In early May 2026, during Japan’s extended holiday period known as “Golden Week”, Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae made official visits to Vietnam and Australia. Takaichi’s trip to Australia – his first since taking office – coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the 1976 Japan-Australia Basic Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and took place at the invitation of Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.
Takaichi’s visit to Australia took place against a backdrop of unprecedented international tensions between the two countries. In particular, the growing instability in the Middle East has created a very worrying situation for Japan and Australia, both of which rely heavily on imported energy resources. Additionally, the Trump administration’s policies toward the Middle East have raised fears of a potential power vacuum in the Indo-Pacific region, calling into question the security of Japan and Australia, which have long depended on the U.S. military presence.
At a summit meeting in Canberra, the two leaders released a series of forward-looking documents, including a joint statement on economic security cooperation, as well as statements advancing partnerships in energy security, critical minerals and cyberspace, as well as an enhanced framework for defense and security cooperation. They further instructed their respective ministers to explore concrete steps to institutionalize “comprehensive security cooperation” between Japan and Australia by their next summit.
During the meeting, Takaichi called Japan and Australia “pioneers in cooperation between like-minded countries.” Although the Japanese government has so far refrained from providing a rigid definition of “like-minded countries,” a survey of states so designated reveals several common attributes.
First, many of these countries share concerns about China’s rise. Although the degree of perceived threat naturally varies depending on geographic and economic circumstances, they are united in their reluctance to have their strategic autonomy limited by military coercion or excessive economic dependence. Therefore, they share an interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in the region. Although they largely welcome the continued presence of the United States, the resurgence of “America First” under a second Trump administration has underscored the imperative to strengthen their own self-reliant economic and defense capabilities.
Second, these countries tend to occupy locations of crucial geographic importance to Japan. The sea lanes stretching from the East China Sea to the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East provide vital lifelines to Japan’s security and prosperity. Strengthening ties with states along these routes has become increasingly important, particularly as uncertainties surrounding U.S. regional engagement increase.
Third, many of these countries demonstrate an affinity with the core principles that underpin Japan’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific – namely openness, inclusion and the rule of law. In this sense, like-minded partnerships do not simply constitute an instrumental alignment of security interests, but are also anchored in a common normative framework.
Few countries embody these characteristics as clearly as Australia. While remaining a close ally of the United States, Australia is also deeply economically linked to China and therefore faces the delicate challenge of managing economic coercion while maintaining a stable bilateral relationship with Beijing. Like Japan, Australia has sought to strengthen its strategic autonomy through diversification and strengthening of trade and supply chains. In the security arena, particularly since the re-emergence of the Trump administration, Canberra has placed increasing emphasis on reducing overreliance on the United States and strengthening its self-reliant defense capability.
Australia is not a littoral state along Japan’s major sea lanes, but is nonetheless a critical partner in ensuring the security and resilience of Indo-Pacific maritime routes. Above all, it is one of the few countries that almost entirely shares Japan’s commitment to preserving a free and open international order. This shared vision of order has long underpinned large-scale cooperation between the two countries since the Cold War.
It is therefore not surprising that economic security is high on the summit’s agenda. Diversifying supply chains for critical resources and strengthening energy security provide a foundation on which both countries can pursue autonomous policy choices without being unduly vulnerable to great power rivalry. The potential transfer of Japanese frigates to Australia would not only strengthen Australia’s self-contained defense capabilities, but also demonstrate deeper cooperation in safeguarding sea lanes in the future.
Additionally, Australia’s acquisition of Japanese-built destroyers could help revitalize Japan’s defense industrial base. If this project – potentially including local production in Australia – were to be successfully completed, it would mark a significant step forward for Japan’s defense export sector.
Naturally, there are limits to what Japan and Australia can achieve on their own. The main challenge lies in expanding the network of like-minded partnerships. For many medium and small powers in the region, neither great power conflict nor the division of spheres of influence constitutes an acceptable outcome.
Even if these states cannot fundamentally change the structure of competition between great powers, by strengthening their cooperation they can limit the extent to which the great powers neglect their interests. To this end, it is essential that each country maximizes its own autonomous capabilities while deepening networked forms of cooperation, thereby building a minimum level of resilience and resistance capacity.
In this regard, Takaichi’s visit to Canberra can be seen as emblematic of the emergence of a new era in regional order-building, anchored in a growing network of partnerships between like-minded countries.