Unlike President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, the new Indonesian president, Prabowo SUBIANTO, has not yet introduced a coherent national maritime strategy. In fact, after its inauguration in October, Prabowo began its administration by dissolving one of the main maritime inheritances of Jokowi: the coordinated ministry of maritime affairs and investments (Marves).
Created during the second mandate of Jokowi in 2019, Marves was crucial to harmonize the approach of the country in terms of maritime affairs, in particular in the light of personalities and public quarrels between the ministers. An example of this was the dispute between the Minister of Marine Affairs and the fisheries Susi Pudjiasti and Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, the coordinated minister for maritime affairs and investments, on issues such as sustainable fishing and the combative position that Susi has taken against foreign fishing ships.
Marves reflected Jokowi’s ad hoc approach on difficult issues, such as the maritime interests rooted, and his administration was based on strong ministers like Luhut, appointed the Prime Minister of Coordination of Maritime Affairs and Investment in 2019, which could prevent other actors from undermining the main national priorities set by Jokowi. In addition, Marves embodied the maritime prospects of Jokowi, which emphasized a tight link between security and economic areas, although economic priorities often prioritize security interests, in particular with regard to key partners such as China. Thus, the dissolution of Marves should be considered as an important difference in this approach by Prabowo, in particular in terms of its approach to the link between economic and security issues.
How, then, should we interpret the approach of Indonesia in terms of maritime problems under Prabowo?
Internal policy behind the maritime strategy
As the largest archiped country in the world, maritime affairs are not only a vital resource for prosperity and security of Indonesia, but also an important aspect of the country’s national identity. Almost all Indonesian presidents have paid institutional attention to maritime governance in one form or another.
Under the first president of the country, Sukarno, in Indonesia, first introduced the archipelagic concept through the Djuanda declaration, which was not only aimed at creating a geographical unit within the borders of the former Dutch Indies, but also sought to promote national cohesion by a shared maritime identity. The declaration was initially designed to meet the challenges of post-war internal security by limiting access to warships abroad to its internal waters to prevent them from organizing unauthorized military exercises or to support internal rebellions across the archipelago.
During the era of Suharto (1966-1998), the declaration was implemented by aligning it with the evolution of the internal legal regime under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982. This allowed Indonesia to advance its program to be recognized as an archipelago state, carrying out its desire to maintain the security of the regir in matters of reaction to the threats posed by its maritime borders personal.
However, as the international understanding of the seas has evolved with UNCLOS, which has recognized not only the territorial seas but also the sovereign rights on the exclusive economic zones (EEZS) and the continental shelves, Indonesia has sought to reflect these developments by expanding its maritime agencies. This expansion has not only complicated border disputes of Indonesia with its neighbors, but also led to the creation of competing maritime agencies in Indonesia itself, preparing the context for attempts to impose coordination.
Given its single geography, the governance of maritime affairs has always been complicated for Indonesia. Maritime affairs are managed by many national institutions. For example, more than five ministries are involved in maritime issues, including the Ministries of Energy and Tourism, Marine Affairs and Fisheries and Transport. Indonesia also has more than 10 institutions with maritime capacity to apply the law, including police, navy, transport authorities, customs and others.
After Reformasi, in 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid created the Indonesian maritime councils and the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries. Under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the first was renamed Indonesia Marine Council. Although the council was dissolved under Jokowi, it was largely replaced by Marves.
Jokowi’s maritime heritage
During his presidency, the main objective of Jokowi was the emphasis on the economy and he sought to integrate the maritime agenda into the economic development of Indonesia through investment. He presented the concept “maritime highway” to respond to inequalities between the different Indonesian islands. Jokowi also consolidated all maritime policy as part of the global maritime Fulcrum strategy, which he introduced during his first mandate campaign.
Although the global maritime support point has faced many criticisms, Jokowi has laid significant foundations for Indonesian maritime governance. An example is the creation of the national policy of the Ocean Indonesia, which incorporates key strategies for maritime affairs, including security, the blue economy and institutional governance. More specifically, under Jokowi, Indonesia has also published the White Paper on maritime diplomacy to raise the importance of maritime affairs in the diplomatic strategy of Indonesia.
In addition, in response to the complexity of maritime governance institutions, Jokowi has created two coordination bodies: the coordinated ministry for maritime affairs and the Indonesian coastal guard (Bakamla). These institutions are crucial not only for the coordination of various maritime problems, but also for monitoring the objectives set by the national ocean policy in Indonesia.
Over the past decade, under Jokowi and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi, Indonesia, has demonstrated significant leadership in the region, especially in maritime affairs. Notable examples include the main role of Indonesia in the formulation of anase’s perspectives on Indo-Pacific, which has a strong component of maritime cooperation, and the maritime perspectives of ASEAN, a document introduced during the presidency of ASEAN in Indonesia in 2023.
Pending the national maritime strategy of Prabowo
During his mandate as Minister of Defense (2019-2024), Prabowo launched a complete naval modernization program. This aimed to improve the power projection capacity of Indonesia by occurring in advanced naval equipment, especially Western countries such as France and Italy.
However, this desire to modernize the naval equipment has not yet been translated into a coherent national maritime program, leaving each agency focusing on their respective priorities – such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs focusing on border delimitation and the Ministry of Defense on arms supply – in the absence of active intervention from above.
The joint statements published after recent Prabowo visits to countries such as China, India and the United Kingdom have presented maritime cooperation, including sustainable fishing, maritime security and security. However, this was done without effort to produce national directives or without close consultation with key institutions.
The absence of a coherent national maritime doctrine and coordinated efforts, and a personalized approach from top to bottom of the policies of President Prabowo in the maritime field, including the Southern China Sea, could lead to confusion and contradictions in the approach of Indonesia. Such an intervention was illustrated in the controversial joint declaration of 2024 with China, where Indonesia recognized a “overlapping complaint” with China for the first time. This policy has contradicted the long-standing position of Indonesia according to which it is a non-seller at the Sea of Southern China and has complicated the efforts of the country, in particular those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to challenge the historical affirmations of China.
In addition, the absence of a prabowo of a maritime strategy could have significant consequences in two key areas.
First, he could undermine and complicate efforts to coordinate maritime institutions. With so many various institutions dealing with maritime affairs, each often has its own priorities and agendas. Therefore, to avoid overlapping and ensuring coordination, Indonesia needs coordination institutions. The authority of overlap at sea can also have economic consequences. For example, the business community has long complained of the cost of maritime inspections for merchant ships.
One of the reasons is the existence of several law enforcement organizations which claim the power to inspect foreign ships under various Indonesian laws. These rides have created confusion and ineffectiveness in maritime inspections. Consequently, merchant ships often complain about the additional costs caused by inspections of several institutions.
Second, this could undermine the efforts to establish a coherent response to increasing powers which do not compromise the interests of Indonesia in various sectors. In the example mentioned above, the accent placed by Prabowo on economic and regional security has undermined the long -standing approach to the foreign policy adopted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which could have been avoided by closer coordination between them.
Consequently, it is crucial for Prabowo, which undertakes to continue the maritime heritage of Jokowi, to develop a strategy which is not only based on the achievements of its predecessor but also articulates its own vision for the advancement of maritime affairs of Indonesia. Indonesia must first establish a clear strategy and an evaluation of the global challenges of maritime affairs, encompassing traditional and non -traditional security problems. With this clarity, Indonesia can allocate resources more effectively to meet these challenges. Without such assessments and a coherent strategy, the simple increase in public procurement will probably not lack the country’s maritime challenges.
This article is part of a series of comments sharing the results of the project on the evolutionary maritime strategy of Indonesia, jointly led by Emirza Adi Syailendra and Evelyn Goh at the Australian National University. Although this comment benefited from the comments of the co-investigator, Syailendra, the opinions expressed are only those of the author.