As U.S. President Donald Trump and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping met in Beijing this week for what many called a “superpower summit,” countries in the South, such as Pakistan, watched closely, examining the meeting’s outcomes and the implications for themselves. These countries hope that better cooperation between China and the United States could benefit not only the world’s two largest economies, but also smaller and middle powers trying to adapt to an increasingly turbulent international landscape.
The summit comes at a particularly difficult time, as violent conflicts in West Asia, maritime disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and long-running disputes over Taiwan have created a volatile mix of security and economic risks.
Trump’s visit to China was originally scheduled for April 2026, but was postponed due to the US-Israeli war against Iran.
Thanks to the fragile ceasefire between the United States and Iran, the Beijing summit could take place. The agenda of Trump’s China visit expanded to cover other pressing regional issues, such as the reopening of critical maritime routes and a lasting resolution to the Iran dispute. Unlike previous engagements between Washington and Beijing, the agenda of the just-concluded summit was reshaped by the war in Iran and resulting economic shocks, which brought these issues to the forefront for everyone in the region and beyond.
China’s Foreign Ministry described Trump’s state visit to Beijing as a historic moment that “brought the world much-needed stability and certainty.” Furthermore, the two sides agreed to strengthen communication and coordination on international and regional issues and address mutual concerns “appropriately.”
For many people in the Global South, this gives rise to cautious optimism. The declaration and meeting represent more than bilateral diplomacy, as it could stabilize the situation in West Asia and prove beneficial to smaller powers like Pakistan.
For example, the Iran-US conflict and the associated closure of parts of the Strait of Hormuz have imposed real costs on countries like Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and other South Asian countries. As trade through the Strait of Hormuz faces uncertainty, energy prices have soared. Countries had to source their oil elsewhere. Moreover, Islamabad, in particular, had to simultaneously balance its relations with the United States, China, Iran and the Gulf states. These pressures have worsened existing economic and geopolitical difficulties.
For Pakistan, a reduced confrontation between the United States and China could potentially ease the burden of constant balancing. In turn, this could allow Islamabad and other regional states to focus more on development priorities rather than crisis response.
Pakistan views this summit through the prism of its own diplomatic history, as a bridge between Washington and Beijing.
In 1971, Pakistan, then led by President Yahya Khan, served as a trusted broker and logistical channel that facilitated the historic rapprochement between China and the United States. This effort paved the way for Henry Kissinger’s visit to Beijing in July 1971 and then U.S. President Richard Nixon’s historic trip to China in 1972. This breakthrough ended decades of hostility between the United States and China and reshaped Cold War geopolitics.
It appears that Pakistan is once again attempting to leverage its unique geopolitical position as a trusted intermediary to reprise its role from 1971. While this role may not be on the scale of that of 1971, Islamabad indirectly helped facilitate the US-China summit.
Last month, Islamabad played a central diplomatic role in negotiating and extending a two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif personally urged Trump to agree to a ceasefire to facilitate peace talks in Islamabad. Trump, for his part, publicly acknowledged Pakistan’s constructive efforts.
Meanwhile, China urged Pakistan to step up diplomatic mediation efforts to facilitate dialogue between Iran and the United States.
It should be noted that this mediation took place against the backdrop of the strong partnership between Pakistan and China. This relationship has further strengthened these initiatives of Pakistan. Notably, Trump’s visit to China was delayed due to active hostilities with Iran.
Like much of the Global South, Pakistan hopes that better China-US cooperation will help end conflicts, stabilize the global economy and create space for multi-alignment without forcing countries to make binary choices that compromise their core interests. Arguably, an improvement in the Sino-US dynamic would provide countries in the Global South, such as Pakistan, with valuable room for maneuver in many respects.
For example, countries deeply involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) often experience implicit pressure when Washington and Beijing clash.
In this context, a reduction in tensions between Washington and Beijing could allow countries like Pakistan to advance practical cooperation, such as the next phase of CPEC projects in the areas of agriculture, technology and connectivity, while also maintaining their trade ties with the United States. Additionally, better great power relations could accelerate the joint agricultural modernization projects that Pakistan is pursuing with its Chinese partners.
In today’s fragmented world order, such space can enable middle powers and the Global South to pursue pragmatic interests rather than ideological alignments.
With the conclusion of the Trump-Xi summit, Pakistan and other countries in the South will be watching to see if the outcome of the meeting will bring them and the world the stability they and the world urgently need.
