The supersonic BrahMos missile, jointly developed by India and Russia, could find another buyer in the United States. United Arab Emirates (UAE). Having become a popular choice among Southeast Asian states struggling with limited defense budgets and China’s growing maritime assertiveness, the BrahMos missile could expand its presence in West Asia. India is reportedly in talks with the UAE to export its frontline defense technologies, including the BrahMos supersonic missile and the Akashteer air defense command and control system.
UAE’s decision to move towards BrahMos missile system comes at important time economic situationwhile the recent Iranian conflict has highlighted evolving security challenges in the region. This strengthens the case for more diverse defense cooperation.
The war in Iran has exposed potential gaps in the UAE’s deterrence capabilities. Although it has one of the largest sophisticated advanced air and missile defense networks – including THAADthe MIM-104 Patriot and the KM-SAM – Abu Dhabi’s conventional long-range precision strike options are limited and rely primarily on the Black Shaheen.
Although it offers precision strike capability comparable to that of the BrahMos, the Black Shaheen is a subsonic missile that cruises at approximately Mach 0.8 and is primarily designed for land attack missions. In addition to the Black Shaheen, aircraft supplied by the United States ATACMS, which Abu Dhabi operates, is a short-range ballistic missile, again designed primarily for high-value precision land attacks. The UAE currently does not have a precision supersonic missile capable of engaging sea and land targets.
The acquisition of the BrahMos would provide the UAE with a credible system of opposition to access and area denial. (A2/AD) capability against surface combatants and land targets, thereby strengthening its conventional deterrence posture in the maritime and land theaters.
The vulnerability of UAE air bases has been demonstrated in the Iranian conflict, with Iranian strikes damaging facilities at Al-Dhafra And Al Minhad air bases. The BrahMos would also offer an additional conventional strike option. This would allow the UAE to maintain its offensive capabilities even if air operations were damaged, reducing its reliance on combat aircraft to provide conventional deterrence and precise strike missions.
In addition to the United Arab Emirates, Russia, co-developer of BrahMos, is would have plans to install the missile on its naval platforms despite possessing a vast arsenal of indigenous cruise missiles missilesincluding the P-800 Oniks, Kalibr and Kh-35. Over the past two decades, Russia had little incentive to introduce the BrahMos because it already had a sophisticated arsenal of indigenous missiles. However, the Ukraine The war significantly depleted Russia’s missile inventory, creating the need to quickly replenish stocks and increase production. BrahMos could complement Russia’s missile arsenal, given their demonstrated effectiveness against warships and maritime defense targets.
Initially, the BrahMos program was primarily intended as a joint export program with India. The missile was designed based on India’s requirements, to be compatible with Indian warships, aircraft and software. But since then, the missile has underwent a significant transformation of the original design derived from the P-800 Oniks. It now has a much longer range, guidance systems, navigation, software, search technologyand cross-platform integration.
Originally, the range of BrahMos the missile was capped at around 290 kilometers, to remain below the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I threshold (300 km/500 kg payload). As Russia was already a member of the MTCR, this limitation avoided complications that might have arisen from the transfer of Category I missile technology to India, a non-MTCR member state at the time. But since India After acceding to the regime in 2016, the conditions were significantly lifted, allowing New Delhi to pursue extended-range variants of the BrahMos for its armed forces and, technically, for those of Moscow as well.
An important point to consider is that the MTCR does not impose a blanket ban; he establishes a “strong presumption of denial” for the export of Category I missile systems to a non-MTCR member state, with transfers assessed on a case-by-case basis. To avoid complications, India export of BrahMos has so far been limited to the original 290 km variant. Russia, however, is in a unique position. As a co-developer with a 49.5% stake in BrahMos Aerospace and a member of MTCR, it is not just a buyer but a partner.
Therefore, if Moscow proceeds with this acquisition, it could potentially field one of the extended-range BrahMos variants, developed after India’s accession to the MTCR, which could now exceed 400 km, with suggestions that future iterations could feature a 800km variant. Given Russia’s unique position, whether it will manufacture the missile domestically, introduce it through a joint venture, or use a hybrid production model will depend on the arrangements governing the joint program, which have not been made public. But whatever the outcome, it is likely to differ from usual export standards for BrahMos missiles supplied to other countries.
Although no BrahMos orders have yet been placed in Russia, a Russian integration would demonstrate the success achieved by this joint venture. Having already found buyers in Southeast Asia and potentially the United Arab Emirates, its adoption by one of the world’s leading missile powers would enhance the BrahMos’ credibility and reputation in the global defense market.
Amid this growing fanfare around BrahMos and the impressive growth of its defense industrial capabilities, India nevertheless continues to lack a vast network of overseas maintenance centers, the logistics networks and support architecture that established defense exporters like the United States or France offer to their buyers. This limits India’s ability to provide comprehensive support. Indian Brahmos exports are also suffering gaps.
Unlike experienced traditional providers who offer ecosystem When it comes to institutionalized training, spare parts, software upgrade options, depot maintenance and overall operational support, the Indian defense export industry remains largely platform-centric. Delivery of individual systems takes priority over integrated support systems. Therefore, potential buyers may face uncertainties regarding integration with their existing defense architecture and supply chain, as well as timely availability of critical spare parts in the event of a crisis.
Potential BrahMos operators, such as the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia, and confirmed buyers, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, have diverse military arsenals with defense systems purchased from multiple partners. Although the BrahMos is commendable for its speed and precise striking ability, its efficiency will also be tested by how seamlessly it integrates with the buyer’s existing command and control networks and the broader defense ecosystem. Ensuring such sophisticated interoperability will require ongoing technical support, software upgrades, maintenance and training – all areas where established exporters already have an advantage, and India is still cultivating more of the same.
In the long term, the BrahMos future as India’s flagship defense export will depend not only on its technical capabilities, but also on New Delhi’s ability to provide institutional and life-cycle support to its buyers.