On May 26, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer spoke with former U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). The results of the U.S.-China summit attracted a lot of attention, but the most telling aspect was the frankness with which Greer discussed the direction of the trade order being pursued by the Trump administration.
Greer argued that China’s state economy is not simply an economic system but is part of China’s political system itself, and that it is unrealistic to expect Beijing to reform state-owned enterprises, reduce subsidies, or shift to a domestic demand-driven economy. He suggested that the United States had largely abandoned its expectations that China would fundamentally reform its state-led economic model.
This does not mean that Washington is relaxing its opposition to China. Instead, the United States seeks to manage the effects of this competition. The aim is to control economic relations through tariffs, export controls, investment regulations and rules of origin – thereby ensuring competition while maintaining stability.
Greer also indicated that MFN (most favored nation) treatment, the cornerstone of WTO rules, would not be at the center of the future trade order. MFN tariffs will remain a minimum floor, but market access and tariff conditions will be set through bilateral negotiations.
This is a major departure from the principle of non-discrimination that underpinned the post-war GATT and WTO systems. Washington intends to shift the core of the trade order from multilateral rules to trade managed through bilateral negotiations.
Implications for ASEAN
In this context, ASEAN is increasingly seen as a potential bypass export platform for China. Greer has repeatedly raised concerns that Mexico, which signed the USMCA (United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement), Malaysia, which entered into a reciprocal trade agreement with the Trump administration, and other Asian countries not signatories to the FTA, are becoming bypass export hubs. Although Greer did not mention China by name, the implication was clear.
Washington fears that Chinese companies will shift production to ASEAN countries and ship their goods to the United States. In a managed commercial environment, these production networks will be subject to intense scrutiny – extending beyond the country of final production to questions of Chinese capital participation, share of Chinese components and compliance with rules of origin.
The United States is currently conducting Section 301 investigations into forced labor and excess production capacity, targeting not only China but also major ASEAN countries and countries with close economic ties to Beijing. As part of the new US trade policy, the ASEAN region is gradually coming under increased surveillance.
ASEAN centrality tested
Amid these changes, ASEAN’s centrality is being tested. Historically, this has meant the ability to act as a mediator between great powers and to serve as an institutional basis for regional cooperation. This is no longer enough. The key question is whether ASEAN can function as an economic community defined by institutional transparency, reliable supply chains and rule-making capacity.
During the 2025 reciprocal tariff negotiations, ASEAN was unable to demonstrate its collective bargaining power. Nonetheless, Greer’s comments make clear that bilateral negotiations will remain the basis of trade policy; this implies that ASEAN must strengthen its unity to protect common interests, even when individual members negotiate separately.
First, ASEAN must strengthen origin management and investment control systems, demonstrating that the region is a truly transparent production base.
Second, ASEAN should accelerate the harmonization of customs procedures and digitalization of customs clearance processes – efforts already underway within the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) – to give real substance to the region as a single market.
Third, ASEAN should leverage the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) to modernize regional supply chains and enhance transparency. A region that grows to become a hub of rule-making and digital connectivity, with strong local purchasing and traceability, will be seen not as a Chinese bypass channel but as a reliable hub for free trade and the digital economy.
The main takeaway from Greer’s comments is not the conclusion of the Chinese reform debate, but the shift from free trade to managed trade. In the post-WTO era, the question for ASEAN will no longer be whether it can remain a free trade hub but whether it can maintain its place at the center of the regional order through robust systems and deeper integration. ASEAN’s centrality will be judged not only by its skills in diplomatic mediation, but also by its ability to put in place reliable rules and systems.