On May 22, a trailer for the film “The Belief” (also known as “Peng Hu” – its Chinese title means “Battle of Penghu”) was released on Chinese channels. social networksannouncing its July 25 release date. This date corresponds to the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894, after which China was forced to cede Taiwan to Japan.
The film mainly depicts the Battle of Penghu in 1683 between the Qing Dynasty navy and the Tungning Kingdom (also known as the “Ming Zheng Regime”), which was a Han Chinese-led regime in Taiwan. Notably, the Tungning Kingdom was loyal to the Ming dynasty, the Han empire ousted by the Qing rulers. The Qing dynasty ultimately won the battle, forcing the Tungning Kingdom to surrender.
Like most “main tune” films – that is, films promoting the Chinese government’s official ideology – promotional materials for “The Belief” have also been released by some Chinese. state media points of sale. However, the film immediately sparked a wave of criticism on Chinese social media.
Most commentaries believe that “The Belief” actually describes the process of the Manchus, a “foreign ethnic group”, conquering a Han Chinese regime. Although the history of the Tungning Kingdom is filled with bloody infighting and chaos, public opinion often idealizes it as a resilient Han Chinese regime fiercely resisting foreign invasion. This has led to state media support for the film being interpreted as an ideological failure favoring capitulation.
The Chinese government had a different message in mind. He hopes to demonstrate through this film his determination to (re)unify Taiwan. The film’s tagline – “The trend of the world comes with the wind” – is strikingly similar to the Chinese government’s assertion that “the reunification of the homeland is an unstoppable historical trend.” Beijing apparently hopes to project the reconquest of Taiwan by the Qing dynasty onto its future (re)unification with the island. If the Taiwanese government, like the Toungning Kingdom in the 17th century, rejects the terms proposed by mainland China, Beijing will have the ability to achieve its goals by force.
In fact, this is the second time the film has sparked such intense public debate. On October 25, 2025 – the 80th anniversary of Taiwan’s handover – the film released its posters and trailer, which also attracted widespread criticism on social media. The announcement of its release date, despite public pressure, is perceived by some Internet users as a new “provocation”.
The negative reaction to “The Belief” reflects strong anti-Qing sentiment in contemporary Chinese society. Where does this atmosphere come from?
The Qing dynasty ended more than a century ago, making it unlikely that contemporary Chinese possess a deep collective memory of their lives under Qing rule. Additionally, the Manchus of today’s China have been heavily assimilated by the Han Chinese, and their language has almost become extinct. This means that serious cultural conflict between the Han Chinese and the Manchus is also unlikely. These factors make this question particularly perplexing.
This anti-Qing sentiment is reminiscent of Han chauvinism, which has long existed in China. Its influence, however, has been limited since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. For decades, it was more of a topic of discussion within a narrow circle than a topic of discussion among mainstream public opinion. For example, compare the reception of “The Belief” with the rise in popularity of palace dramas and romantic dramas set in the Qing dynasty in mainland China during the 2010s. Some of these drama series achieved extremely high ratings during this period.
However, in recent years, films and television series set under this dynasty have been subject to harsher questioning and criticism for their political and nationalist implications. This represents a new wave of Han chauvinism, which conflicts with official discourse.
According to the Han chauvinist discourse that has strengthened in recent years, the Qing dynasty is often seen as a dark era for the Han people, leading to entirely negative consequences for Chinese history. This dynasty is frequently associated with massacres, national humiliation, monarchical autocracy and cultural control. Some even compare it to the Japanese invasion of the 1930s and 1940s, arguing that the Qing dynasty was a successful conquest of China, while Japan was a “defeated Qing”. In fact, these accusations are often one-sided and exaggerated.
This feeling can be explained mainly by the fact rise of nationalism among the young Chinese generation. But more importantly, it stems from a socio-economic narrative that has gained ground in Chinese public opinion in recent years, according to which the Manchus and the Qing dynasty are assigned a class identity.
In recent years, due to the growing gap between rich and poor and the solidification of class structures, a “class story” is spreading among the Chinese people, especially among the younger generation, driven by pessimism and discontent with society. This narrative aims to explain the collective despair and anxiety of Chinese society. In this narrative, those in power and the wealthy are often portrayed as “exploiters” and the source of suffering for contemporary Chinese people.
Although sometimes accompanied by misinformation and conspiracy theories, this “class narrative” has combined with more pervasive nationalist sentiment and spread into historical understanding. This led to the current anti-Qing sentiment.
Looking at history, the Manchus, who conquered China with a relatively small population, enjoyed certain privileges during their rule. These privileges have led to a deliberate distinction between the Manchus and the Han Chinese in current sentiment, equating the Manchus with the “ruling class” and portraying them as “oppressors” of the Han. This reminds people of the rigid class system in Chinese society today. Seen in this light, the rise of anti-Qing sentiment is essentially a collective historical imagination, used to catharsis contemporary Chinese discontent with reality.
Although this sentiment may seem to contradict the Chinese government’s policy of ethnic unity, in the context of the new “Law on Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress“, it could be used to advance Beijing’s more Han-centered project. ethnic politics. However, even if it is possible to exploit this sentiment for government purposes, Beijing must recognize that the underlying collective pessimism and anxiety could become a potentially destabilizing factor for society.
More importantly, if Han chauvinism spirals out of control, it could threaten the stability of China, a multi-ethnic country, in its efforts to further achieve its goal of “national unity.”