After almost two years of speculationchanges to the North Korean constitution have been made public. Of great interest was the country’s definition of its territory, which is a key indicator of its policy towards South Korea.
The amendment bed that North Korea’s territory borders “China and Russia to the north and the Republic of Korea to the south, as well as the territorial waters and airspace established thereon.” This is the first time that North Korea abandoned its territorial claims against the South.
Pyongyang also deleted references to “peaceful unification” and “imperialist aggressors” in the document. Neither identify Seoul as “main enemy”.
This is undoubtedly a textual confirmation of Pyongyang’s two-state theory vis-à-vis Seoul, according to which it adopted in December 2023 and the lack of interest in any South Korean action. The constitutional amendments mark a major shift in how North Korea defends itself. Instead of seeking security guarantees from its neighbors – whether its allies Russia and China or its foes South Korea and the United States – Pyongyang now gives these countries its own guarantees to avoid miscalculations and clarify the conditions under which it can use force.
Coercive diplomacyor the combined use of credible and explicit threats and assurances to discourage other countries from engaging in undesirable behavior, has been the essence of North Korea’s security strategy since the end of the Korean War. Pyongyang wants discourage a South Korean march towards the North as well as a weakening of the South Korea-United States alliance. The country has invested heavily in the threats aspect of coercive diplomacy in parking long-range artillery along the inter-Korean border and the development of nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that if South Korea and the United States invaded North Korea, Pyongyang would respond quickly. launch pre-emptive attacks, including possible nuclear strikes.
However, the assurance aspect of Pyongyang’s diplomacy has not received as much attention. Without it, North Korea could build weapons for deterrence purposes. poorly perceived as preparation for an invasion due to the security dilemma. North Korea attempted to explicitly assure the South that it did not intend to invade first as part of the South-North agreement of July 4, 1972. Joint press release. But in April 1975, as the U.S.-backed regimes of Indochina collapsed, North Korean President Kim Il Sung adopted an activist unification policy and asked China to help “liberate” the South. China opposite.
In 1991, Kim again assured Seoul of his peaceful intention under the Agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression, exchanges and cooperation. However, such assurance was not credible. In March 1994, North Korea threat war against South Korea and the United States over IAEA inspections of its nuclear program.
Joint North-South statements at the 2000, 2007, 2018 The summits discussed “peaceful unification,” but they were not enough to completely dissipate Seoul’s tensions. skepticism of a North Korean invasion because Pyongyang still claimed the entire Korean peninsula. North Korea’s new territorial clause significantly changes insurance dynamics. By renouncing its territorial claims to South Korea and officially calling its neighbor the “Republic of Korea” in the constitution, North Korea got rid of a legal pretext to attack South Korea.
Stronger assertiveness helps North Korea’s efforts to deter foreign attack in two ways. First, it complements North Korea’s red line on the use of nuclear and conventional forces. Currently, Pyongyang’s red line against American and South Korean provocations covers the Korean peninsula, but such a red line is not credible. Neither Washington nor Seoul believes that Pyongyang is determined to turn Seoul in “a sea of fire”. Limiting the scope to areas north of the 38th parallel means Pyongyang has aligned its resolve with its ability to defend North Korea’s territorial integrity and regime survival. North Korea’s threats will become more credible.
This assurance also allows North Korea to strengthen the deterrent side of coercion by delegitimizing a preemptive U.S. or South Korean attack on its nuclear program as an invasion of a country. Sovereign state. It is no coincidence that North Korea’s constitution underlines its status as a nuclear weapons state and precise Delegated command and control of nuclear forces by Chairman Kim Jong Un alongside the Territorial Clause.
Second, forgoing an attack on the South strengthens North Korea’s ties with Russia and China. Mutual defense clauses in alliance treaties between North Korea and the two countries not require Russian and Chinese assistance if North Korea attacks the South first. However, the territorial scope of the clauses is vague because before the constitutional amendments, North Korea’s territory covered the entire peninsula and did not recognize the Republic of Korea. North Korea aligns its de jure territorial claims with its de facto control removes this uncertainty as to the scope of the security commitment of Russia and China.
At the same time, Moscow and Beijing can be assured that they will not be entangled in a North Korean effort to reclaim lost territory south of the 38th parallel, as was the case in 1950. Stabilization of relations with South Korea also allows North Korea to continue sending troops and weapons to Russia without fear of a South Korean attack.
There is still ambiguity over the status of the disputed northern boundary line, the de facto north-south maritime boundary, in the amended constitution. In the past, Pyongyang and Seoul confronted in this area. However, a maritime crisis is less likely overflow onto land if the land border has been demarcated. North Korea has fortified its side of the demilitarized zone in recent years, meaning it does not challenge the status quo of the land border. North Korea cannot unilaterally give up its maritime claims in the new constitution, but it also does not seek to provoke Seoul and undermine its assertiveness policy. Leaving the issue open means Pyongyang can peacefully resolve maritime disputes with Seoul as separate states if the two Koreas sign a peace treaty.
The long period between the debate on this clause by North Korea and October 2024 and adopt it in March 2026 indicates that this is a deliberate change. The amendment is also accompanied by massive domestic adjustments of organizations dealing with inter-Korean affairs and public messaging. As such, North Korea will not abandon its two-state theory anytime soon, unlike its previous short-lived attempts at outreach by South Korea’s liberal presidents.
North Korea’s assurances to South Korea also indicate that Pyongyang does not have a hostile policy toward the South. In particular, he removed any reference to the South as an enemy in the constitution. North-South relations are not hostile. They are in a state of peaceful, albeit difficult, coexistence as neither side threatens to absorb the other by force.
More importantly, the constitutional change also shows that North Korea has devalued the hypothetical security guarantees of the United States and South Korea, consistent with its growing security commitment. trust in the evolution of the inter-Korean balance of power. It is the greatest expression of sound Perched (“autonomy”).