With his victories in the recent state legislative elections in West Bengal And AssameseThe Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), or its alliance partners, are in power in all five Indian states sharing a border with Bangladesh. This should make New Delhi’s task of implementing its Bangladesh policy a breeze, since it will no longer attract opposition from state governments. However, this does not necessarily mean a reset in India-Bangladesh relations. In fact, a harsh, poorly managed policy lacking nuance could further alienate Dhaka, thereby discouraging its current drive to repair ties with India.
The new Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in Dhaka congratulated the BJP on his victory in West Bengal, which toppled the Trinamool Congress (TMC) party. The BNP described ousted chief minister Mamata Banerjee as a “obstacle” at the signing of the Teesta river water sharing agreement and expressed hope that the new BJP government in the state would be different. At the same time, he expressed apprehension regarding the possible increase in Indian attempts to “bring in” people whom New Delhi describes as illegal Bangladeshi migrants. Bangladesh Border Guard (BGB) personnel will remain vigilant against such incidents, according to Dhaka. Interior Minister Salahuddin Ahmed announced. Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman was tough, promising that “Dhaka will act» against such movements.
Expelling so-called illegal Muslim migrants from Bangladesh has been a priority for the BJP. Promises of forced evictions may have contributed to the party’s electoral victory in West Bengal, leading the new state government to attempt, in tandem with directives from India’s Home Ministry, to implement such a policy. However, in the absence of a consensus between New Delhi and Dhaka on the issue, the latter is not expected to take such a decision sympathetically.
India, in April, appointed Dinesh Trivedi, a BJP politician from West Bengal, as the new envoy to Dhaka, breaking with a long tradition of placing only career diplomats in the post. The reason for this decision has not been explained by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Perhaps, according to New Delhi’s calculations, a politician is better placed than a diplomat to try to soothe the feathers of a Dhaka shaken by India’s refusal to extradite former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Shaikh Hasina. However, as long as the BJP’s domestic politics continues to portray Bangladesh as a country that tolerates persecution of the Hindu minority and BJP leaders call Bangladeshi migrants “termites» which threaten India’s national security as part of a sinister policy of demographic invasion, Trivedi’s room for maneuver will remain limited.
The extradition of Hasina, who was sentenced to death in absentia for her role in the violence that accompanied the July 2024 uprisings that deposed her, is a priority for the BNP, but not necessarily an issue on which it will allow its ties with India to deteriorate to the point of no return. Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Rahman came to India in early April with a series of demands that included the Hasina file, but also the supply of larger volumes of diesel and fertilizer and the resolution of the delay in the issuance of visas to Bangladeshi citizens by the Indian High Commission and consulates in Bangladesh.
India’s response, particularly on the issue of diesel and fertilizer, would have been positive, but lacking the warmth one would expect to see towards a neighbor reeling from the impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. India’s oil minister told Rahman that such supplies would only be made once India’s own demands were met. India has a dedicated refinery in Assam and an agreement to supply diesel to Bangladesh, but it currently supplies a reduced volume fuel to the country.
New Delhi’s assessment seems to be that Dhaka has no choice but to come to terms with the fact that India is an irreplaceable neighbor that can single-handedly meet Bangladesh’s critical needs for energy, water, raw materials, essential commodities, health services, etc. These are well-established areas of cooperation, which can also be weaponized, as is currently the case in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh is not alone. It’s no surprise that there are more anxious neighbors than friends around India. Despite its much-vaunted “neighborhood first” policy, New Delhi continues to act like a big brother and remains indifferent to the needs of its neighbors – until those countries seek a solution to their problems by engaging with China. India’s past foreign policy towards Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives is instructive.
Dhaka, under the BNP government, is ready to take the same path. Rahman paid a three-day official visit to China on May 5, invitation by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Before his departure, he had some sharp words for New Delhi. Expressing frustration over delays in negotiating the Teesta River water sharing agreement with India, Rahman said that his country will discuss development projects with China instead of waiting for the agreement to be concluded. Rahman is expected to discuss trade, low-interest loans, extended repayment periods and new investments with the Chinese side.
Beijing, slow to act since the fall of the Hasina government two years ago, is clearly reorganizing its activities in Dhaka. This could wake New Delhi from its slumber. But it will be a question of taking to the track while the other competitor is already running..