The message from the recent defeat of the ruling Trinamool Congress (TMC) to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the Indian state of West Bengal is clear: the people of West Bengal want a chance to reverse the long-term decline of their state.
West Bengal is the western half of the Bengal region – the other half being Bangladesh – which has long been one of the wealthiest regions in South Asia. This election reflects the population’s desire for change and economic development.
Long an economic and cultural power, West Bengal’s illness lasts several decades. Between 1960 and 2024, its share of the national gross domestic product (GDP) fell from 10.5 percent to 5.6 percent. Recent estimates rank its GDP per capita around 23rd or 24th among India’s 36 states and union territories (UTs), behind states that were once much poorer than it, such as Rajasthan and Odisha. Its Human Development Index (HDI) ranking is also abysmal; it ranks 27th among Indian states and UTs.
The prosperity of West Bengal is important not only for the sake of its own people, but also because the state is the hub and natural port of the entire eastern India. Eastern India’s economic stagnation relative to the rest of India is partly due to the underperformance of West Bengal, which drags down with it Bihar, Assam and Odisha.
What happened to West Bengal? Colonialism alone does not fully explain the decline of West Bengal. After all, while the whole of India was under British rule or suzerainty, individual states today have widely varying development outcomes. Additionally, the eastern half of Bengal, Bangladesh, enjoys a booming export-oriented economy. West Bengal’s woes are of its own making: the country implemented bad policies after India’s independence in 1947.
During the Mughal era, Bengal became the richest region in India. In premodern times, the wealth of a region was most often a function of the size of its population and the amount of land under cultivation. These factors allowed not only taxation – and subsequently large revenues – but also a surplus of food and labor that could be used in other sectors of the economy. Many historians characterize Mughal-era Bengal as a proto-industrial economy. This meant that a large proportion of the population was employed in industry, but in the form of rural artisan production rather than the industrial production that characterizes modern industrialization. According to the historian William Dalrymple, in the 18th century:
With [Bengal’s] a myriad of weavers – 25,000 in Dhaka alone – and an unrivaled luxury textile production of fabulously delicate woven silks and muslins, it was by the end of the 17th century Europe’s most important supplier of goods to Asia and by far the richest region of the Mughal Empire…. A single market near Murshidabad alone would process 650,000 tonnes of rice annually. The region’s exports – sugar, opium and indigo, as well as the textiles produced by its 1 million weavers – were coveted around the world….
Bengal also did well under the British Raj, becoming the powerhouse of their Indian Empire. The British ruled the subcontinent from Calcutta (modern Kolkata) for almost 200 years, until 1911. On the one hand, the British were notoriously linked to the deindustrialization of India – because factories were putting local cottage industries out of business – and to a number of famines in Bengal itself, including the Great Famines of 1770 and 1943. On the other hand, the British also introduced modern industry, technology and transportation to India. The Bengal Presidency, being the hub of British India, received a large part of this investment. At the time of Indian independence and the partition of Bengal, West Bengal’s industrial capacity was the highest among Indian states.
Partition, along with the influx of refugees and the separation of some of its agricultural markets in East Bengal, dampened West Bengal’s prospects. The ruling Indian National Congress (INC) has not helped the state much, preferring to direct the industry to other states, such as Maharashtra and Gujarat. West Bengal’s decline began in earnest with the rise of militant leftism in the 1960s and 1970s, driven largely by agrarian anger against landlords. It was in 1967 in West Bengal that the Naxalite Maoist insurgency broke out in the town of Naxalbari. In 1977, the Communist Party of India (Marxist)-led Left Front came to power in West Bengal, ruling the state for 34 years. Between 1970 and 1998, the state’s share of India’s industrial output fell from 13.5 percent to 5.10 percent because left-wing politics enabled militant unionism and scared away businesses.
Even after India liberalized its economy in 1991, West Bengal did not attract much investment because local hostility to land acquisition was exacerbated by politicians siding with protesters to block industrialization. This, in turn, created the impression that the state of West Bengal was lawless and incapable of providing the necessary administrative and infrastructural environment for development and investment. Protests in the state have often been accompanied by road blockades and shootings.
Take, for example, the actions of Mamata Banerjee, the leader of the Bengal-based TMC. In 2006, while in opposition, she began protesting on behalf of a minority of farmers near the town of Singur, opposed to the acquisition of their land for a Tata Motors factory because they felt the compensation was insufficient. Banerjee even went on a hunger strike on their behalf. In 2008, Tata shifted the factory project to Gujarat. Banerjee – and current West Bengal BJP chief minister Suvendu Adhikari, who was then a TMC member – were also involved in violence in the city of Nandigram to protest a CPI(M) plan to build a chemical plant. Following these allegations, the TMC came to power in the 2011 parliamentary elections, ending three decades of communist rule.
But the economy has not improved: Banerjee’s hostility towards industry and development has not diminished, nor has her commitment not to acquire land for industry. With the growth of manufacturing and information technology (IT) sectors, cities and states like Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Bangalore and Hyderabad prospered, largely because their leaders courted investments. On the other hand, West Bengal has resorted to welfare without attracting investments. While the Banerjee government introduced more than 90 welfare schemes, infrastructure spending has declined. Extortion rackets run by TMC have also scared away investors.
The economic and social decline of the state went hand in hand with the decline of its cultural and social influence, as the national influence of Mumbai and the Hindi belt grew. It did not help that West Bengal’s political and economic trajectories were at odds with the trends of the past two decades in the rest of India, trends that emphasized development, economic growth and nationalism.
The modern economy of the 21st century is different from that of a rural economy shaped by the concerns of peasants facing the oppression of rapacious landlords. Modernity – industry and services – requires a structural approach to development different from that of the rural revolution and the land revolution, characteristic of 20th century Maoism. A modern economy needs the Internet, electricity, technology, factories and education to meet these demands. In addition to its lack of interest in development, the TMC was increasingly seen by Hindus in the state as being more interested in using Muslims or so-called Bangladeshis to win elections, moving them around in constituencies to get the necessary votes. All these factors led to the victory of the BJP, led by a former lieutenant of Mamata Banerjee.
The trajectory of any state can be reversed with the right policies, even if it takes time. Bihar was once synonymous with anarchy and violence, but has recently improved significantly, in part due to the policies of Nitish Kumar, who invested in roads, schools and health care, while keeping political violence in check. West Bengal has an educational tradition and literary culture and, as a coastal state, is well placed to benefit from the global economy. The new BJP government, with a clear majority, has the opportunity to do this and has promised to adopt new land policies to bring industries to the state without alienating the population by cutting cash transfers and social programs.
Reconciling the competing goals of development, citizens’ rights and well-being is tricky. But after 50 years of failed policies, the election of a government committed to industry, investment and modernization is a welcome development, however complicated its implementation may be.