The arrest of an alleged operator of the province of Khorasan (ISKP) in the Islamic State in Pakistan has rekindled longtime tensions between Kabul and Islamabad, the two parties exchanging accusations pointed on the operational base of the transnational terrorist group.
Zabihullah Mujahid, spokesperson for the Islamic emirate of the Taliban from Afghanistan, took the detention of Mohammad Sharifullah to say that Pakistan, not Afghanistan, offers ISKP refuges. This statement, however, has encountered vehement refutations from the Pakistani authorities, which argue that Afghanistan lax border controls and ineffective terrorism strategies have enabled ISKP activists to infiltrate Pakistan, to destabilize regional security. Pakistan says Sharifullah is an Afghan national, a complaint rejected by the Taliban. The exchange highlights a deepening flaw between neighboring nations, each trying to divert the blame while the threat of ISKP is looming.
Mujahid’s declaration has made Sharifullah’s arrest as an irrefutable proof of the rooting of ISKP in Pakistan, declaring the group’s activities “unrelated to Afghanistan”. This story aligns with the wider effort of the Taliban to position its regime as a responsible governance force which has eradicated terrorism within its borders since its resumption of power in 2021.
However, this argument easily neglects the own reports of the Taliban government on the realization of frequent operations against ISKP in Afghanistan – a tacit recognition of the persistent presence of the group on Afghan soil.
For their part, Pakistani officials rejected Mujahid’s claims as a “fallacious diversion” of Afghanistan’s failure to guarantee its territory. They underline that the ideological roots and operational command structures of ISKP remain rooted in Afghanistan, citing high-level attacks such as the assassination in 2022 of the eminent minister Taliban Khalil-Ur-Rehman Haqqani as proof. Islamabad maintains that Kabul’s mismanagement of borders allows activists to transform themselves into Pakistan disguised as civilians, exploiting porous control points to orchestrate attacks. Despite Pakistan’s deployment of advanced surveillance systems and fences along the Durand line of 2,640 kilometers, officials claim that Afghan negligence has made these measures insufficient to stem the flow of activists.
ISKP, a regional emanation of the active Islamic State since 2014, has capitalized on geopolitical friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan to extend its influence. The group’s ability to launch attacks in the two countries – Kabul suicide attacks on sectarian violence in Peshawar – highlights its transnational scope. While the Taliban government has intensified raids against ISKP cells in provinces like Nangarhar, its refusal to collaborate with Pakistan on intelligence sharing has hampered the regional efforts to combat terrorism. Conversely, the historical use by Pakistan of proxy militant groups for strategic depth in Afghanistan has eroded confidence, Kabul considering the accusations of Islamabad as hypocritical.
The murder of Khalil-Ur-Rehman Haqqani, a senior Taliban figure with close ties with the Haqqani network, illustrated the complexities of this game of blame. ISKP claimed the responsibility of the attack, which occurred in the strongly fortified interior ministry of Afghanistan. Pakistani analysts have cited this as final evidence of the group’s operational capacities within Afghanistan, undermining the story of the Taliban of complete territorial control. Conversely, the Taliban allocated such security towers to residual chaos of the American withdrawal, diverting the examination of its governance gaps.
The climbing of rhetoric threatens to derail already fragile diplomatic relations, the two nations prioritizing political points on collaborative security measures. For Afghanistan, the blame deviant on Pakistan is used to strengthen its image of a stable emirate capable of self-government. For Pakistan, positioning oneself as a victim of a cross -border terrorism justifies its border policies and its calls for international aid. However, this impasse only authorizes ISKP, which thrives in unreaded spaces and diplomatic vacuum cleaners. The absence of a unified regional strategy is likely to allow the group to metastate, threatening the States of Central Asia and beyond.
To alleviate the ISKP threat and defuse tensions, the following measures are essential. Afghanistan and Pakistan must improve the bilateral sharing of intelligence through a joint working group against terrorism facilitated by neutral mediators. They should also establish a regional security dialogue involving Iran, China and the Central Asian States to coordinate information and funding against terrorism.
Afghanistan and Pakistan must modernize border infrastructure with biometric systems and drone monitoring to monitor high traffic crossings. Third -party audits of border management protocols would help identify and rectify systemic weaknesses on both sides. However, any strengthening of border protocols remains uncertain due to the continuous refusal of the Afghan government to recognize the Durand line.
Finally, socio-economic development programs in the Afghan border provinces are essential to undermine the recruitment of ISKP motivated by poverty and grievances. A security centered approach alone cannot end the problem of terrorism.