From Europe has decided to close its Russian gas market In the wake of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Kremlin actively requested new export markets.
But in 2024, Gazprom – once the largest energy company in the world – deleted losses of 1.076 rolle (approximately 12.89 billion dollars), its first net loss in almost 24 years, over a profit of 700 billion rubles of 2023 ($ 7.51 billion). The situation for the Kremlin aggravated When China refused to increase supplies As part of the Power of Siberia 2 project, which was to compensate for the loss of 50 billion cubic meters of gas in Europe.
Always looking for new markets last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin reached an agreement With President Uzbek, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the Russian gas supply to Uzbekistan, known as “reverse scheme”. Russian gas export to Uzbekistan reached 5.6 billion cubic meters in 2024In order to increase the flow to 11 billion cubic meters.
Uzbekistan, which has its own gas industry, uses Russian gas to respond to its growing internal requests, while allowing Tashkent to continue exporting gas to China. Uzbekistan is cashed in hard currency (about $ 160 per thousand cubic meters) for exports to China, while it pays a much lower price for imported Russian gas.
As the gas export crisis is always acute for Russia, The Kremlin also put pressure to provide Russian gas in northern KazakhstanIncluding the capital of Kazakhstan – Astana. Despite the vast deposits of western gas and oil and oil deposits, the regions of the northern country are not gasified. The essence of these regions, where more than 2 million ethnic Russians live, presents significant geopolitical risks for Kazakhstan similar to those in eastern Ukraine.
It is no secret that Russia has repeatedly used gas supply as a political pressure tool. Currently, three -quarters of exported Kazakh oil pass through the Russian port of Novorossiysk. The essential pipelines for Kazakhstan exports through Russia are Stop from time to timeon various technical Pretexts. These closures often coincide with the problems of bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Russia in other regions, suggest political motivation.
The prospect of importing Russian gas into northern Kazakhstan should encourage how the country uses its own abundant resources. In oil and western gas in the country, a large part of the gas produced is reinjected into oil tanks in fields like Karachaganak, Tengiz and Kashagan. As oil production is expected to decrease in five to seven years, it will be important for the Kazakh government to make plans for the future use of this gas.
The increase in gas exports will require pipelines. Thus, the government of Kazakhstan should negotiate with Russia to alleviate the severe position of Moscow on the construction of an oil and gas gas pipeline in Kazakhstan through the Caspian Sea in Azerbaijan, Turkiye, then in Europe. Russia and Iran have long blocked progress on these roads to extend the energy export of Central Asia to the world markets, often using as pretext discussions on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea.
Kazakhstan can currently provide oil and gas to German refineries via the Druzhba pipeline, but this is still based on the permission of Russia. Ensuring energy security via the diversification of export routes is crucial for Kazakhstan, and placing a pipeline through the Caspian Sea bed is essential for the energy stability of the Kazakh and political independence.
The costs of installing a gas pipeline through the Caspian Sea could be shared with Turkmenistan, which also benefits. And the EU can also be encouraged to help finance. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have the fourth largest gas reserves worldwide and can replace US or expensive American liquefied natural gas in Europe, meeting the needs of Europe for the decades to come.
During the recent EU-Central Asia summit, which was held from April 3 to 4 in Samarkand, the president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen announced her intention to invest more than 12 billion euros in the regional development of infrastructure. At the same time, China makes significant investments in the expansion of logistics on the Kazakh coast of the Caspian Sea as part of its Belt and Road (BRI) initiative.
The current geopolitical conditions, as tumultuous as they are, are nevertheless conducive to Kazakhstan to achieve the energy independence of Russia.
Europe would support such a project given more and more unpredictable trade relations between Europe and the United States. China development of oil and gas deposits in western Kazakhstan would also promote increasing exports, but the most important is the reduction in the geopolitical influence of Russia in the region. In 2023, Russia lost its economic hegemony against China for the first time since the Russian Empire colonized Central Asia. According to 2024 data, commercial volumes between Kazakhstan and China exceeded $ 40 billion, compared to $ 27 billion between Kazakhstan and Russia. A similar situation can also be observed in Uzbekistan.
Today, Kazakhstan has a crucial opportunity to diversify its oil and gas pipelines given the geopolitical and economic weaknesses of Russia. To maintain economic and political independence, the government of Kazakhstan must act quickly by capitalizing on the desire of Russia to seek new markets for computer gas. The Russian desire to export gas to northern Kazakhstan should have a price – and this price should be Moscow’s acquiescence for Kazakhstan to sell its own gas to Europe, bypassing Russia.