As it struggles to transport its oil through the Strait of Hormuz, Iran is looking for alternative land routes to import and export goods. In March, Iran exported 1.84 million barrels per day (BPD) to Asian customers, mainly Chinese. Although some ships managed to escape Since the blockade, Iran still cannot transport as much oil as it produces each day.
Iran looks to railway lines crossing Central Asia as a safer passage for trade with China. Although Iran can transport some of its oil by rail across Central Asia, it does not have the capacity to transport the same amount of oil as by sea. At best, transporting oil by land would provide a limited lifeline for Iran to survive until the end of the war.
In operation since May 2025a 10,400-kilometer China-Iran rail corridor stretches from the Chinese city of Xi’an to Tehran. The railway passes through Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan before arriving in Iran – takes about 15 days versus a month at sea. Bloomberg Reports that shipments of goods from Xi’an to Tehran have increased from one per week to “one every three or four days” since the US blockade began in April.
In recent years, China, Iran, Russia and other countries have built and expanded railway lines across Central Asia. Officials from China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan announced in 2024, the long-awaited implementation of the 523-kilometer China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway corridor, with China providing a $2.35 billion loan and majority stake. In November 2025, Interfax reported that the first freight train from Russia to Iran arrived in Aprin, near Tehran, after a 12-day journey through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
According to the Central Asia and Caucasus Institute (CACI), before the war, Iran and Turkmenistan agreed to lay additional tracks at Sarakhs station in northeastern Iran, bordering Turkmenistan, to increase the volume and speed of cross-border shipments. China and Iran are also collaborating on the electrification of a 1,000-kilometer railway line in Iran connecting the city of Sarakhs to Razi, on the border with Turkey.
The route through Central Asia could offer Iran a quick economic lifeline if U.S. forces further restrict passage through Hormuz. But this will not be enough to relieve Iran of the pressure of the blockade.
First, rail shipments run mainly from China to Irantransporting industrial and consumer goods, not Iran to China. Although this could be changed to allow more rail transport to China, Iran may have to sacrifice importing the goods it needs – an unlikely scenario under the blockade.
Second, the location of Iranian oil fields and Chinese oil refineries is not favorable for the transportation and sale of Iranian oil across Central Asia. Most of Iran’s oil fields are in the southand ships transport oil exported by Iran to China’s east coast for refining “teapot” refineries. While there is oil refineries in western and central Chinathey currently refine domestic or imported oil from other countries and cannot refine as much oil as the big countries on the coast.
Third, although rail transportation of oil to China is faster and safer, the results are not ideal. The average shipment of oil by rail is between 60,000 and 70,000 barrels. Iran can also transport between 250,000 and 300,000 b/d if it exports oil to other countries like Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. In comparison, even with the risk of being caught or captured, the average tanker can carry more than 600,000 barrels, and a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) can transport more than 2 million barrels.
If Iran decides to send oil to China by rail (figure 70,000 barrels per shipment) at a reduced rate (between $75 and $100 per barrel), it could generate between $5.25 and $7 million per shipment. If the number of shipments increases two to three times a week, Iran could generate revenue of $10.5 million to $21 million after the two-week trip. However, there is a lack of available data showing that Iran even has the capacity to transport that much oil by rail. After dividing the revenues, they would fall short of the billions of dollars that IRGC received oil revenue in 2025.
As the war and blockade of the Strait of Hormuz drag on for a month, Iran has the possibility of transporting oil to China by rail via Central Asia. If implemented, the plan would give Iran the ability to safely transport oil to its largest customer in a short period of time. However, Iran will not be able to export enough oil to fully replace what it can deliver more efficiently by sea. China and Iran can work together in the future to make this option more attractive, but neither can do anything about it as long as the war continues. Such a plan will serve as an emergency lifeline rather than a solution to Iran’s oil problem.
