As the ongoing purge continues to haunt the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officer corps – as seen for example in the June 26 newspaper impeachment of six military lawmakers of the National People’s Congress – there are signs that Chinese leader Xi Jinping has begun putting together the cornerstones of a new Central Military Commission (CMC).
On July 3, a promotion ceremony was held at the CMC headquarters, where two lieutenant generals – Zhang Shuguang of the Army and Wang Gang of the Air Force – were elevated to the rank of general. At the same time, Zhang was appointed as the new secretary of the CMC Disciplinary Inspection Commission and Wang became the new commander of the Air Force.
A career political officer, Zhang has spent the past decade in the PLA’s anti-corruption disciplinary inspection system, with experiences at the CMC level, as well as in the Air Force and the Army. This background makes him well prepared for success Zhang Shengmin to head the Disciplinary Inspection Commission, which was instrumental in overseeing the purge of the PLA.
In contrast, new Air Force chief Wang Gang appears to fit the definition of a professional military officer. Wang began his career as a pilot before becoming commander of an Air Force division. Later, Wang served as Director of the Air Force Training Department (2012-2016), Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force (2016-2019), Chief of Staff of the Air Force Central Theater Command (2019-2022), Chief of Staff of the Air Force (2022-2025), Deputy Commander of the Army of the Air Force (2025-2026) and finally current Commander of the Air Force.
Ahead of the July 3 promotions, the APL, an organization with more than 2 million people, had only four generals in service. As a result of continuing purges that reached a climax in 2025, senior PLA leaders have been exhausted and new promotions are desperately needed to replenish positions in the CMC and its subordinate bodies.
With this in mind, we should expect a steady stream of promotions between now and the 2027 Party Congress, when a new CMC will be unveiled.
Zhang Shuguang’s promotion to general and taking charge of the CMC Disciplinary Inspection Commission show that Xi continues to prioritize enforcing strict discipline within the PLA – fundamental to maintaining his personal control over the most important institution in China’s political system. His predecessor, Zhang Shengmin, oversaw the second peak of the PLA’s anti-corruption campaign, which reduced top military leaders to office. the smallest size in modern Chinese history. Zhang Shuguang will likely implement Xi’s directives with equal, if not greater, zeal, thereby improving his chances of becoming a CMC member at the next Party Congress.
At the same time, Zhang Shuguang’s appointment aims to reduce Zhang Shengmin’s power base. After nearly a decade controlling the CMC Disciplinary Inspection Commission, Zhang Shengmin has accumulated enormous influence within the anti-corruption apparatus – an institution made up of powerful individuals who can investigate and arrest officers at any level. Since becoming vice chairman of the CMC in October 2025, Zhang Shengmin’s power has further strengthened, which could have worried Xi, who operates in an environment of very low confidence.
Just like when Xi sidelined his former anti-corruption partner Wang Qishan in 2018, at the height of his authority and prominence after the early years of the anti-corruption campaign, Xi appears to be repeating the same tactic here in 2026. While CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin retains indirect influence over military discipline and anti-corruption work, immediate control of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission has eluded him.
Wang Gang’s promotion further confirms that the PLA Air Force remains Xi’s preferred service after the military. So far, air force officers have been least affected by the purge, suggesting that Xi still trusts them and views them as the least problematic service. In fact, Air Force officers account for three of the PLA’s current six generals. Wang’s elevation is likely to open the door for more air force officers to take leadership positions as further promotions take place in the run-up to the 21st Party Congress.
More broadly, the promotion of a political officer and a professional military commander indicates that Xi seeks to strike a balance between the two streams of officers, who represent ideological trustworthiness and professional military competence, respectively.
In essence, what appears to be a routine promotion ceremony shows clear signs that Xi is laying the groundwork for a new CMC, after recent purges gutted the body to just one member besides Xi himself. It would be very difficult for an army of more than 2 million men to operate effectively under the leadership of just two senior decision-makers. Thus, rebuilding the CMC with “red and expert” officers has become an urgent task for Xi.