Since 2023, Australia has committed to updating its defense strategy documents every two years to assess changes in the strategic environment and adjust its strategic thinking accordingly. On April 16, 2026, Australia released the National Defense Strategy (NDS) for 2026 and the Integrated Investment Program (IIP) for 2026. In this year’s defense strategy, Australia placed particular emphasis on the threat posed by China.
Australia’s NDS explicitly identifies China’s national power and military capabilities as the main factors shaping the Indo-Pacific region. It also highlights the risks posed by the activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) in international waters, including the South China Sea and the East China Sea.
Compared to the 2024 strategy, the 2026 NDS uses clearer language on China. Not only does it directly mention the regional impact of the PLA and GCC, but also omits the 2024 assessment that Sino-US communication could help manage disputes.
Experience has shown that when policy documents issued by foreign governments address China’s impact, Beijing often responds forcefully by accusing Western countries of clinging to the so-called “China threat” narrative. For example, in response to Australia’s 2024 NDS, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged Australia to “abandon its Cold War mentality” and stop making China a problem at every turn. Chinese Ministry of Defense He also criticized Australia for touting the “China threat” as a pretext to expand its own military capabilities. Even though the 2024 NDS only highlighted the impact of Sino-American competition on the strategic environment, Beijing still issued a firm response.
However, despite Australia’s more direct references this year to the impact of the PLA and CCG, as well as its more pessimistic assessment of the future strategic environment, no Chinese government agency has issued a response to Australia’s NDS. China’s muted response to Australia appears to stand in stark contrast to its past wolf-warrior diplomacy, which emphasized a willingness to “dare to fight.”
This raises a question: what drove the change in Beijing’s response to Australia’s defense policy?
China sees opportunity to influence Australia
Looking at the current state of Australia-China relations, both countries are restoring diplomatic and economic ties even as military frictions continue to escalate. Since Anthony Albanese became Australian prime minister in 2022, Canberra has sought to repair strained relations with Beijing that developed under the Morrison government. At the same time, Albanese also strengthened Australia’s defense cooperation with the United States in response to China’s growing military threat in the Indo-Pacific.
Maintaining a balanced approach between the two great powers is consistent with Australia’s national interests. However, since Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency, the Australia-US defense relationship has come under pressure.
Like other countries with close security ties to the United States, Australia has faced demands and political pressure from the Trump administration as Washington calls on its allies to take greater defense responsibilities. At the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth urged Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles. increase Australia’s defense spending at 3.5 percent of GDP. In June, the United States also launched a magazine of the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine program. These pressure tactics prompted Australia to demonstrate its commitment to defense by increasing its military spending and supporting US shipbuilding efforts. However, they also undermined Australia’s confidence in cooperation with the United States under the Trump administration.
This erosion of trust has had its most direct impact on the Australian public’s perception of the United States. Since Trump returned to power, the share of Australians who trust the United States has fallen sharply from 56 percent to 36 percentreflecting a deep distrust of the United States under the Trump administration. At the same time, Australian views of China have become more and more balanced. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the proportion of Australians who view China as a security threat has gradually declined, while the proportion who view China as an economic partner has increased. For the first time since 2019, these two views intersect, suggesting a growing ambiguity in how Australians view China.
Amid declining trust in the United States and growing ambiguity in Australia’s perception of China, Canberra continues to align closely with US policy while also seeking closer ties with Beijing to diversify risks. This created an opportunity for China to expand its influence over Australia by using diplomatic, military and economic means to encourage Canberra to adopt policies more favorable to Beijing.
Speak softly and wield a big stick
This may reasonably explain why Beijing has not publicly criticized Australia’s national defense strategy this year. Now that China has re-established bilateral relations with Australia, it no longer needs to respond more forcefully to the defense strategy document that Canberra regularly releases. Not only would this risk escalating tensions between China and Australia, but repeated, high-intensity criticism of Australia’s defense policy could also diminish Beijing’s influence, undermining its strategy of shaping Australian policy through bilateral engagement.
Establishing friendly relations with Australia helps safeguard China’s core interests, particularly on issues such as Taiwan and Hong Kong, which Beijing regards as matters of its internal affairs. China’s economic and trade ties with Australia have long served as a powerful tool in determining which issues Canberra raises with Beijing, reducing Australia’s willingness to proactively press China over its sovereignty and human rights concerns.
However, this does not mean that China has stopped responding to Australian defense policy. In recent years, Beijing has instead expressed its position through diplomatic criticism of AUKUS and increasingly assertive military actions. In its external messaging, instead of directly targeting Australia on defense issues and risking further confrontation, Critics of China The AUKUS deal appears intended more to raise awareness in Canberra that participation in the deal could increase tensions with Beijing, thereby increasing Australia’s willingness to withdraw from multilateral defense cooperation with the United States.
To reinforce fears that AUKUS could draw Australia into conflict with China, the Chinese military has become a tool to shape this possibility. In recent years, in response to Australia-US AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation and participation in multinational exercises in the South China Sea, the PLA has tended to assert China’s sovereignty through military actions directed against Australian forces, including close approaches by PLA planes and setting off flares. At the same time, the unexpected intervention of the PLA Navy exercises in the Tasman Sea in 2025, as well as its circumnavigation of the Australian continent, also served as a warning that China possesses power projection capabilities. It was a signal that Australia should not cooperate with the United States to counter China.
Conclusion
As relations between Australia and China have mended, Beijing’s approach to influencing Australian defense policy has shifted from directly criticizing Australia’s defense policy to targeting Australia’s multilateral defense cooperation. Amid emerging tensions in Australia-US defense relations, China appears more inclined to use diplomatic means to determine Canberra’s willingness to cooperate with Washington, while resorting to assertive military actions to highlight the possibility that AUKUS could draw Australia into conflict with China. China’s decision not to respond to Australia’s NDS this year is therefore consistent with its current strategy towards Australia.
The pressure imposed by Trump on Australia will inevitably encourage the Albanian government, which is actively seeking to repair ties with China, to deepen its relationship with Beijing in order to maintain balance. But at the same time, Australia also faces active efforts by China to influence its policy of cooperation with the United States. Under the dual influence of Washington and Beijing, Australia’s ability to balance its security and economic relations will depend even more on the care with which it calibrates its China policy.