Donald Trump’s return to the White House led to a series of dramatic changes in American foreign policy, disorienting his allies, in particular the European Union (EU). Recent key developments, such as the full alignment of the United States with the government of Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel and, more particularly, bilateral negotiations with Russia concerning the war in Ukraine, have generated unprecedented tensions between the EU member states and the new American administration. The cooling that results from the relations between the two sides of the Atlantic can produce large-scale effects, in particular in the Indo-Pacific region, where American and European strategies can diverge more and more. This disalemination can be motivated by three main factors: political differences, security change and defense priorities and divergent economic needs.
Less than two months after the inauguration of Trump, a partial ideological decoupling between the United States and the EU began to emerge, constituting a direct threat to the future of joint transatlantic action on the world scene, including in the Indo-Pacific. Declarations and positions taken by important personalities from the new republican administration – such as Elon Musk’s support for the far -right alternative Für Deutschland (AFD) in Germany or the disturbing discourse of vice -president JD Vance during the Munich security conference – underline the growing divider. These developments highlight the rise of two distinct conceptions of democracy between the United States and the EU, which influence their definition of long-term objectives and the identification of threats.
According to the strategy published in 2021, European external action in Indo-Pacific should be guided by the principles of promoting democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights, as well as the implementation of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Climate Change Agreement. None of these principles, however, appears on the list of priorities of American foreign policy and, therefore, it is unlikely that Washington and Brussels maintain a shared political account on key Indo-Pacific questions, such as disputes of Taiwan and the Sea of Southern China.
In addition, without a mutual understanding of international law and the role of its main actors, including the UN, it is unlikely that the EU and the United States continue to implement their respective strategies to support the partners aligned on the Euro-Atlantic block in a coordinated manner. The absence of a common transatlantic vision for the future risks of Europe creating a deep friction between the United States and the main member states such as France and Germany. This divergence could lead European actors to distance themselves, rather than align with American foreign policy as has often been the case in the past. Consequently, the approach of Europe to the Indo-Pacific Region can become more autonomous, while individual member states are likely to focus more on bilateral relations.
In parallel, the lack of political alignment between the EU and the United States over the war in Ukraine pushes the Member States to accelerate the rearmament, as evidenced by the launch of the Rearm Europe plan by the president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, while encouraging them to reorganize institutionally to respond to growing threats in the European district. With an increasing accent on the securing of the eastern flank against Russian belligerent and the prospect of American disengagement from Europe, Indo-Pacific is likely to reduce the list of political and security priorities for Europe. This change would reverse the tendency of the growing presence of the EU and the growing participation of the Member States in the region.
Maritime security in Indo-Pacific, in particular, could become one of the first victims of these changes, Europe potentially highlighting the economic aspects of its regional commitment instead of a broader strategic approach. This would mark a return to the past, when Indo-Pacific was mainly considered as an area of great economic opportunities rather than a critical strategic importance. In this context, national strategies for Indo-Pacific, often influenced by dialogue with Washington, could be sidelined or even revised in the long term, especially if Trump’s foreign policy turns out to be more than a simple phase of passage.
To assess the implications of Trump’s foreign policy on EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, it is essential to consider what is happening between the United States and the Baltic States. The latter, in line with the United States, incorporated Indo-Pacific Affairs into their national strategic discourse, which traditionally focused on the Russian threat. Lithuania, a country that has developed a regional perspective, has experienced an increasing affirmation of China and the dangerous Sino-Russian partnership “without limits”. The election of Kaja Kallas of Estonia as a high representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and the security policy seemed to signal a complete alignment in foreign policy between the United States and the EU, both in Europe where they faced the common Russian opponent and in Asia where they sought to balance the swarming of China.
However, the Trump administration has revolutionized this dynamic and, at least for the moment, marginalized the Baltic States in the discourse on the future of the EU. Kallas, after being excluded from negotiations on Ukraine, was denied a meeting with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, officially due to planning problems. In this context, it is difficult to imagine how the high representative of the EU, which had explicitly stated its intention to strengthen the EU-US dialogue on Indo-Pacific, will be able to establish a framework for transatlantic cooperation in the region. Even the Polish presidency of the EU Council, which set one of its objectives, the deepening of the transatlantic dialogue on Indo-Pacific, is now confronted with an unexpected scenario which obliges it to rethink its regional approach at a time when the national strategic community on Indo-Pacific was higher than ever.
The ideological and strategic rockets between Brussels and Washington could therefore encourage a return to a purely economic approach by Europeans towards Indo-Pacific. The main consequence of this would be the efforts of the EU and certain Member States to rekindle relations with China, after years of increasing tensions motivated by the growing political, economic and commercial partnership. Indeed, a fight against the EU with the double economic challenges of the increase in defense spending and the management of the threat of American prices is likely to slow the implementation of its strategy of deactivation of China.
Ironically, this change can occur just when the EU seemed ready to redefine its regional strategy, in particular thanks to the rebirth of its strategic partnership with India, aimed at approaching, at least in the long term, the very question of significant economic and commercial dependence on China. Currently, despite the differences in relevant perspective between Europeans and the Americans on most international issues, there is a notable consensus concerning the desire to build positive relations with New Delhi. However, the fate of open issues and critical projects, such as the EU-Indre free trade agreement and the East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) of India, will also be influenced by the trajectory of American protectionist and neo-commercial policies.
Essentially, Trump’s impact on European strategy in Indo-Pacific can lead to slowing down and reshaping the regional EU’s external action in the short term. In the long term, in particular if transatlantic relations continue to deteriorate, divergences of approach and vision between the United States and the EU concerning Indo-Pacific could deepened considerably, with large-scale implications for regional sales.