On September 3, 2025, Xi Jinping held a military parade in Tiananmen Square to mark the 80th anniversary of China’s victory over Japan in World War II. The display was deliberate in every detail, from the advanced weapons systems to the leaders of several authoritarian states in attendance, including Russia and North Korea. The scale of the parade was rare, even for Xi. It was a signal of authority for the military, a demonstration of legitimacy for the public. But that wasn’t his only weapon.
A week after the parade, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress began deliberating on the “Law of the People’s Republic of China.” [PRC] on the promotion of ethnic unity. The law treats Taiwanese as citizens of the PRC. Article 21 requires the Chinese Communist Party to strive to “strengthen Taiwan compatriots’ sense of belonging, identification and honor to the Chinese nation”, “promote the common heritage and promotion of Chinese culture by compatriots on both sides of the strait”, and deepen the recognition that both sides “belong to Chinese culture” and are both “Chinese people”.
The law provides for a reporting mechanism: any person can be denounced and prosecuted. Any Taiwanese person who does not identify as Chinese is, under these terms, committing a crime subject to criminal liability.
The law was passed in March 2026 and comes into force on July 1. From tomorrow, it will be one of Xi’s weapons against Taiwan.
In Taiwan, what was once a matter of personal national identity will become the target of criminal prosecution. And the vast majority of Taiwanese are guilty of this “thought crime.” According to a survey of several companies, approximately two-thirds of Taiwan’s population primarily identify as Taiwanese. Less than 3 percent consider themselves primarily Chinese. Among young Taiwanese, aged 18 to 34, the gap is even bigger: more than 80 percent identify as primarily Taiwanese; only one percent as primarily Chinese.
It’s no surprise. Of Taiwan’s 23 million people, approximately 600,000 are indigenous Polynesian peoples entirely distinct from China’s Han majority in terms of language, culture, society and belief. More than a million are new residents, from Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan, Hong Kong, Macau and parts of mainland China; they and their descendants constitute what many consider a new cultural wave in Taiwan. There are those who came to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek after 1949, some of whom retain deep feelings for China.
Taiwan’s largest population group is people whose ancestors migrated from China’s southeastern coast about 400 years ago and who have long developed distinct cultures and identities. Their ancestors came from China. This does not mean that they still identify as Chinese, any more than Americans whose ancestors came from England, Germany or the Netherlands still call themselves British, German or Dutch.
This diversity is what differentiates Taiwan from China and constitutes the strongest argument for Taiwan’s right to self-determination. This is precisely what is blocking the CCP’s unification goal, and this is precisely what the CCP fears most.
The law which is due to come into force on July 1 establishes a sort of thought police system, an invisible identity camp. Its definition of “undermining ethnic unity” is deliberately vague, thereby widening the scope of criminality. If you have publicly denied being Chinese, you have no idea what will happen the next time you travel to China for business. You will now have to fear being detained or extradited during a stopover abroad. You cannot know if you have already unknowingly broken the law. You will live in the shadow of potential retaliation.
By asserting that this law applies to the Taiwanese people, the CCP can place Taiwanese citizens under a form of ideological house arrest, incentivizing journalists, businesses, and public figures to self-censor, sowing doubt about the legitimacy of the Taiwanese government, and creating internal divides. This has long been China’s strategy to force Taiwan to adhere to Beijing’s rule.
Taiwan has been governed separately from China since the end of the civil war in 1949. Although Taiwan’s governance was initially in the hands of a Chinese nationalist dictatorship, direct presidential elections began in 1996. Taiwan’s democracy is young and fragile. In every presidential race, the most contentious issue is identity vis-à-vis China – and the results show that the more a candidate leans toward China, the harder it becomes to win.
Taiwan is a free country today. Since the lifting of martial law in 1987, nearly 40 years of open public debate have accumulated. There are hundreds of TV channels. Every evening, during prime time, political commentary programs openly criticize the government and debate China. The fiercest discussions almost always revolve around identity. Taiwan’s independence is expressed through its plurality. This is what the CCP is trying to erase today.
Years of CCP intimidation, combined with the spread of AI and algorithmic amplification, have pushed Taiwanese public opinion toward the extremes of the spectrum. The specter of populism hangs over the country. Taiwan has been, for 10 consecutive years, the country most targeted by foreign disinformation, according to international observers. He found it difficult to resist the CCP’s pressure campaign. Research shows that 95% of Taiwanese have been victims of misinformation. Distrust of politicians stands at 68 percent. The share of people reporting a loss of trust in the media stands at 70.5 percent. All these numbers are climbing.
The CCP uses the law to formalize its political goals, exploiting existing distrust to propagate narratives of hatred and Chinese identity from within. Taiwan’s freedom of speech is being used as a weapon against itself.
This is not hyperbole; this is a serious matter. If Beijing gets its wish, Taiwan will become the next Hong Kong, or Tibet, or Xinjiang. This would not bring stability to the Indo-Pacific region, nor would it help a global economy that depends on advanced semiconductors. Yet since his summit with Xi, US President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized Taiwan and questioned the justification for its military defense. The language of democratic values no longer looms large in how the United States approaches Taiwan.
On July 1, the Taiwanese will begin a new battle. We are increasingly alone in the face of this challenge, with our democracy at stake.