Connectivity has become the new currency in geopolitics and the Economic Corridor of Indian Eastern Europe (IMEC) has become a critical link in Delhi’s effort to increase trade with Europe. The ambitious IMEC – designed as a product of displacement of geopolitical realities in the region, in particular with the conclusion of the Abraham agreements and the initiation of I2U2 (India, Israel, United States and water) – has ease of new levels of strategic confidence and cooperation.
Announced with a large fanfare on the sidelines of the Delhi G-20 summit, the IMEC is often considered among decision-makers and analysts through a strict geopolitical lens, presented as a potential counterweight on the initiative of the belt and the road to China (BRI). However, its geoeconomic meaning is just as deep. As a multimodal connectivity initiative, the IMEC seeks to integrate rail and sea routes, extend telecommunications networks and energy networks and establish under high-speed data cables. Consequently, it represents a certain level of strategic alignment with connectivity between partners and has further drawn the attention of the main regional players.
A year and a half after its launch, however, Imec remains at its best a political declaration of intention until stages and practical executives are developed by signatories to operationalize its potential.
There was a recent increase in diplomatic activity around the project. US President Donald Trump has called He “one of the largest commercial routes in history”. In Europe, France has already appointed a special envoy to Promote the port of Marseille as an entry point of the IMEC in Europe. Italy has positioned tries as its favorite point of entry on the European market and plans to appoint a special envoy also in the coming months, reflecting emerging competition compared to the economic and commercial dividends of the IMEC.
At the same time, the corridor has rekindled a classic liberal dilemma: will trade promote stability, or will peace be a prerequisite for trade? IMEC was once considered a major breakthrough for regional connectivity; However, the attacks of Hamas October 7 in southern Israel and the invasion of Israel of Gaza by ESRAEL launched the project in geopolitical uncertainty.
For Israel, permanent regulation in Gaza will remain a political priority above the IMEC in the foreseeable future. Which will harm the prospects for the normalization of the Arabine a few Believe a necessary condition for the operationalization of the IMEC.
Meanwhile, the exclusion of the main regional actors such as Egypt, Oman and the Turkiye of the Imec Warrants to re -examine. Egypt, despite the control of the Suez strategic channel, finds itself away. Oman, the most reliable strategic partner in India in the region, is visibly absent, although his ports are well placed to eliminate the logistical obstacles from the equation and bypass Iran and the controversial waterways of the Hormuz Strait. The absence of these countries limits not only the awareness and impact of the IMEC, but it also risks creating ineffectures for a project already ready with structural logistical, financial and geopolitical obstacles.
Qatar, another unparther from the IMEC agreement, has been advocacy So that the Nations of the Gulf engage with BRI and IMEC in China. This adds another layer of complexity, promoting a more inclusive approach that considers the integration of China and Turkiye as part of the corridor.
The Chinese factor is clearly looming. The rhetoric of the IMEC will have to try to correspond to the scale, to the financing and to the institutional impulse that the imprint of the BRI has generated. In addition, the main partners of the Saudi stakeholders and the water do not consider the IMEC as a rival for the BRI. Their approach to Chinese investments remains pragmatic, taking them out as tools to diversify their economies and progress in regional development. Israel and Greece also praised Chinese investments. China operates A terminal in the port of Haifa and holds majority participations in the port of Piraeus, which is also in competition as a potential entry point for the IMEC in Europe.
The commitments of previous infrastructure from India, such as the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSC) and the Chabahar Port Initiative, have not yet delivered significant economic dividends. However, the continuous relevance of these projects remains linked to strategic and geopolitical imperatives rather than for pure commercial gains, INSTC serving as a critical commercial link in deepening the energy links between Delhi and Moscow, and Chabahar offering critical access to Afghanistan while bypassing Pakistan.
Beyond geopolitics, financial realities and investments in the IMEC remain uncertain. Insurance, profitability and long -term financing issues persist. Saudi Arabia has hired $ 20 billion, but wider investment commitments remain vague. Estimates suggest that around 3 to 8 billion dollars will be necessary to develop each IMEC component. In addition, Europe’s commitment with the IMEC seems to be more focused on expanding its Indo-Pacific awareness and strengthening links with the Gulf rather than drawing direct economic advantages of the corridor itself.
The logistical challenges still complicate the image. Maritime transport remains the most effective and profitable way of commerce, but Imec envisages a 5000 kilometers route with land corridors through rugged land which includes deserts and several loading and unloading points required, introducing delays more and increasing shipping costs. The proposed railway route of Jordan in Israel do does not exist, without progress made over the past 25 years. Meanwhile, the vulnerabilities of the supply chain also persist, with The increase in freight costs and the current capacity for producing current containers from India to 30,000 compared to the 3 million Chinese, further stressing the structural limitations which could shape the Indian ambitions concerning the competitiveness of the IMEC.
To fight against these obstacles, a agreed framework must be developed between the different stakeholders to determine the nuts and the bolts of the project. Three critical factors can still stimulate the operationalization by India of the IMEC: mobilize the participation of the private sector; Inclusion of other regional players to establish alternative routes; And focus on the rapid development of its naval construction industry and its container capacity.
Currently, the IMEC is mainly a state connectivity initiative in the state with little or no imprint by private stakeholders. A greater involvement in the private sector and multinational companies will strengthen the competitiveness of the IMEC and increase the appetite for risks and investments for other stakeholders and project partners. The support provided by the inclusion and orientation of industry experts will speed up the real activation calendar of the IMEC.
Israel’s questionable commitment to the project under current geopolitical conditions will require thinking of alternative trade routes. To this extent, expanding the IMEC train to include Egypt, Oman and possibly Turkiye as stakeholders’ partners will provide India with alternative ports and shipping routes to reach Europe. The involvement of Cairo in the IMEC and the collaboration with the Suez Canal as well as on the port or the port of Alexandria as an alternative shipping route in the project will be a win-win model for all those involved. In addition, a possible reduction in land and rail networks with the inclusion of new places within the IMEC will also reduce carbon emissions, ensuring that the corridor complies with sustainability standards and remains respectful of the environment.
India has also intensified naval construction efforts in order to reduce the vulnerabilities of its supply chain and its container capacity deficit towards China. Delhi has established A maritime development fund of Indian rupees of 250 billion rupees ($ 2.9 billion) to support the long -term financing of the naval construction industry and repair, aimed at improving its maritime logistics infrastructure and extending commercial shipping fleets. In addition, India plans To increase the shipping capacity of containers by acquiring more used ships, which will likely lead to an increase in capacity from 10 to 12%. While trying to compete with the domination of China in shipbuilding is a huge task, the edge of Delhi can be in the restoration of small ships – an area largely neglected by the main naval manufacturers in China, South Korea and Japan. By capturing this specific niche, India could improve its maritime logistics and strengthen its role in the IMEC supply chain.
THE joint declaration Emitted by Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi last month confirmed that “the leaders planned to convene partners of the India-Middle East-Europe corridor and group I2U2 in the next six months to announce new initiatives in 2025.” Many depends on how discussions in the coming months will take place.