Seventy-six years ago, the People’s Republic of China launched its first flagship, the Nanchang. It was the ship’s third life. First known as Uji, then Changzhi, she had been surrendered to the Communists by Nationalist mutineers, and the Nationalists themselves acquired the ship as a war prize from Japan.
In the 21st century, Beijing has no need for second-hand military assets.
Through an impressive and sustained industrial surge, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has grown and modernized, aiming to become a “world-class army” by mid-century. It already has the world’s largest navy, extensive cyber capabilities, and a vast array of rockets and missiles.
This expansion is not only significant in absolute terms. It is not possible to consider the expansion of the PLA without considering its competitor, the United States. While the U.S. military remains the preeminent military force as its power relative to the PLA declines, the international landscape is changing.
The implications of these changes are of great importance for Australia.
Any in-depth conversation about Australian defense policy – about how we structure and invest in our own capabilities as well as the partnerships we form – must be informed by all the facts. And one notable fact is that, as Sam Roggeveen and I show in a recent report for the Lowy InstituteThe PLA’s military expansion is gradually reducing one of Australia’s key defensive assets: geography.
The PLA’s growing force of long-range bombers and missiles will be able to threaten parts of northern Australia in the future, eroding the sanctuary afforded by geography. In the case of China’s highly sophisticated cyber capabilities, geography provides no refuge.
The growth of the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) offshore fleet – from destroyers and frigates to submarines, aircraft carriers and supply ships – demonstrates China’s aspirations for a global navy. Long-distance expeditions such as those of Task Force 107 Australia world tour in 2025 will become more and more common.
Our report does not indicate any specific intentions of China towards Australia. But knowing a state’s capabilities is as important to defense planning as any assessment of its intentions – in fact, capabilities inform intentions.
A better understanding of another state’s capabilities means better planning on Australia’s part. The National Defense Strategy states that the Australian Defense Force (ADF) must deter threats, shape Australia’s environment and respond to contingencies. The evolving military balance in the Indo-Pacific region affects the scale of these threats, the nature of this environment and the substances of these contingencies.
In Chinese planning, the possibility of forced unification with Taiwan remains a central question. An attack on Australia is therefore not a high, or even medium, priority. But to threaten Australian interests, it is not necessary to strike Australian territory.
The disruption to international trade caused by the US military adventure in Iran has demonstrated unequivocally that Australia is not immune to shocks occurring on the other side of the world. If Beijing took steps to change the status quo regarding Taiwan, it would disrupt some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes – shipping lanes that carry huge quantities of Australia’s exports and imports.
Furthermore, if such an eventuality were to arise in Taiwan, the debate would not be over if Australia were to be involved. Australia operates facilities critical to the US military presence in Asia – such as Pine Gap and North West Cape – and hosts a large contingent of US Marines in Darwin, and it is expanding the RAAF base at Tindal to accommodate US strategic bombers. In the event of war, these sites would certainly be targets and would be within range.
With the likelihood that China will project a force closer to Australia in the coming decades, we cannot pretend that the country faces an imminent threat. But we cannot claim to be free from threats either.
Given the scale of the challenges encountered, the FAD cannot be considered as an impersonal political arm. How it shapes the regional environment, deters and responds to threats affects all Australians. It is therefore vital to understand how the region’s military build-up changes Australia’s situation. An informed public is better able to engage in substantive conversations about defense.
If these are “the most difficult circumstances Australia has faced since the Second World War,” such conversations are not only useful; they are imperative.