The 2026 FIFA World Cup in the United States, Mexico and Canada captured the global imagination with open play, star players, fan diversity and state-of-the-art stadiums. Few events attract as much attention as a World Cup, attracting viewers from around the world at all hours of the day and night. Yet football’s flagship tournament is rarely free of controversy. This World Cup has sparked criticism over travel restrictionseye-watering ticket priceand commercial pressures that have reshaped the game. Less visible are the protests directed against private sector players, such as Aramco And Mytellinking FIFA to states with dismal human rights records.
The World Cup has long been used by malicious governments seeking legitimacy and international prestige. Benito Mussolini recognized the propaganda value of the tournament when Italy hosted the 1934 World Cup, presenting fascist Italy as modern, disciplined and prosperous. During the 1978 World Cup in Argentina, the military dictatorship of General Jorge Rafael Videla projected an image of national unity as political prisoners were tortured and disappeared just miles from tournament sites. More recently, Russia the organization of the 2018 World Cup and from Qatar of the 2022 tournament demonstrated how major football events can help mitigate international criticism and cultivate favorable narratives.
Much of the debate around “sportswashing” focuses on international competition. Yet national tournaments can serve a similar function. The Chinese government’s promotion of football in the Uyghur region provides an example of how local sporting events can be mobilized to distract from current human rights violations while advancing state political goals.
Since 2017, the Chinese state has been implicated in a series of human rights violations targeting Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples, including mass internment, state-sponsored forced labor, widespread surveillance, cultural destructionAnd forced sterilization. The Uighur court concluded that these policies amounted to genocide, while the United Nations find that they may constitute crimes against humanity.
As international scrutiny intensified, Beijing gradually changed its message. Rather than defend After the crackdown, officials began touting these same policies as being responsible for creating a stable region now open to visitors and investors. There are more and more Uyghurs appeared in state narratives as grateful beneficiaries of development and modernization. International hotel chains and journey businesses helped build a regional tourism industry, while social media influencers amplified images of hospitality and prosperity, ignoring the context of repression. Sporting events have become an important part of this effort. Winter sports, rally racesand others competitions helped normalize conditions and distract from allegations of atrocity crimes.
The Assimilation Cup
Football has now become one of the most visible elements of China’s changing message.
Chinese state media are promote the 2026 Tongxin Cup Xinjiang Super League as the first amateur football competition on a regional scale. Fourteen teams at the prefecture level compete in a tournament that takes place from May to August. Extensive state media coverage highlighted large crowds, cheap ticketsAnd popular participation. The league is also marketed as a economic engineprefectural governments promoting football tourism, cultural shows, goodsAnd local branding campaigns.
These initiatives align with sportswashing’s goal of distracting from human rights violations and cultivating favorable narratives. Yet the political message surrounding the Tongxin Cup reveals something else. The name of the competition, “Tongxin” (同心) – translated as “one heart” or “united as one” – is strongly associated with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) rhetoric of “ethnic unity”. State media systematically frame the Tongxin Cup as bringing together players and spectators from “all ethnic groups”, while the tournament pomegranate themed the mascots, Tongtong and Xinxin, draw directly from the CCP’s narratives of ethnic unity. The pomegranate mark is a direct reference to the image of Xi Jinping. comment that China’s ethnic groups should be “closely knit like the seeds of a pomegranate.”
A promotional graphic showing the 2026 Tongxin Cup mascots Tongtong and Xinxin.
As such, the political message of the Tongxin Cup is closely aligned with state policies aimed at reshaping ethnic identity in the region. Adopted in March this year, the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress need public institutions, schools, media and businesses to promote a shared national identity rather than distinct ethnic identities. The law develops Teaching in Mandarin encourages greater “inter-ethnic integration” and institutionalizes campaigns promoting national unity.
Therefore, national identity is understood as Han culture, and the decades-long process of Uyghur cultural loss is codified by law. In this context, football becomes a vector for strengthening assimilation and erasing diversity. It is no coincidence that the law comes into effect on July 1, 2026, right in the middle of the Tongxin Cup matches.
Football as a tool of control
The use of national football competitions for political purposes is not unique to China. Across different political systems and eras, authoritarian governments have used national football to manufacture consent, project legitimacy, and distract from repression. Francisco Franco renowned Spain’s historic Copa del Rey as the Copa del Generalísimo between 1939 and 1976, making football an affirmation of its regime.
China’s use of football in the Uyghur region continues this tradition. The strategy is particularly effective because football is also popular in Uyghur society as in countries like Spain. However, for many years, football provided a means for Uyghurs to express their discontent with Chinese rule. Supporting the national team playing against China became a common form of support. resistance among some Uighur fans.
Additionally, football became a means of independent organization. In the mid-1990s, the Uyghurs of Ghulja replied unemployment and drug addiction among young people by relaunching the meshrepa traditional community gathering, to offer mutual support and moral guidance. MEshrep leaders organized a 16-team soccer league to provide healthy activities for marginalized Uyghur youth. Chinese authorities halted the tournament, deployed tanks on football fields and removed goal posts to prevent matches from taking place. The suppression of Meshrep’s activities became one of the grievances that contributed to the Ghulja protests of February 1997 and subsequent demonstrations. massacre Uyghur protesters by Chinese security forces.
The lesson learned by the Chinese state is not that football can strengthen communities. It was that football could become a focus of resistance and generate social networks beyond the control of the state. Today, football is encouragedbut only under official control. The State promotes participation and funds facilitiesprovided that football serves state objectives rather than community autonomy.
Football thrives in the Uyghur diaspora, with initiatives like establishment of the East Turkestan national team, which compete in international non-FIFA tournaments, as well as the game of “Uyghur World Cup» and amateur competitions organized by diaspora communities in countries like UNITED STATES, Australia And Türkiye. However, these initiatives operate on limited budgets. Their importance lies in the ability of exile communities to organize themselves and maintain their language, culture and community ties despite formidable obstacles.
In a context of limited resources within the diaspora, the Tongxin Cup represents more than a football tournament. It demonstrates how an authoritarian state with sufficient resources can appropriate a popular sport and transform it into an instrument of political messaging and diverting attention from human rights violations. By promoting narratives of unity, prosperity and participation, the competition helps normalize a broader project to assimilate Uyghurs into a state-defined national identity.
Football can bring people together. It can also be used to legitimize policies that erode the very diversity that sport is often celebrated to reflect. As he himself said:guardians” of world football, FIFA could express its concern, but with a coterie of autocratic regimes pulling the strings of world football, this seems more than distant.