raise sanctions against Russia, which could improve the economic situation and limit Putin’s political isolation. Trump’s idea to repair fences with Russia could give Putin more room for maneuver to become less dependent on China – and that is the American goal, as Rubio said in his interview.
But it seems unlikely that Putin will offer something substantial in China in the United States. Even in the case of a partial “reverse kissinger”, it would be risky for Putin to bet on the United States. China and Russia are very cautious to avoid the risk of two fronts, so Putin will not seriously damage her relationship with XI. And given the unpredictability of Trump, it is quite unlikely that Putin trusts the American president.
The reduction of Russia’s dependence on China could actually be used to strengthen their relationship. XI must be aware that Russia’s over-dependence on China is not a comfortable position for Putin. This is probably why Putin took aggressive measures towards Ukraine and the West immediately after his face -to -face meetings with XI in 2022 and 2023 – he wanted to show his own program and his independence from China. Putin began war with Ukraine two weeks after his February 2022 visit to Beijing; announcement partial mobilization and increased his threats to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine immediately after meeting XI at 2022 Shanghai cooperation organization in Samarkand; and revealed his plans to Deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Bélarus right after Official Visit of Xi Jinping in Moscow in March 2023.
In fact, any “lever effect” that Putin could obtain from an increased commitment to the United States would be just a tactical and short-term gain for Trump, but not a strategic and deep decision of Putin to distance himself from China. And this could be advantageous for Xi Jinping because it creates the illusion that the Sino-Russian alignment is weakening. In other words, Russia and China could play this game together as a kind of cognitive war, because the two countries played the (respectively) role of “bad cop” and “good cop”, especially since the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. In these circumstances, China can be considered as having less power and influence on Russia, which can also lead to less global attention to Chinese -Russia alignment – a situation that is certainly good for China.
Another good news for China is the fact that the rapprochement of Russia-US has already really undermined the transatlantic relationship, thus advancing one of the main and long-term objectives of the Beijing approach in Europe. China’s story on Europe, especially Central Europeis that the continent is completely subordinate in the United States and that European or European policies depend completely on the orders of Washington. This is why, from the start, China favored the idea led by France of strategic autonomy, initially understood as a relaxation of Europe’s links with the United States.
On a related note, there is an idea floating in several European capitals which, given Trump’s apparent will to abandon Europe and put an end to the transatlantic alliance, it is time to soften the EU Chinese policy. Supporters cite several advantages of a rapprochement in China-EU: Europe could gain a lever effect on Trump and avoid opening “two fronts” (friction with the United States and China). It is also believed that, if the United States decides to support Russia during the current war in Ukraine or after the conflict gels, China could play a role of stabilizing strength in Europe.
All these arguments are obviously to the advantage of China. Although Beijing does not intend to change its policy, it could be perceived differently in Europe, a challenge or even a threat to a stabilization force. It is undeniably a huge gain for China (Although a complete reversal of EU policy towards China is not very likely).
The deterioration or abandonment of the transatlantic alliance and the Russian-US agreement to block membership in NATO in Ukraine is another gift for China. NATO is considered by Chinese leaders as a vestige of the Cold War, and Beijing has always opposed the enlargement of NATO. In the meantime, the new strategic concept Adopted in Madrid in 2022, for the first time mentioned China, as well as cooperation with Asia-Pacific 4 (now Indo-Pacific 4)-the two movements considered as proof of a NATO pivot in Asia. From the point of view of Beijing, any movement to block the enlargement of NATO and undermine its unit and its consistency is good for China.
Finally, Trump’s desire to put an end to the war in Ukraine by focusing on the result, but not on the substance or the content of the peace process and the final agreement, means that the war ends with an undisputed Russian victory – or a defeat. For Putin, his ultimate victory would mean the attrition of the Ukrainian state and the eradication of the Ukrainian nation. What Trump really grows Hybrid peace – The situation that China wants the most.