On February 14, 2026, Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu met with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference. Both men reaffirmed the strategic importance of cooperation between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, collectively known as IP4.
With concerns about China and Russia intensifying and concern about the future trajectory of U.S. alliances growing, IP4 has taken on renewed importance.
The group, initially called AP4, first gained attention when the leaders of Japan, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand attended a NATO summit in June 2022. Since 2025, NATO has described them more consistently as its “Indo-Pacific partners”, and the label IP4 has taken hold. Cooperation focused on four main areas: support for Ukraine, cyber defense, countering disinformation and emerging technologies. Concrete projects in these areas are now underway.
These efforts are clearly motivated by shared concerns about Russia and China. In recent years, strategic dialogue has intensified between European states that feel directly threatened by Russia – notably the Baltics and Poland – and Indo-Pacific countries facing pressure from China and North Korea. The feeling that the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security theaters are increasingly interconnected has become a common refrain.
However, the rise of IP4 cannot be explained solely by geopolitical convergence. It also reflects unease with the United States.
For traditional U.S. allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, questions about Washington’s long-term reliability have prompted deepening ties. In this sense, IP4 is not simply a complement to American strategy; it is also part of a broader search for resilience among US partners themselves.
At the same time, the United States remains central. As NATO’s largest member, Washington would normally serve as a bridge between the alliance and its Indo-Pacific allies. Indeed, in July 2024, IP4 leaders held informal talks with US President Joe Biden, reaffirming solidarity between countries committed to a “free and open Indo-Pacific”.
Under the Trump administration, however, cooperation between the United States and IP4 appears less coordinated. Paradoxically, this has increased European interest in strengthening direct ties with Indo-Pacific partners within the framework of NATO. In some ways, diminishing U.S. engagement has encouraged greater autonomy in transregional cooperation.
Japan’s approach has been less consistent.
In June 2025, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba did not attend the NATO summit, raising questions about Tokyo’s commitment. Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya nevertheless maintained his commitment, meeting with the NATO Secretary General and participating in IP4 discussions. Despite this, Japan’s overall position towards NATO and IP4 appears somewhat uncertain. This ambivalence may reflect broader considerations, including the state of U.S.-NATO relations and Japan’s policy toward China.
The structural constraints facing the Indo-Pacific region also differ significantly from those in Europe.
An additional factor: Western Europe includes several nuclear powers and is anchored in NATO’s collective defense framework. In contrast, the Indo-Pacific region relies heavily on the US nuclear umbrella and operates primarily through a hub-and-spoke system of alliances. Although minilateral initiatives such as the Quad and trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan and South Korea have increased coordination, there is no multilateral security architecture equivalent to that of NATO in the region.
In recent years, US allies in the Indo-Pacific region have been encouraged – in part by Washington itself – to deepen their ties. Defense cooperation between Japan and Australia is an example; Improving relations between Japan and South Korea is another. IP4 can be seen as an extension of this trend.
Its limitations are nevertheless obvious. Unlike France and the United Kingdom, none of the United States’ traditional allies in the Indo-Pacific region are nuclear powers. A framework that excludes the United States may have symbolic value, but its operational effectiveness remains limited.
Ultimately, IP4 is a mechanism for cooperation with NATO. It is not, at present, a stand-alone security framework in the Indo-Pacific region. Its evolution into something more will depend on both political will and strategic necessity.
If IP4 were to assume a more defined role within the Indo-Pacific itself, beyond its cooperation with NATO, this would mark a significant development. However, to realize this potential, the group will have to exceed its limits.