When EU leaders gathered In Brussels on June 18-19, their agenda was loaded with the bloc’s long-term budget, regional conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and global trade frictions. Even if China was not explicitly named during the last European Council conclusionsleaders’ discussions of “global macroeconomic imbalances” likely referred to the bloc’s strained economic ties with Beijing.
The summit resulted in an ambivalent mandate. EU leaders called on European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to maintain dialogue with the main economic partners, while exhorting an assessment of the EU trade defense toolbox to design new regulatory instruments.
This leaves China-EU relations suspended in a familiar state of friction. Brussels’ bifurcated policy toward Beijing, which simultaneously pursues diplomatic engagement while cracking down on specific aspects of the economic relationship, is set to continue. Above all, the summit offered no indication of a broader, unifying strategic framework that would make this dual-track policy predictable. This lack of a coherent EU approach, compounded by member states’ political oscillations, structurally limits what Brussels can achieve with Beijing, as it erodes the strategic trust needed to reach meaningful compromises.
Relations between China and the EU have been strained for years, weighed down by a series of evolving regulatory measures that restrict business activities on both sides. These frictions are complex and span multiple regulatory and commercial areas.
For example, both sides have conducted trade investigations and imposed tariffs on each other’s products. In October 2024, the EU imposed definitive countervailing duties ranging from 17 percent to 35.3 percent on battery electric vehicles (BEVs) made in China to counter what Brussels considers an “unfair subsidy”. Although BEVs make headlines, they represent only one facet of a broader regulatory campaign; the EU maintains a rate of 79 percent price on Chinese ceramics and is investigate tire imports.
On the other side of the equation, Beijing has launched targeted anti-dumping investigations and taxes on European products. European pork, milkmanAnd Brandy are all subject to import duties in China, ranging from 4.9 percent to 34.9 percent, depending on the specific products.
Additionally, both parties have also implemented or plan to implement regulatory restrictions that go beyond targeting a specific product group and apply to entire industries and supply chains. The EU proposal Industrial Accelerator Act aims to protect European strategic sectors, while the next revision of the Cybersecurity Act aims to exclude “high-risk” providers from EU telecommunications networks. Although this decision is on paper independent of the country, it threat Chinese tech giants like Huawei.
Beijing has its own defense legislation. THE Industrial and supply chain security provisions allow China to penalize foreign companies that discriminate against Chinese supply chains, while the Provisions to combat illegal foreign extraterritorial jurisdiction empower the Department of Justice to prevent domestic entities from complying with foreign investigations. This last tool was recently used to end cooperation with the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) investigation into security technology company Nuctech.
Additionally, both sides have also implemented export control regulations, in addition to trade investigations and industry-wide laws. The EU continues to to squeeze export controls on dual-use goods to prevent European technology from potentially reaching the Russian military economy via Chinese intermediaries. Conversely, Chinese restrictions on the export of rare earths and permanent magnets pressure on Europe’s industrial competitiveness and the green transition.
This list of frictions is not exhaustive, as both sides have also disagreements in other areas, such as the public supply medical devices. Nevertheless, even amid these growing pressures in Sino-EU relations, diplomatic channels have not closed. A European Parliament delegation led by Engin Eroglu visit China at the end of May and Chinese Vice Minister of Commerce Ling Ji encounter with Ditte Juul Jorgensen of the European Commission on June 9 to discuss a new consultation mechanism on trade and investment.
The June European Council took place amid media headlines that Europe debate on China was at a “boiling point“, and that the leaders were moving in the direction of a “harder line towards» Beijing.
The actual result, however, was much more muted. Rather than choosing a definitive path, the Council chose to institutionalize its ambivalence. He presented the Commission with a mandate design new commercial defense tools, apparently focused on diversificationwhile explicitly asking him to continue dialogue with the EU’s main trading partners. Therefore, the trade uncertainty that characterizes China-EU relations is likely to persist.
The structural weakness of the EU’s approach lies not only in the Commission’s dual policies, but also in the geopolitical incoherence of its member states. Germany, whose economic weight naturally determines the direction of EU policy, remains stuck between preserving its close trade relations and links with Beijing and maintain unity with its European partners. As a result, Berlin continues to oscillate between moderate approach and approving a stronger defense posture.
Similarly, Spain has demonstrated a shift in priorities, recently moving from its initial support to a French-led policy. paper demand a tougher line towards China distancing himself of the initiative. These changing national positions limit the EU’s capacity for collective action.
Long-term stability in China-EU relations cannot be built on defensive toolkits, political buzzwords or reactive tariffs. This requires a coherent, consistent and united policy.
Brussels’ fragmented approach to China, shaped by its reduce risks This strategy, the proclaimed commitment to dialogue and the divergent actions of member states, make it difficult for Beijing to distinguish the signal from the noise. As long as China receives mixed messages from a fractured bloc, it has little incentive to make concessions on crucial issues like rare earth export permits or market access barriers.
A predictable and unified European policy provides a viable basis for the strategic trust needed to advance relations beyond this volatile inflection point. Only when Brussels establishes clear and consistent borders will Beijing be able to assess Europe’s long-term strategic trajectory, creating the stable environment needed for the two powers to negotiate a coveted economic compromise.