Last week, the Indonesian Parliament adopted a series of controversial amendments to its Indonesian law of the National Armed Forces (TNI), which is currently waiting for the signing of President Prabowo suffered before embarking on. In addition to authorizing the appointment of military officers in exercise in a wider range of civil agencies, revised law is expanding the duties of the TNI concerning military operations other than war, namely government efforts to counter cyber-menices (cyber-defense) and help protect and save citizens and national interests abroad.
The latter, in particular, could have a considerable impact on the security dynamics of the region. Although its exact implementation is determined by government regulations, it indicates an increasing concern of Indonesia concerning the potential of conflict in the region, in particular on Taiwan.
Since its independence in 1945, the strategic culture of Indonesia has been mainly interior. This is closely linked to the nature of the threats to which the nation has been faced. According to a book on the history of the TNI published by the CSIS Indonesia in 2020, the country led 370 military operations between 1945 and 2020, 72% of which took place within the borders of Indonesia. To date, various official documents from the Ministry of Defense and TNI still consider separatism in Papua as the main threat to the nation, in particular since the resolution of the terrorist threat to Poso, Sulawesi, in 2022.
The defense posture of Indonesia was generally not prepared for the expeditionary war. This was obvious during the operation of free sailors taken hostage by Somali pirates from the Cargo MV Sinar Kudus in 2011 in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. At that time, Indonesia deployed two frigates (the KRI Abdul Halim Perdanakusuma-355 and Kri Yos Sudars-353), a platform of landing platform (Kri Banjarmasin-592 ship), and a helicopter, with several sea runners and reception crafts. In addition to being supported by diplomacy, in particular with Singapore, the hostages were published after Indonesia paid a ransom of 40 billion rupees.
Evacuations have since become a routine task for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often supported by TNI operations. Between 2011 and 2024, there were 14 operations to evacuate Indonesian citizens abroad – an average of approximately one incident per year. The largest evacuation was the return of 151,386 Indonesian citizens stuck in various countries due to COVID-19. However, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOS) linked to conflicts include Syria operations (2013-2014), where 4,000 Indonesians were evacuated; Yemen (2015), where 1,684 were evacuated; Sudan (2023), where 1,010 Indonesians were evacuated; and Lebanon (2024), involving 79 Indonesians.
The Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs estimates that there are 350,000 Indonesian citizens in Taiwan, although only 284,751 is officially registered.
In the event of a conflict, the revised version of the TNI law requires that the government evacuated these citizens of Taiwan, which is around 2500 kilometers. It would be much more complicated than the Dynamo operation, the greatest successful evacuation operation in history, which saw 338,000 allied soldiers evacuated from Dunkirk, in France in England in 1940.
Indonesia understands that many Anase countries face similar challenges. According to official Taiwanese data, the number of foreign residents in Taiwan in 2023 included 239,580 Vietnamese, 153,278 Philippins, 73,052 Thaïs, 23,854 Malaysians and 1,828 Singaporeans. As with Indonesians, real figures would be much higher. Migrant workers in Southeast Asia have become increasingly important for Taiwan, in particular in the light of its growing elderly population.
The new law of the TNI law on the protection of Indonesian citizens abroad will constitute the foundation of the military strategic plan to achieve this objective. The main objective of protecting the interests of Indonesia is, of course, to ensure regional security, including in the case of Taiwan. If this effort fails, a second objective must be pursued, namely an evacuation of Indonesian nationals of the affected areas. Although this double approach was discussed among the stakeholders of the Defense and experts in foreign policy, given the development of the strategic environment, Indonesia must prepare for the two scenarios.
Indonesia’s foreign policy journey has so far been officially “free and active”. However, on a combination of pragmatic economic interest and concern about the evolution of the situation in the United States, Indonesia is increasingly tilted towards China. On the other hand, China also has strategic interests in Indonesia linked to access to markets and raw materials such as coal and nickel. Consequently, Indonesia hopes that China will have a reservoir on Taiwan. If the conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait and China is the aggressor, especially if Indonesian citizens are affected, there will certainly be internal pressure on President Prabowo to reduce relations with China. Anti-China factions can exploit this feeling to undermine Chinese companies that are currently thriving in Indonesia, even using physical attacks.
However, in the second scenario, Indonesia hopes that there will be a humanitarian assistance corridor involving all parties. Besides the Philippines, China would be the place closest to evacuation.
In the two scenarios, it is crucial for Indonesia to engage with the countries of the Anase, in particular those who have common interests and concerns. Over the past two years, discussions on the importance of an emergency plan have become more frequent and have drawn attention among the political decision -makers in Jakarta. In addition, in the past four years, the security of the northern sea of Natuna has been relatively stable, the aggressive actions of China being less pronounced, in particular in relation to questions such as illegal, not declared and unregulated fishing by Vietnamese fishing vessels. At the same time, the military aggression of China around Taiwan has increased. Developments in China and the United States are also considered variables that could lead to Taiwan conflicts.
While Indonesia tends to look towards China, it remains more comfortable to collaborate with the countries of the Anase. In two recent surveys conducted by the Research Group Studies Strategic and Indonesian Defense (ISD) in cooperation with Litbang Kompas, one in January 2024 (312 respondents) and one in December (321 respondents), the Anase was perceived as the favorite partner of the safeguard of indexing of independence, the sovereign of China, like 39.1% of respondents of China.
However, the coordination of efforts with the countries of the Anase is not easy because of their different internal policy, their foreign policies and their relations with China and the American countries as the Philippines have had frequent conflicts with Beijing and are close to Washington. Conversely, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos tended to align with China and should remain so aligned in the predictable future. Meanwhile, countries like Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam seek to maintain their neutrality or balance their relations with China and the United States, according to their situation.
Despite these differences, the Anase countries will inevitably be faced with internal pressure to evacuate their citizens from Taiwan in the event of a kinetic conflict. The majority of Taiwan migrant workers who are from these countries are the backbone of their families. It would be imperative for their respective governments to repatriate them to avoid internal political instability.
Until now, the ANASE has been based on its “directives for the provision of emergency assistance of the missions of the Anase in third countries to nationals of the member countries of the Anase in crisis situations”, adopted in 2006, which describes the scope of mutual assistance during crises. However, Indonesia has not implemented these directives in depth and was concerned about domestic problems instead. Changes in the TNI law indicate an increasing interest on the part of Indonesia in this case and a change towards a more towards the outside to treat immediate threats.
As a traditional leader within the Anase, the change in orientation of Indonesia could lead him to become a cornerstone of ASEAN’s solidarity on these questions. The common interests between anase countries can facilitate cooperation, in particular in the development of a joint contingency plan on technical aspects such as evacuation routes and assets, as well as strategic aspects in the way of cooperating with China, the United States and other countries such as Japan, South Korea and even Australia to approach this crisis. For Taiwan, practically speaking, a unified anase effort to evacuate its citizens would be easier to respond than to address each of these countries individually.
How Indonesia, in particular TNI, will implement the new law is not clear. Many interior factors will influence foreign policy and the evolution of TNI towards a more outward orientation. In addition, President Prabowo also sees the urgency to tackle food security, partly thanks to greater military involvement
If the TNI focuses on non -military tasks, this will undoubtedly erase the resources of the TNI, raising questions about its ability to achieve its external objectives.