Shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the democratic world largely passively observed that China was the main enabler of Moscow’s war effort. Even though Russia is aware of its dependence on China, the world’s inaction boils down to collective dependence on China’s control and dominance over global trade and technology supply chains. While democracies are reluctant to take economic risks, China’s support for Russia continues, as does the war.
Initial hopes that China could convince its junior authoritarian partner to scale back the war quickly faded when it became clear that there were truly no limits to the Beijing-Moscow friendship. The use of nuclear weapons may be an exception, but even this assumption should be questioned.
Now, a May 19 Reuters report citing three European intelligence agencies, revealed that the Chinese military “secretly trained around 200 Russian servicemen in China late last year.” Although this is apparently a revelation, no one should be surprised, given that the training, which reportedly took place in Beijing and Nanjing, was based on an agreement signed in July 2025.
And yet, no world leader or government is yet prepared to publicly condemn such training. Indeed, world leaders such as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz continue to answer questions by repeating the same 2022 hope that President Xi Jinping can “urge President [Vladimir] Putin to end this war in Ukraine.” This hope should have disappeared from the rhetoric long ago.
If these training reports are true, this activity represents a blatant contradiction with Chinese leaders’ declarations of neutrality in the Ukraine conflict. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2024, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Beijing was not a party to the war in Ukraine and “all efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the crisis must be supported”. At a July 2025 press conference with German Foreign Minister Johann David Wadephul, Wang reiterated China’s position on the Ukraine conflict, which he said “involves promoting peace talks, not providing lethal weapons to conflict parties, and strictly controlling the export of dual-use items, including drones.”
Although we have yet to see evidence of direct Chinese government involvement in the war (while North Korea has sent soldiers to the front), the countries supporting Ukraine have effectively set a precedent by allowing China to give Russia everything it needs for the war, without direct military involvement.
We created a rod for Ukraine’s back. China’s supply of electronic components, machine tools, drones and other dual-use items has been instrumental in Russia’s ability to sustain the war. In the early months of the invasion, China reportedly ramped up exports to Russia of microchips, other electronic components and raw materials, some of which have military uses. THE Wall Street Journal reported in July 2022 that these exports had “more than doubled to around $50 million” in the first five months after the start of the war. The report added that shipments of aluminum oxide, an important precursor in weapons production and aerospace, increased 400-fold.
A March 2026 report by The Insider identified Chinese companies as the largest group among 6,000 exporting restricted dual-use goods to Russian companies and defense industry contractors. This included small turbojet engines generating 800 newtons of thrust (80 kg force), potentially for large military drones.
Russia is also reported having received chemical precursors, such as ammonium perchlorate, which can be used in high-performance solid propellants for space launches and missiles.
A policy dashboard produced by the Mercator Institute of China Studies provides details on Chinese exports of dual-use technologies with military applications.
Source: Hugo von Essen/Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies.
As part of its Russia-China policy dashboard, the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) has identified specific Russian dependencies that have increased in recent years (top), and which have potential military applications. Another chart from EUISS (bottom) provides more details on Chinese exports of dual-use goods to Russia.
Source: EUISS.
Source: EUISS.
An ASPI from March 2026 report detailed the growing defense cooperation between China and Russia. He revealed that military exercises were increasingly numerous and complex, particularly peaking after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies And Chinese Ministry of National Defense.
China did not slowly become the first decisive catalyst of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Its limitless partnership was signed just before the war, and the two authoritarian regimes have been a couple since day one. China’s training of Russian troops may be a new activity, but it is just another element of their deep strategic partnership.
This article was originally published in ASPI’s The Strategist.