Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers from around the world for their diverse perspectives on U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Xiaobing Li – professor of history and Don Betz Chair of International Studies at the University of Central Oklahoma and author of “The Chinese Mahan: Admiral Liu Huaqing and the rise of the modern Chinese navy” (Naval Institute Press 2026) – is the 508th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”
Describe the influence of 19th-century U.S. naval strategist Alfred Mahan on Admiral Liu Huaqing, commander of the Chinese Navy from 1982 to 1988 and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission from 1990 to 1998.
Mahan influenced Liu Huaqing with new strategic ideas and conceptions of maritime sovereignty and sea power. Mahan’s theory of sea power showed Liu what China needed to become a great power again. Liu realized that China was traditionally a land power despite its long coastline. He agreed with Mahan on “a rich country and a strong navy.” Liu also understood that China had lost its position of power in East Asia due to its naval defeat by Japan. China needed a strong naval force if it wanted national rejuvenation.
Although Liu Huaqing’s theory and practice sometimes resembled or overlapped with parts of Mahan’s theory, the work’s conclusions did not provide enough evidence to show Mahan’s direct influence on the Chinese admiral. One reason is that Mahanian theory could include universal truths about the nature of maritime strategy. These truths are accessible to theorists and practitioners, whether they have read Mahan or not.
How does Russian Admiral Sergey Gorshkov’s influence on Liu Huaqing differ from that of Mahan?
Meanwhile, Liu Huaqing’s fundamental understanding of maritime theory and naval force construction stemmed from intellectual roots such as Gorshkov’s maritime theory and shipbuilding. The Chinese admiral shared the same institutional framework and organizational system as the Soviet naval commander. Therefore, Liu Huaqing was more like the Chinese Gorshkov than the “Red Mahan”.
Gorshkov influenced Liu on how to build a strong Chinese navy with institutional reform, technological improvements, and centralized control of the party and the navy. Gorshkov’s theory and methodology showed Liu, step by step, how to transform the PLA Navy (PLAN) from weak to strong, from a near-shore fleet to a modern high-seas navy. Liu learned Gorshkov’s experience and lessons during his four years of study in the Soviet Union.
Liu Huaqing in 1955.
Analyze how the PLAN’s operational doctrine and strategic thinking were transformed under Liu Huaqing’s maritime security doctrine.
Liu Huaqing rethought China’s maritime power and shifted naval strategy from near-shore defense to near-shore defense and far-sea protection. He told leaders that China’s next war would be a naval conflict in areas close to the sea like the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. Subsequently, the PLA moved away from traditional land war preparation and instead focused on a new naval war. Liu’s plan prioritized the modernization of the PLA Navy under the command of the third generation and further efforts at reorganization, institutional reform, and improvement of sustainability systems.
His strategic thinking expanded the country’s maritime interests, reoriented China’s ocean development, and built a deep-sea navy capable of open-sea operations. He transformed the PLAN from a defensive force into an offensive navy, and his new strategy led to the development of aircraft carrier battle groups, key combat warships, and high-tech weapon systems. As a result, China’s shipbuilding industry, aviation technology research and imports, reconstruction, qualitative improvement, and naval training and education systems supported its impressive naval development throughout the 1990s and continued into the 2010s. Liu shifted the PLAN from brown water operations to blue water development.
Liu Huaqing officially retired in 1998 and died in 2011, before Xi came to power. How did Liu’s adaptation of the PLAN strategy pave the way for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s strategic priorities?
With geostrategic ambitions and political confidence, Xi Jinping launched his global plan, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in 2013. His intention was to create the New Maritime Silk Road via maritime trade routes from the Pacific to the Indian Oceans through Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and Africa, representing the maritime dimension of China’s global geostrategic ambitions. The BRI has brought enormous trade, financial, transportation, communications, infrastructure and energy programs, by sea and land, from China’s shores to other continents. It was designed to establish a global system centered on China, excluding America.
Liu’s new naval strategy effectively prepared China for Xi’s BRI in the 2010s-2020s. Since Xi Jinping became China’s commander-in-chief in 2012, he has emphasized Liu Huaqing’s sea power doctrine and expanded China’s maritime policy beyond that of Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao. Liu’s strong naval strategy became part of Xi’s grand strategy. Xi believes that the current trade system in the Asia-Pacific region under US leadership limits China’s maritime interests. He focused on naval development and directed the PLAN to build a battle fleet capable of winning naval battles in the near and far seas.
In 2020, the global shipbuilding industry estimated that China’s shipbuilding capacity was the largest, accounting for approximately 45% of global capacity. As of 2020, the PLAN had 240,000 naval officers and sailors with an overall combat force of 350 surface ships and submarines. – The United States Navy had 293 warships at that time. Among the most high-profile developments is China’s growing fleet of aircraft carriers. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, Liu Huaqing’s dreams of a Chinese aircraft carrier and deep-sea navy came true.
Assess how China’s Blue Water Navy and the PLAN’s new strategy might function in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea maritime conflict despite the PLAN’s lack of contemporary warfare experience.
Considering that the United States is in decline, Xi has changed China’s strategic role from supporting the United States in the Asia-Pacific region to challenging the United States in the region. It has repositioned China as the regional epicenter of the Asia-Pacific, despite unprecedented demands and new challenges.
Taiwan has become the most dangerous flashpoint in the growing rivalry between the United States and China. Chinese attacks on Taiwan, aimed at protecting Beijing’s so-called “core interests”, are part of Chinese strategy. Beijing views an attack on Taiwan as a near-sea operation. The PLAN’s new strategy rejects the question of timing and justifies war efforts as defensive in nature, even though Chinese warships may have to open fire first. The new strategy and transformations require the PLAN to build a combat fleet capable of winning naval battles in an offensive amphibious landing campaign against Taiwan. During the 2020s, Beijing has strengthened its multi-agent naval services, including the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the Chinese Maritime Militia. The PLAN has coordinated closely with its sister services for similar strategic objectives.
Xi Jinping has shifted China’s strategic posture in the South China Sea and the Pacific with an emphasis on far-sea operations. For protection and attacks in distant seas, the PLAN could use anti-aircraft weapons, shipboard A2/AD systems, anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), and nuclear submarines.
In line with the strategic requirements of mobile operations and multidimensional offense and defense, the PLAN has shifted its focus to transoceanic mobility. In the 2020s, China operates 90 maritime facilities, 13 of which are owned by these Chinese states. Ten of them are suitable for a naval base, after the PLA established its first naval facility in Djibouti in 2017.
The period 2025-2049 is the most important period for China’s rejuvenation, as well as when the PLAN will reach the milestone of being a world-class navy.