On May 8, Pakistan Interior Minister and Cricket Board Chairman Syed Mohsin Raza Naqvi arrived in Dhaka for a two-day visit. His visit coincided with the Bangladesh-Pakistan cricket series, but it was not just focused on sports. It also conveys distinct political and strategic messages.
In the South Asian political landscape, relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan have always been both complex and emotionally charged. A political betrayal – Pakistan’s refusal to transfer power, ignorance of the massive Bengali mandate in the 1970 elections and memories of the genocide of the 1971 Liberation War – persisted and kept bilateral relations frosty for a prolonged period. Nevertheless, amid the changing realities of international politics, we have recently seen the beginning of a new diplomatic warmth between Dhaka and Islamabad.
Soon after the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government on August 5, 2024, several Pakistani ministers, including Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar, visited Dhaka. Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Asim Munir also met Bangladesh Air Force Chief Hasan Mahmood Khan in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on January 8, 2026. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif is expected to visit Dhaka in June after Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s visit to China. These visits are not simple acts of diplomatic courtesy; rather, they reflect the emerging geopolitical realities of South Asia.
The pertinent question remains whether this growing rapprochement between Bangladesh and Pakistan marks a new beginning. Or is it simply a fleeting mirage born of strategic necessity?
Weight of history and realities of bilateral relations
The 1971 war undoubtedly remains the greatest source of unease in Bangladesh-Pakistan relations. Memories of the genocide perpetrated by Pakistani forces against the Bangladeshi intellectuals and masses, as well as the atrocities committed against women, remain deeply etched in the minds of the Bangladeshi people. Therefore, any initiative to improve relations with Pakistan is inextricably linked to public sentiments. Political parties have often exploited this history for their own ends, thus making the issue of bilateral relations even more sensitive.
When the Awami League was in power in Bangladesh between 2008 and 2024, relations with Pakistan were frosty, particularly due to the trial and conviction of several leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami, which collaborated with Pakistan in the 1971 war, for crimes against humanity. Pakistan has repeatedly expressed its objections to the legal proceedings, which have only widened the gap between the two countries.
However, the political changes that took place in Bangladesh after Hasina’s ouster marked the beginning of a new reality. Under the caretaker government, there has been a notable increase in visits to Bangladesh by Pakistani ministers and military officials, accompanied by a visible increase in diplomatic and military engagement between the two countries.
Nevertheless, the historical burden remains. Pakistan has yet to issue a full and formal apology for the genocide committed in 1971. A significant part of the Bangladeshi population firmly believes that a real improvement in bilateral relations is impossible without Pakistan’s admission of guilt. Therefore, even though diplomatic exchanges have intensified, the psychological distance between the two nations remains significant.
On the other hand, the reality of the modern state system is that, in addition to emotional feelings, strategic and economic interests are also important. Bangladesh’s burgeoning economic power in South Asia is forcing Pakistan to reassess its approach to its relations. At the same time, as part of its multifaceted diplomatic strategy, Bangladesh seeks to maintain its ties with all major regional powers. However, progress in these relations must be carefully calibrated to ensure that the delicate geopolitical balance with India is not disrupted.
New equations in geopolitics and security cooperation
During his recent visit to Dhaka, Naqvi met with Bangladesh Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Shama Obaid. The most significant outcome of Naqvi’s visit was the signing of a memorandum of understanding on security cooperation. Under the agreement, the two countries are expected to exchange intelligence and technical assistance to combat drug trafficking, money laundering and cross-border crime.
However, given that Bangladesh shares no land border with Pakistan, how far can such cooperation go? Rather, the agreements appear to be a diplomatic spectacle, with little substantive impact on security.
Furthermore, Pakistan’s security apparatus has long been a subject of controversy on the international stage. Issues such as the prevalence of terrorism, its use of terrorist groups as a tool of its foreign policy, the proliferation of extremist groups, and instability along its border with Afghanistan cast a shadow over the country’s international image. Therefore, some analysts are skeptical about how security cooperation with such a state could actually prove beneficial for Bangladesh.
In the context of the current crisis in West Asia, Pakistan is trying to present itself as an important regional power. Leveraging its position as a close ally of the United States and China and its active engagement in the Afghan issue, Islamabad seeks to strengthen its position in the international arena.
Pakistan frequently exploits regional crises to secure strategic advantages. Therefore, questions persist about the sincerity of his sudden overtures towards Bangladesh.
Bangladesh’s main challenge lies in maintaining a strategic balance. Dhaka aims to cultivate balanced relations with China, India, the United States and the Muslim world. However, excessive proximity with Pakistan could generate unease with India, a country that surrounds Bangladesh on three sides. This could pose risks to Bangladesh’s economic and national security interests. The current warmth in bilateral relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan is less a product of mutual trust than of geopolitical calculations.
New possibilities or diplomatic mirage?
Not only has Pakistan not formally apologized for the 1971 genocide, but the issue of assets owed to Bangladesh also remains unresolved. These issues constitute obstacles to improving bilateral relations.
Furthermore, Pakistan does not have the strong trade infrastructure needed to meet Bangladesh’s import demands. Therefore, positioning Pakistan as a viable alternative to India will not be an easy task.
Nevertheless, new avenues of commercial, educational, technological and cultural exchange could emerge between the two nations. There is considerable potential for cooperation, particularly in the textile, pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors. As Pakistan seeks to reduce its economic isolation within South Asia, Bangladesh is simultaneously exploring new export destinations and investment opportunities beyond its traditional partners. This convergence of economic interests encouraged Islamabad to court Bangladeshi investments and establish closer commercial ties. Improving people-to-people contacts could also help to alleviate mutual distrust to some extent.
However, the sustainability of these relationships will ultimately depend on political goodwill. If the relationship remains limited to simple formal visits and diplomatic communiqués, it is unlikely to continue. Similarly, if Pakistan continues to maintain an ambiguous position regarding its history with Bangladesh, it will be difficult to dispel the mistrust that prevails among the Bangladeshi population.