On May 11, Beijing announced that US President Donald Trump would visit China on May 13-15 – just two days before the start of his summit with President Xi Jinping.
Trump had publicly confirmed his visit dates back to March. For months, Beijing’s public response remained deliberately evasive: “China and the United States are in communication regarding the proposed visit of US President Donald Trump.” Preparatory diplomacy continued in the background, including a bipartisan visit to Congress in Beijing that raised issues likely to be on Trump’s agenda: market access for U.S. companies, Boeing plane sales, tariff relief and agricultural purchases.
Beijing’s late confirmation was a calibrated response to a transactional president who treats diplomacy less as a tool of institutional government than as a theater of negotiations. Trump had proposed a two-day visit; China announced three days. Whether motivated by protocol, negotiations, or both, the extra 24 hours had political significance: If Trump came to Beijing, he would do so as part of the Chinese agenda.
This choreography reflects Beijing’s broader approach toward Washington under the second Trump administration: do not initiate, do not refuse and do not compromise. Don’t take the initiative, because Beijing has no interest in rewarding Trump’s instinct for diplomatic theater and agenda-setting spectacle. Do not refuse, because closing the door to a guest is not China’s style, and keeping the door open preserves diplomatic flexibility. Do not compromise, because national security, the one-China principle and technological sovereignty remain non-negotiable.
The summit agenda will be busy. Taiwan, trade, nuclear security, Iran, artificial intelligence and rare earths could all be on this list. On the surface, the meeting will be all handshakes and protocol. Underneath, it will be a test of strength on three connected fronts, determining which side will be best able to turn its influence into diplomatic advantage.
Taiwan: the heart of the heart
Taiwan will be the underlying political issue of the Trump-Xi summit. For Beijing, this is not just one subject among many others. This is the question that defines the political boundary of the relationship. During the preparatory visit to Congress, Chinese officials again emphasized that the United States must adhere to the one-China principle if it wants stable relations with China.
This is where Trump’s transactional instincts create both opportunities and risks. His instinct is to turn every problem into a deal. But Taiwan is not a soybean contract or an order from Boeing. Any attempt to use Taiwan as a pressure card would face the strongest resistance from Beijing. Conversely, any hint that Washington might dilute its commitments to Taiwan in exchange for Chinese purchases or trade concessions would alarm U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
The most likely outcome is therefore not a grand agreement on Taiwan, but a fight over the language. Beijing will push for greater US reassurance on the one-China principle and opposition to Taiwan independence. Washington will seek to avoid any visible retreat from current policy. The danger lies in ambiguity. Trump may prefer language that appears to be a breakthrough but creates uncertainty among allies.
For Australia, Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asian states, this could be the most important part of the summit. The question is not only what Trump and Xi say about Taiwan, but also whether the meeting changes perceptions of U.S. trustworthiness. In the Indo-Pacific region, deterrence depends not only on military capacity, but also on confidence in political commitments.
Trade: Trump wants numbers; China wants optionality
The second common thread is trade. Trump needs visible economic victories. His domestic audience understands aircraft orders, farm purchases, tariff cuts and investment promises more easily than abstract language about strategic stabilization. It is Why Boeing planes and agricultural contracts should return to the center of expectations at the summit.
It looks like a managed business. This is not rules-based liberalization. These are numbers that can be advertised, photographed and sold politically. For Trump, increasing purchases of soybeans, corn, beef or other agricultural products would reassure rural populations hit by years of tariff volatility. An order from Boeing would back up its manufacturing narrative. Limited tariff adjustments would allow it to claim that China acts first.
China might accept some of this. There are incentives to stabilize the relationship. Its economy still benefits from reduced tariff uncertainty, U.S. investment, and access to the U.S. market. Chinese businesses and consumers could also benefit from some imports. Beijing may believe that carefully chosen purchases are a manageable price for reducing short-term tensions.
But China will resist any framework that gives Washington unlimited leverage. Beijing has learned the lessons of Phase One trade agreement under which large purchase commitments are politically useful but structurally fragile. It has also diversified its trade away from US imports and the US market, giving it more room to absorb pressure.
Technology: AI versus rare earths
The third common thread is technology. Trump and Xi may not resolve export controls or restrictions on rare earths in detail. Yet technology will remain beneath negotiations as the most important form of asymmetric interdependence: U.S. strength in artificial intelligence, chips, software ecosystems, and cloud infrastructure compared to Chinese influence in rare earths, critical minerals processing, industrial supply chains, and rapidly evolving application ecosystems.
Washington’s pressure points are clear. The United States has imposed export controls on advanced semiconductors, AI chips and related technologies, although Trump has shown this since December 2025. a willingness to exchange this leverage for tariffs. Nonetheless, Washington’s strategic goal remains to slow China’s progress in artificial intelligence and prevent Chinese companies from accessing the most advanced parts of the U.S.-led tech stack.
Beijing’s counter-influence lies upstream. China dominates many of the physical foundations of the clean energy and defense industrial economy, including rare earth processing and magnet manufacturing. These materials are essential to defense systems, robotics, wind turbines, electric vehicles and advanced manufacturing.
Neither side can completely dissociate itself without incurring heavy costs. The United States can restrict tokensbut it encourages China to accelerate its quest for technological autonomy. China can use restrictions on rare earths as leverage, but it will strengthen efforts to build alternative supply chains without China. This is the paradox of militarized interdependence: each coercive action encourages the other party to reduce its vulnerability, thus weakening the coercive power of the initial decision.
This makes the Trump-Xi summit both dangerous and necessary. Dangerous, because each side is tempted to use its choke points in a coercive manner. Necessary because unmanaged technological competition can quickly lead to industrial disruptions, supply chain shocks and military tensions.
Who is the true ally of time?
Trump is in a hurry. Domestic political pressures, economic uncertainty, and instability in the Middle East make visible diplomatic victories more valuable. Beijing, on the other hand, can afford to slow down when it serves its interests. It seems that time is playing more and more in his favor.
This is the ruthless logic of negotiations between great powers: the side most desperate for an outcome generally starts from a position of weakness.
This is why the summit choreography is important. Trump’s diplomacy depends on converting pressure into visible concessions. If the other side refuses to panic, refuses to accept Trump’s agenda, and refuses to fund de-escalation with core interests, the pressure campaign loses its force.
Beijing’s late announcement was therefore not a minor protocol choice. It was an early test of the agenda-setting power of great power diplomacy. China did not reject the visit, nor was it quick to confirm it. He will receive Trump in conditions that demonstrate uncompromising courtesy.
What to watch
Trump will arrive in Beijing and China will receive him in ceremony. But the success of the summit should not be judged by whether Trump announces a major deal, even though he will almost certainly seek one. The most important questions are: Does the summit produce language on Taiwan that reassures the region or destabilizes it? Are trade commitments formulated as reciprocal stabilization or as unilateral Chinese concessions? Will an agreement on rare earths be accompanied by changes in American technological restrictions?
Answers matter. Trump needs the performance of success. Xi needs power management.
For middle powers like Australia, the lesson is sobering. Sino-US relations are not returning to the old world of engagement, nor are they moving clearly toward complete decoupling. It is entering a phase of selective negotiations in the areas of security, trade and technology. Taiwan, tariffs, AI and rare earths are no longer separate files. They are now part of the same strategic register.
China’s diplomatic posture – receiving Trump, but on Xi’s timetable – indicates that time is no longer just Washington’s ally. Beijing is increasingly confident in its ability to set the agenda rather than being driven by the United States’ domestic political cycle.